標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; 7th International EA Lingjie Duan,Anibal Sanjab,Rachid Elazouzi Conference proceedings 2017 ICST Institute for Co [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: BULK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:59
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 夜晚 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:22
A Multitype Hawk and Dove Gamean decide whether to act aggressively (Hawk) or peacefully (Dove). Each individual is characterized by its strength. The strength distribution among the population is assumed to be fixed and not to vary in time. If both individuals involved in an interaction are Hawks, there will be a fight, the res作者: 愛(ài)管閑事 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:19
Assortative Mixing Equilibria in Social Network Gamesof their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon? Is it that such relations are more convenient and easier to maintain? Or are there also some more tangible benefits to be gained from this collective behaviour?.The current work takes a game-theoretic perspective on this phenomenon, an作者: exceptional 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:40 作者: Incorporate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:31
On the Finite Population Evolutionary Stable Strategy Equilibrium for Perfect Information Extensive form games. In this adaptation, players reach a finite population evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium by using finite population evolutionary stable strategies which ensure that the game ends up with equal payoffs. We studied the fpESS equilibria of some famous two-player bargaining games such 作者: opalescence 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:31
Designing Cyber Insurance Policies: Mitigating Moral Hazard Through Security Pre-Screeningity. However, in the absence of regulated insurance markets or compulsory insurance, the introduction of insurance deteriorates network security. This is because by transferring part of their risk to the insurer, the insured agents can decrease their levels of effort. In this paper, we consider the 作者: opalescence 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:17
A Game-Theoretic Model for Analysis and Design of Self-organization Mechanisms in IoTti-interface nodes are modeled as self-interested agents who individually decide on establishment and severance of links to other agents. Through analysis of the static game, we formally confirm the emergence of realistic topologies from our model, and analytically establish the criteria that lead t作者: Ardent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:15 作者: Demulcent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:17
Rules for Computing Resistance of Transitions of Learning Algorithms in Gamesal games, the SSSs of the log-linear learning algorithm are the minimizers of the potential function. The SSSs can be characterized using the resistance trees of a Perturbed Markov Chain (PMC), they are the roots of minimum resistance tree. Therefore, computing the resistance of trees in PMC is impo作者: dictator 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:36
Optimal Control of Multi-strain Epidemic Processes in Complex Networksress. Despite the rapid development of vaccines and drugs, one challenge in disease control is the fact that one pathogen sometimes generates many strains with different spreading features. Hence it is of critical importance to investigate multi-strain epidemic dynamics and its associated epidemic c作者: 無(wú)能力 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:28 作者: 有其法作用 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:51
Energy Trading Game for Microgrids Using Reinforcement Learningnce their operational performance and reduce their dependence on power plants. In this paper, we investigate the energy trading game in smart grids, in which each MG chooses its energy trading strategy with its connected MGs and power plants according to the energy generation model, the current batt作者: 朦朧 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:19 作者: 令人不快 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:19 作者: capillaries 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:44
Paradoxes in a Multi-criteria Routing Gameweighted sum of a delay cost and a cost for losses. We compute the equilibrium and optimal solution (which are unique). We discover here in addition to the classical Kameda type paradox another paradoxical behavior in which higher loss rates have a positive impact on delay and therefore higher quali作者: Enrage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:49 作者: 使痛苦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-5156-5preted as the sum of degrees of the group members in the network, then the only strategy achieving Nash equilibrium is a perfect homophily, which implies that cooperation with other groups is harmful to this utility function. A second, and perhaps more surprising, result is that if a reward for inte作者: 冷漠 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:34
,Die Philosophie des Alternativen Führens, effort reduction resulting from risk transfer, thus improving the state of network security over the no-insurance scenario. In other words, the availability of pre-screening signals benefits both the insurer, as well as the state of network security, without the need to regulate the market or compu作者: Pudendal-Nerve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:58 作者: Musculoskeletal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17351-6n model and the renewable generation of other MGs in the trading market. We apply the estimated renewable energy generation model of the MG and design a hotbooting technique to exploit the energy trading experiences in similar scenarios to initialize the quality values in the learning process to acc作者: 不如樂(lè)死去 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:47 作者: 編輯才信任 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:42
Nash Equilibrium Seeking with Non-doubly Stochastic Communication Weight Matrixgraph such that the players are able to update all the estimates of the players who interfere with their cost functions. It is shown that the communication digraph needs to be a superset of a transitive reduction of the interference digraph. Finally, we verify the efficacy of the algorithm via a sim作者: FORGO 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:05 作者: AWE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:47 作者: 豐滿有漂亮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:06 作者: HOWL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:35 作者: investigate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42292-9ti-interface nodes are modeled as self-interested agents who individually decide on establishment and severance of links to other agents. Through analysis of the static game, we formally confirm the emergence of realistic topologies from our model, and analytically establish the criteria that lead to stable multi-hop network structures.作者: 感激小女 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:46
A Game-Theoretic Model for Analysis and Design of Self-organization Mechanisms in IoTti-interface nodes are modeled as self-interested agents who individually decide on establishment and severance of links to other agents. Through analysis of the static game, we formally confirm the emergence of realistic topologies from our model, and analytically establish the criteria that lead to stable multi-hop network structures.作者: 史前 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:25 作者: AVOW 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:49
1867-8211 noxville, Tennessee, USA, in May 2017..The 10 conference papers and 5 invited papers presented cover topics such as smart electric grid, Internet of Things (IoT), social networks, networks security, mobile service markets, and epidemic control..978-3-319-67539-8978-3-319-67540-4Series ISSN 1867-8211 Series E-ISSN 1867-822X 作者: Synovial-Fluid 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:13
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4agents; artificial intelligence; game theory; incentive mechanism; information dissemination; internet; le作者: stress-response 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:40
978-3-319-67539-8ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2017作者: 裝飾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:35
Game Theory for Networks978-3-319-67540-4Series ISSN 1867-8211 Series E-ISSN 1867-822X 作者: evasive 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:39 作者: ELUDE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:21 作者: 流逝 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:53 作者: theta-waves 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:55 作者: outskirts 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:24 作者: cliche 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:04
,Die Philosophie des Alternativen Führens,ity. However, in the absence of regulated insurance markets or compulsory insurance, the introduction of insurance deteriorates network security. This is because by transferring part of their risk to the insurer, the insured agents can decrease their levels of effort. In this paper, we consider the 作者: 英寸 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42292-9ti-interface nodes are modeled as self-interested agents who individually decide on establishment and severance of links to other agents. Through analysis of the static game, we formally confirm the emergence of realistic topologies from our model, and analytically establish the criteria that lead t作者: Outwit 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:28 作者: 投票 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:10
Menucha Birenbaum,Filip J. R. C. Dochyal games, the SSSs of the log-linear learning algorithm are the minimizers of the potential function. The SSSs can be characterized using the resistance trees of a Perturbed Markov Chain (PMC), they are the roots of minimum resistance tree. Therefore, computing the resistance of trees in PMC is impo作者: constellation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:25
Local Power Structure in an Indian State,ress. Despite the rapid development of vaccines and drugs, one challenge in disease control is the fact that one pathogen sometimes generates many strains with different spreading features. Hence it is of critical importance to investigate multi-strain epidemic dynamics and its associated epidemic c作者: 營(yíng)養(yǎng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:27
Swagata Nag,Nutan Singh,Suman Kumariastem including communication infrastructure. The concentration of wide area synchronized measurements within large system is challenging. In this paper, we investigate the data aggregation issue of phasor measurement units (PMU) data stream in the synchrophasor network, where large latencies lead to作者: 膽汁 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17351-6nce their operational performance and reduce their dependence on power plants. In this paper, we investigate the energy trading game in smart grids, in which each MG chooses its energy trading strategy with its connected MGs and power plants according to the energy generation model, the current batt作者: addition 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:03 作者: 橢圓 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:10
Matthias Sch?ller,Paul W. Flinnnformation sharing are two prominent mechanisms to defend cybersecurity issues proactively. However, standardization and realization of these choices have many bottlenecks. In this paper, we discuss the benefits and importance of cybersecurity information sharing and cyber-insurance in the current c作者: meritorious 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6945-5weighted sum of a delay cost and a cost for losses. We compute the equilibrium and optimal solution (which are unique). We discover here in addition to the classical Kameda type paradox another paradoxical behavior in which higher loss rates have a positive impact on delay and therefore higher quali作者: 摻和 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:20
Nash Equilibrium and Stability in Network Selection Gameslient connects to exactly one Base Station..We formulate a non-cooperative game and study its convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium, if it exists, or prove non-existence otherwise, and present algorithms to discover pure Nash equilibrium for multiple cases.作者: ASTER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:30 作者: Autobiography 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:40 作者: 返老還童 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:36
Conference proceedings 2017Tennessee, USA, in May 2017..The 10 conference papers and 5 invited papers presented cover topics such as smart electric grid, Internet of Things (IoT), social networks, networks security, mobile service markets, and epidemic control..作者: GREG 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 19:31 作者: Pulmonary-Veins 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:40 作者: cauda-equina 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 00:57 作者: 爆炸 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:11 作者: Brochure 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:17
