標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory for Networking Applications; Ju Bin Song,Husheng Li,Marceau Coupechoux Book 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 Game theo [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: FLAW 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:22
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory for Networking Applications讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 錫箔紙 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:48
Routing on a Ring Networkrom originating nodes to the center and also multihop paths via other nodes. We show that routing games with only one and two hop paths and linear costs are potential games. We give explicit expressions of Nash equilibrium flows for networks with any generic cost function and symmetric loads. We als作者: 控制 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:47
Performance of Dynamic Secure Routing Gamenitive radio networks. We derive the saddle-point equilibrium for distributed routing game that supports a novel recovery of routing path failure against unknown attackers and enhances the security and resilience of the routing protocols in face of adversarial attacks. We use network simulation usin作者: 廚房里面 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:25 作者: 難管 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:12
Matching Games for 5G Networking Paradigmscation operations from centralized to distributed operations. This chapter discusses a novel framework based on matching games that operates in a distributed manner for future wireless networks. Moreover, this chapter also builds a bridge between matching games and resource allocation for novel 5G n作者: 左右連貫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:09
Enhanced Design of Stochastic Defense System with Mixed Game Strategiesered as an opponent. The framework of this game finds the best strategy towards preparation for a disaster or system crash. This strategic choice depends on payoffs and the chance that a disaster occurs. An analogue of the fluctuation theory is applied for finding the exact moment of decision making作者: 左右連貫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:49
Optimal Impulse Control of SIR Epidemics Over Scale-Free Networksate the spreading and makes the containment and control of the malware more challenging. In this work, we propose an impulse optimal control framework for epidemics over networks. The hybrid nature of discrete-time control policy of continuous-time epidemic dynamics together with the network structu作者: obsession 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:25 作者: affect 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:12 作者: expdient 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:36
Social Coordination and Network Formation with Heterogeneous Constraintsion on action in a 2?×?2 coordination game as well as the population with whom they costly interact. Agents of two groups support different constraints of active links. We find that in the situation of low linking cost, the co-existence of payoff dominate and risk dominate absorbing sets is determin作者: ESO 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:10 作者: 解脫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:58 作者: Brocas-Area 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:31
Noncooperative Energy Charging and Discharging Game for Smart Gridy consumption profile of the building. The building controller aims to minimize the Square Euclidean Distance between the instantaneous energy demand and the average demand of the building. In a decentralized system, we design an energy cost-sharing model and apply a noncooperative approach to formu作者: 時(shí)代 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:34
Stackelberg Differential Game Based Charging Control of Electric Vehicles in Smart Grid aggregation and the electrical vehicles. We use the Stackelberg differential game to formulate the charging/discharging interactions between the aggregation and the electrical vehicles, and introduce the differential equations to reveal the dynamic behavior of the energy levels of the aggregation a作者: hysterectomy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:36 作者: Bph773 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:26 作者: 鑲嵌細(xì)工 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:44
Jochem Unger,Antonio Hurtado,Rafet Islert for a community. These analysis results provide possible explanations to the sociological observations such as “the Law of the Few” and also provide insights into how to effectively build and maintain the structure of information communities.作者: propose 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:14 作者: 一個(gè)姐姐 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:09 作者: 聯(lián)想 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:41
Types of Nodes and Centrality Measures in Networksbut with the same typology have common properties; in particular, game equilibria may be transplanted among networks of the same typology. For calculation of any of these centrality measures, the type adjacency matrix may be used instead of the adjacency matrix. A problem is: for which classes of ne作者: BRINK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:56 作者: machination 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:34 作者: 常到 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:55 作者: flimsy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:13 作者: BINGE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:48
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3467-1among Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Content Provider (CP), and End User (EU), where each player is selfish and wants to maximize its own profit. In particular, we consider multi-ISP scenarios, in which the network connectivity between the CP and the EU is jointly provided by multiple ISPs. We m作者: Aprope 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:35
Susana Galera,Pablo Acosta,Helena Soletocation operations from centralized to distributed operations. This chapter discusses a novel framework based on matching games that operates in a distributed manner for future wireless networks. Moreover, this chapter also builds a bridge between matching games and resource allocation for novel 5G n作者: 實(shí)施生效 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:01 作者: 蒼白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:53
Alternative Education as Protest,ate the spreading and makes the containment and control of the malware more challenging. In this work, we propose an impulse optimal control framework for epidemics over networks. The hybrid nature of discrete-time control policy of continuous-time epidemic dynamics together with the network structu作者: rheumatology 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:01 作者: 沐浴 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:55
Umweltrelevante Beurteilungskriterien,lives, and this demands a thorough analysis of such platforms. These live streaming applications have tremendous user bases, and learning the user behavior in such scenarios can be very insightful. Here, there is a great need to aggregate the individual preferences of the users into a single group p作者: Yourself 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9979-8ion on action in a 2?×?2 coordination game as well as the population with whom they costly interact. Agents of two groups support different constraints of active links. We find that in the situation of low linking cost, the co-existence of payoff dominate and risk dominate absorbing sets is determin作者: 內(nèi)向者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:07
Jochem Unger,Antonio Hurtado,Rafet Islerumption. In this paper, we study such structures through mathematical modelling and analysis. We formulate a generic model of a community in which each member decides how they allocate their time between content production and consumption with the objective of maximizing their individual reward. We 作者: 代理人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:36 作者: BLANK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-6451-0y consumption profile of the building. The building controller aims to minimize the Square Euclidean Distance between the instantaneous energy demand and the average demand of the building. In a decentralized system, we design an energy cost-sharing model and apply a noncooperative approach to formu作者: 溫順 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:53
Ist Fleischverzehr für Kinder vorteilhaft? aggregation and the electrical vehicles. We use the Stackelberg differential game to formulate the charging/discharging interactions between the aggregation and the electrical vehicles, and introduce the differential equations to reveal the dynamic behavior of the energy levels of the aggregation a作者: 突襲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:52
Alessandro Corsi,Silvia Novellitures. Since the decentralization of power grids raises the unreliability of power supply, it is crucial to switch to a production-oriented consumption in order to provide the stability of the grid. In this work, we describe a multi-supplier power grid model with day-ahead time span planning. We for作者: 碳水化合物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:22 作者: 柱廊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:39
Ivorian Industry at the Cross-roadsnitive radio networks. We derive the saddle-point equilibrium for distributed routing game that supports a novel recovery of routing path failure against unknown attackers and enhances the security and resilience of the routing protocols in face of adversarial attacks. We use network simulation using NS-2 to corroborate our results in the paper.作者: 不安 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:25 作者: 消極詞匯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 13:22
Farrah Dina Yusop,Amira FirdausIn this paper, cooperative network games with pairwise interactions are considered. The cooperative version of games is investigated. For a particular type of networks, a simplified formula for the Shapley value based on a constructed characteristic function is derived. The time inconsistency of the Shapley value is shown.作者: Aggressive 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:46 作者: podiatrist 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 22:09
978-3-030-06575-1Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019作者: 擁擠前 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:25
Game Theory for Networking Applications978-3-319-93058-9Series ISSN 2522-8595 Series E-ISSN 2522-8609 作者: 令人苦惱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:48
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93058-9Game theory; Game theory for networks; Game theory in communications; Game theory in wireless networks; 作者: 脆弱么 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:28 作者: congenial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3467-1odel the non-cooperative interaction between the players as a four-stage Stackelberg game, and derive the optimal behaviors of each player in equilibrium. Taking into account the transit price at intermediate ISP, we provide in-depth understanding on the sponsoring strategies of CP, and verify our results through numerical simulations.作者: Fibrin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:48
Susana Galera,Pablo Acosta,Helena Soletoetworking paradigms. Furthermore, the readers are also exposed to the potential challenges, key solution concepts, and algorithmic details of matching games for these 5G networking paradigms. Finally, this chapter also discusses the implementation details of matching games for these paradigms.作者: 世俗 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:10
Alternative Education as Protest,re poses a challenging optimal control problem. We leverage the Pontryagin’s minimum principle for impulsive systems to obtain an optimal structure of the controller and use numerical experiments to corroborate our results.作者: 幻想 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:13
Routing on a Ring Networko consider a ring network with random number of users at nodes, all of them having same demand, and linear routing costs. We give explicit characterization of Nash equilibria for two cases: (i) General i.i.d. loads and one and two hop paths, (ii) Bernoulli loads. We also analyze optimal routing in each of these cases.作者: cortisol 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:35 作者: 1分開 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 10:20
Matching Games for 5G Networking Paradigmsetworking paradigms. Furthermore, the readers are also exposed to the potential challenges, key solution concepts, and algorithmic details of matching games for these 5G networking paradigms. Finally, this chapter also discusses the implementation details of matching games for these paradigms.作者: 貧窮地活 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 12:45
Optimal Impulse Control of SIR Epidemics Over Scale-Free Networksre poses a challenging optimal control problem. We leverage the Pontryagin’s minimum principle for impulsive systems to obtain an optimal structure of the controller and use numerical experiments to corroborate our results.作者: 臭名昭著 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 19:24
Book 2019ying traditional game theory as well as intelligent game theory to the understanding and designing of modern network systems, with emphasis on both new analytical techniques and novel application scenarios. After an overview of game theory for networks, the book narrows in on game theory in communic作者: 減震 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:30
