標題: Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; 2nd International IC Rahul Jain,Rajgopal Kannan Conference proceedings 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, [打印本頁] 作者: affront 時間: 2025-3-21 17:28
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 拋射物 時間: 2025-3-21 21:14
Heinz Ben?lken,Nils Br?hl,Andrea Blütchenyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for the socially efficient and the revenue-maximizing mechanism. In both cases, we provide an estimate of the loss resulting from the usage of a finite .-clas作者: insular 時間: 2025-3-22 01:05 作者: Atmosphere 時間: 2025-3-22 05:07 作者: 是他笨 時間: 2025-3-22 10:25
Ein chinesisch-japanisches Ratspiel,ts of view. In order to improve its performance, research has been carried on how to increase the number of simultaneous transmissions in the network while avoiding signal interference among radios. Considering WMNs based upon IEEE 802.11 b/g standards, lately most of researchers have been relying o作者: GULP 時間: 2025-3-22 15:09 作者: GULP 時間: 2025-3-22 17:11 作者: ASSET 時間: 2025-3-22 21:40 作者: averse 時間: 2025-3-23 03:40 作者: 闡釋 時間: 2025-3-23 06:29 作者: ANTI 時間: 2025-3-23 09:45
,Rechtliche Fragen und ?ffentlichkeit,ious structural changes in the Internet. The status that the Internet access has in Europe as a universal service evolves as the level of quality of service (QoS) to be offered improves. If guarantees on QoS are to be imposed, as requested by several economic actors, it would require introducing new作者: 胰臟 時間: 2025-3-23 17:07 作者: Cervical-Spine 時間: 2025-3-23 19:08 作者: 聯(lián)想記憶 時間: 2025-3-24 00:29
Raymund M. Spang,Gerhard von Zezschwitzll level of trading. Multi-portfolio optimization is a technique for combing multiple accounts at the same time, considering their joint effects while adhering to account-specific constraints. In this paper, we model multi-portfolio optimization as a game problem and adopt as a desirable objective t作者: 有機體 時間: 2025-3-24 05:47 作者: seruting 時間: 2025-3-24 08:26
,Analytische L?sungen mit Beispielen,ed resource. We investigate the equilibrium of such systems and show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. In the second part, we study a stochastic congestion games where there is only one shared resource and the traffic is indivisible. The information structure that we consider is such that作者: 易發(fā)怒 時間: 2025-3-24 12:23
,Geologische Oberfl?chenerkundung,tion schemes under imperfect monitoring. We examine a model of slotted multiaccess communication to illustrate our framework. In this model, an intervention device monitors the behavior of agents for a period called the test phase and takes an intervention action which affects agents for the remaini作者: Gentry 時間: 2025-3-24 17:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78709-6munication infrastructure) a spanning tree of the graph, and an attacker is trying to disrupt the communication tree by attacking one link of the network. Attacking a link has a certain cost for the attacker who also has the option of not attacking. We model the interaction between the network manag作者: Rinne-Test 時間: 2025-3-24 19:10 作者: 廣大 時間: 2025-3-25 00:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-3806-0ed on an observed sequence of attacks on file- or mail-servers. The spammer’s goal is attacking the mail-server, while the spy’s goal is attacking the file-server as much as possible before detection. The defender observes for a length of time that trades-off the potential damage inflicted during th作者: Redundant 時間: 2025-3-25 06:49
978-3-642-30372-2ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2012作者: Afflict 時間: 2025-3-25 11:20
Game Theory for Networks978-3-642-30373-9Series ISSN 1867-8211 Series E-ISSN 1867-822X 作者: BOLUS 時間: 2025-3-25 15:27 作者: MORT 時間: 2025-3-25 16:25
Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering380506.jpg作者: 懸崖 時間: 2025-3-25 20:16 作者: 戰(zhàn)勝 時間: 2025-3-26 00:33
Game Based Self-Organizing Scheme for Femtocell Networksnk achievable rate of the femtocell users and to guarantee the performance of the macrocell users by limiting the co-channel interference from the femtocells. The proposed scheme is based on a potential game which guarantees a convergence property, and we enhance the scheme with a Tabu search, which作者: 外向者 時間: 2025-3-26 04:21
Additively Coupled Sum Constrained Gamesxists and the best-response algorithm converges globally and linearly to the Nash equilibrium. In settings where users can exchange messages in real-time, we focus on user choices that optimize the overall utility. We provide the convergence conditions of two distributed action update mechanisms, gr作者: 團結(jié) 時間: 2025-3-26 12:30
Technology Choices and Pricing Policies in Wireless Networkse access (CSMA) and outcomes obtained under time-division multiple access (TDMA). Simulation results demonstrate that differences in MAC technology can have a significant effect on social welfare, on provider profit, and even on the (financial) feasibility of a wireless network.作者: hermetic 時間: 2025-3-26 14:55 作者: 光亮 時間: 2025-3-26 20:04 作者: organic-matrix 時間: 2025-3-26 22:48
Thermoelektrischer Basiseffekt,xists and the best-response algorithm converges globally and linearly to the Nash equilibrium. In settings where users can exchange messages in real-time, we focus on user choices that optimize the overall utility. We provide the convergence conditions of two distributed action update mechanisms, gr作者: heckle 時間: 2025-3-27 05:12 作者: 壓艙物 時間: 2025-3-27 05:27 作者: 絕食 時間: 2025-3-27 13:07 作者: VAN 時間: 2025-3-27 15:43 作者: 悶熱 時間: 2025-3-27 18:24
Einsatz von Methoden und Verfahren,ies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game through the expected value of the payoff difference for arbitrary neighbors and the evolutionary advantage/disadvantage of nodes due to the degree distributions within their neighborhoods. Simulation results for various networks and game parameters are also presented.作者: Feedback 時間: 2025-3-27 23:46 作者: Motilin 時間: 2025-3-28 03:54
Network Regulations and Market Entryather than one-sided pricing. From our results the superiority of one regime over the other depends on parameters of advertising rates, end-user demand, CPs’ and ISPs’ costs, and relative importance of their investments. Thus, caution should be taken in designing neutrality regulations.作者: adequate-intake 時間: 2025-3-28 06:54 作者: 爆米花 時間: 2025-3-28 13:27
Analyzing the Dynamics of Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on Structured Networksies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game through the expected value of the payoff difference for arbitrary neighbors and the evolutionary advantage/disadvantage of nodes due to the degree distributions within their neighborhoods. Simulation results for various networks and game parameters are also presented.作者: 細查 時間: 2025-3-28 16:33
1867-8211 s, stochastic and dynamic games, game-theoretic network models, cooperative games in networks, security games, spectrum sharing games, P2P and social networks and economics of network QoS.978-3-642-30372-2978-3-642-30373-9Series ISSN 1867-8211 Series E-ISSN 1867-822X 作者: 主動 時間: 2025-3-28 20:25 作者: 幼稚 時間: 2025-3-29 00:57 作者: recession 時間: 2025-3-29 04:31 作者: 琺瑯 時間: 2025-3-29 09:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-3806-0 observation window, often the spy’s best response is either full-exploitation mode or full-confusion mode. This discontinuity prevents the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in many cases. However, when the defender can condition the observation time based on the observed sequence, a Nash equilibrium often exists.作者: 女上癮 時間: 2025-3-29 14:32
Net Neutrality and Quality of Servicethe nature of the Internet from a best effort network to, perhaps, a more expensive one, that offers guaranteed performance. This paper presents an overview of the above issues as well as an overview of recent research on net-neutrality, with an emphasis on game theoretical approaches.作者: Canvas 時間: 2025-3-29 17:49 作者: delusion 時間: 2025-3-29 21:35
A Network Security Classification Game observation window, often the spy’s best response is either full-exploitation mode or full-confusion mode. This discontinuity prevents the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in many cases. However, when the defender can condition the observation time based on the observed sequence, a Nash equilibrium often exists.作者: objection 時間: 2025-3-30 00:33
1867-8211 ngs of the Second International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2011) held in Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011. The 45 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from numerous submissions and focus topics such as mechanism design, physical layer games, network mechanism作者: Tremor 時間: 2025-3-30 05:52 作者: LEVER 時間: 2025-3-30 10:47 作者: 空氣傳播 時間: 2025-3-30 14:18 作者: 一個姐姐 時間: 2025-3-30 18:29 作者: 冷漠 時間: 2025-3-31 00:08 作者: extemporaneous 時間: 2025-3-31 01:30 作者: neutrophils 時間: 2025-3-31 08:11
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56652-2ation partners to realize a Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) for secondary coexistence. We illustrate how this mechanism works when secondary users in an OFDMA access network form cooperation through BE for which the NBS is calculated based on information obtained from the database.作者: OVERT 時間: 2025-3-31 13:13 作者: Notorious 時間: 2025-3-31 16:56
,Analytische L?sungen mit Beispielen,ng another model for stochastic congestion game in which a fixed amount of divisible demand arrives each day. This demand can shipped to destination by sending some part today and remaining the next day.作者: 下級 時間: 2025-3-31 20:41 作者: 哥哥噴涌而出 時間: 2025-3-31 22:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78709-6cal subsets and all edges in the same critical subset are attacked with the same probability. For the game of zero cost of attack considered in [8], we characterize the set of all Nash equilibria. Some implications of the results are discussed and a detailed proof of the NE theorem is provided.作者: Synchronism 時間: 2025-4-1 05:00
Hierarchical Auctions for Network Resource Allocationbility and efficiency cannot be simultaneously achieved. We then consider the resource to be divisible and propose the hierarchical network second-price mechanism in which there exists an efficient Nash equilibrium with endogenous strong budget balance.作者: 有助于 時間: 2025-4-1 09:11 作者: HEDGE 時間: 2025-4-1 10:39 作者: atrophy 時間: 2025-4-1 17:20 作者: Corporeal 時間: 2025-4-1 21:15
