標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; Third International Vikram Krishnamurthy,Qing Zhao,Yonggang Wen Conference proceedings 2012 ICST Institute for C [打印本頁] 作者: Destruct 時間: 2025-3-21 18:53
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: minaret 時間: 2025-3-21 20:43 作者: MUTED 時間: 2025-3-22 02:42
The Attractiveness of Alternative Medicine,ution. In the first case we fully characterize the nature of the optimal contract design. In the second case, we find the optimal contract design when there are two possible types and determine a design procedure and show that it is optimal when the nature of the stochastic channel is common to all possible types.作者: 敵意 時間: 2025-3-22 05:56 作者: 異教徒 時間: 2025-3-22 12:21 作者: BOON 時間: 2025-3-22 14:32
Optimal Contract Design for an Efficient Secondary Spectrum Market,ution. In the first case we fully characterize the nature of the optimal contract design. In the second case, we find the optimal contract design when there are two possible types and determine a design procedure and show that it is optimal when the nature of the stochastic channel is common to all possible types.作者: BOON 時間: 2025-3-22 18:00 作者: preservative 時間: 2025-3-22 22:44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07862-1ted which generates trajectories of empirical frequency of joint plays that converge almost surely to the set of correlated .-equilibria. Thus, sophisticated rational global behavior is achieved by individual player’s simple local behavior.作者: muster 時間: 2025-3-23 03:55
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05679-0minor players using local information. Under a solvability assumption of the consistent mean field approximation, the obtained decentralized strategies are stationary and have an .-Nash equilibrium property.作者: 我正派 時間: 2025-3-23 07:05 作者: happiness 時間: 2025-3-23 10:43 作者: 較早 時間: 2025-3-23 17:51 作者: 代替 時間: 2025-3-23 19:17
Efficiency Loss in a Cournot Oligopoly with Convex Market Demand,ficiency of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand function. Our results provide nontrivial quantitative bounds on the loss of social welfare and aggregate profit for several convex inverse demand functions that appear in the economics literature.作者: 遺忘 時間: 2025-3-24 01:32
A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks,, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of . inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.作者: foreign 時間: 2025-3-24 03:22
Stochastic Loss Aversion for Random Medium Access,odeling the game. We observe that when player’s modulate with their throughput, a more efficient exploration of play-space (by Gibbs sampling) results, and so finding a Pareto equilibrium is more likely over a given interval of time.作者: 高度表 時間: 2025-3-24 09:04
Conference proceedings 2012th 7 invited papers. The papers focus on topics such as mechanism design, physical layer games, network mechanisms, stochastic and dynamic games, game-theoretic network models, cooperative games in networks, security games, spectrum sharing games, P2P and social networks and economics of network QoS.作者: 動物 時間: 2025-3-24 12:15
,Buddhist Tendencies in Hardy’s Poetry,brium in polynomial time via lazy best response updates. When the collection of sets of resources available to each player is a matroid, we show that pure Nash equilibria may not exist in the most general case. However, if the resources are homogenous, the game can converge to a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.作者: 內(nèi)向者 時間: 2025-3-24 17:30 作者: Flustered 時間: 2025-3-24 20:31 作者: Graduated 時間: 2025-3-25 03:14 作者: 中古 時間: 2025-3-25 06:58
Establishing Network Reputation via Mechanism Design,a centralized ., who then computes a . for each network. We use a simple mechanism to demonstrate that not only a network has the incentive to provide information about itself (even though it is in general not true), but also that this information can help decrease the estimation error.作者: 匍匐 時間: 2025-3-25 11:01
Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks,uilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the . of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.作者: Frequency-Range 時間: 2025-3-25 13:28
1867-8211 ngs of the Third International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2012) held in Vancouver, Canada, May 24-26, 2012. The 13 revised full papers were carefully selected from 24 submissions and are presented together with 7 invited papers. The papers focus on topics such as mechanism desi作者: Astigmatism 時間: 2025-3-25 18:44 作者: 馬賽克 時間: 2025-3-25 23:53 作者: Blanch 時間: 2025-3-26 02:50 作者: 動物 時間: 2025-3-26 08:09
Achievability of Efficient Satisfaction Equilibria in Self-Configuring Networks,neral framework. Numerical results are provided in the context of a particular uplink power control scenario, and convergence from any initial action profile to an ESE is formally proved in this scenario. This property ensures the proposed rule to be robust to the dynamic arrival or departure of rad作者: BOAST 時間: 2025-3-26 11:31
A Competitive Rate Allocation Game,not, and show that it is possible for the transmitter to set penalties so as to ensure that both receivers have a dominant strategy and the corresponding Price of Anarchy is bounded by 2. We show, moreover, that this is in a sense the best possible bound. We next consider the case when receivers hav作者: Exonerate 時間: 2025-3-26 12:58
A Game Theoretic Optimization of the Multi-channel ALOHA Protocol, we propose to limit each user’s total access probability and solve the problem under a total probability constraint. We characterize the NEPs when user rates are subject to a total transmission probability constraint. We propose a simple best-response algorithm that solves the constrained rate maxi作者: Confess 時間: 2025-3-26 19:32
Marketing Games in Social Commerce, discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model, and help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level.作者: 儀式 時間: 2025-3-26 23:32 作者: 史前 時間: 2025-3-27 03:41
Revenue Maximization in Customer-to-Customer Markets,any transaction fee charged by the market owner, there always exists a unique equilibrium in the selling decision stage. Finally, we derive the optimal transaction fee that maximizes the market owner’s revenue. We find that to maximize its revenue under certain circumstances, the market owner may ev作者: 提升 時間: 2025-3-27 07:41
Token-Based Incentive Protocol Design for Online Exchange Systems,we use this structural property to design exchange strategies that maximize the system efficiency. Among all protocols with the same threshold, we find that there is a unique optimal supply of tokens that balances the token distribution in the population and achieves the optimal efficiency. Such tok作者: FLINT 時間: 2025-3-27 10:21 作者: penance 時間: 2025-3-27 15:32 作者: cyanosis 時間: 2025-3-27 19:20
Risk and Return with Derivatives, we propose to limit each user’s total access probability and solve the problem under a total probability constraint. We characterize the NEPs when user rates are subject to a total transmission probability constraint. We propose a simple best-response algorithm that solves the constrained rate maxi作者: 放大 時間: 2025-3-28 01:29 作者: 天空 時間: 2025-3-28 03:08
,History of Taiwan’s Political Changes,e model and a constant-rate revenue model are considered. The Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for four different combined cases corresponding to the two pricing schemes and the two revenue models, and is unique for three of the cases under certain conditions. It is further shown that both pricing作者: Herd-Immunity 時間: 2025-3-28 06:49
N. S. Cherniack,E. P. Cherniackany transaction fee charged by the market owner, there always exists a unique equilibrium in the selling decision stage. Finally, we derive the optimal transaction fee that maximizes the market owner’s revenue. We find that to maximize its revenue under certain circumstances, the market owner may ev作者: 表主動 時間: 2025-3-28 13:10 作者: preservative 時間: 2025-3-28 15:10 作者: 殖民地 時間: 2025-3-28 22:03 作者: 祝賀 時間: 2025-3-29 02:01 作者: ANNUL 時間: 2025-3-29 07:02
Convergence Dynamics of Graphical Congestion Games,g when graphical congestion game dynamics converge to pure Nash equilibria yields important engineering insights into when spatially distributed individuals can reach a stable resource allocation. In this paper, we study the convergence dynamics of graphical congestion games where players can use mu作者: Forsake 時間: 2025-3-29 07:14 作者: 狂熱文化 時間: 2025-3-29 14:40
Efficiency Loss in a Cournot Oligopoly with Convex Market Demand,t a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market demand function is convex. We establish a lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand function. Our results provide nontrivial quantitative bo作者: intricacy 時間: 2025-3-29 17:59
A Game Theoretic Optimization of the Multi-channel ALOHA Protocol,-channel ALOHA protocol, each user tries to randomly access a channel using a probability vector defining the access probability to the various channels. First, we characterize the Nash Equilibrium Points (NEPs) of the network when users solve the unconstrained rate maximization. We show that in thi作者: subordinate 時間: 2025-3-29 23:43
Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks, a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary’s payoff作者: 人類學(xué)家 時間: 2025-3-30 03:03 作者: Fibrinogen 時間: 2025-3-30 06:28 作者: 喚起 時間: 2025-3-30 08:58
Marketing Games in Social Commerce,ship between key decision issues such as marketing inputs and revenue stream. As more SCs join the industry, they are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing and advertising expenditure. This type of competition may lead the industry away fro作者: aggressor 時間: 2025-3-30 14:38
Mean Field Stochastic Games with Discrete States and Mixed Players,layers have decoupled state transition laws and are coupled by the costs via the state distribution of the minor players. We introduce a stochastic difference equation to model the update of the limiting state distribution process and solve limiting Markov decision problems for the major player and 作者: 有其法作用 時間: 2025-3-30 20:29 作者: 沒花的是打擾 時間: 2025-3-30 23:38 作者: 兩棲動物 時間: 2025-3-31 03:02 作者: gregarious 時間: 2025-3-31 05:32 作者: hysterectomy 時間: 2025-3-31 11:37
Revenue Maximization in Customer-to-Customer Markets,rket requires an appropriate pricing (i.e., transaction fee charged by the market owner) scheme that can maximize the market owner’s revenue while encouraging customers to participate in the market. However, the choice of an optimal revenue-maximizing transaction fee is challenged by the large popul作者: 過分 時間: 2025-3-31 14:12 作者: Crohns-disease 時間: 2025-3-31 18:24 作者: epidermis 時間: 2025-3-31 22:12
