標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory for Cyber Deception; From Theory to Appli Jeffrey Pawlick,Quanyan Zhu Book 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Game Theory [打印本頁] 作者: ARRAY 時間: 2025-3-21 18:33
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory for Cyber Deception讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 不足的東西 時間: 2025-3-21 22:49
Nash and Stackelberg Games matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games. This chapter introduces the structure of the game and the solution concept of Stackelberg equil作者: magnanimity 時間: 2025-3-22 02:53 作者: 長處 時間: 2025-3-22 08:38
Obfuscationation tracking algorithms, or evade government surveillance. These techniques raise two conflicts: one between each user and the machine learning algorithms which track the users, and one between the users themselves.作者: 可轉(zhuǎn)變 時間: 2025-3-22 08:43
Honey-X a species of crypsis (Sect.?.). But in other species of deception, the defender aims to create a specific false belief. This is called mimesis. The present chapter studies static mimesis, or, ., which takes its name from technologies related to honeypots, honeytokens, etc.作者: 600 時間: 2025-3-22 16:38
Attacker Engagementorked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies create and exploit information asymmetry for defenders. If these active defenses are also dynamic, then we have the species of deception that Chap.?. calls ..作者: 600 時間: 2025-3-22 21:01 作者: 諂媚于人 時間: 2025-3-23 00:49
Active Crowd Defensethe “physical bandwidth” of a cyber-physical system. In order to model active defense used against a PDoS attack, we develop a “Poisson signaling game,” a signaling game with an unknown number of receivers, which have varying abilities to detect deception. Equilibrium results indicate that (1) defen作者: 出汗 時間: 2025-3-23 01:50
Insights and Future Directionssons learned during its completion. These insights are situated within the current state of cybersecurity research, and more importantly, within current societal challenges. Second, we outline an ambitious range of future research which could be carried out using this book as a foundation.作者: ungainly 時間: 2025-3-23 08:52
Current Challenges in Cyber Deceptionon that are found more broadly in the existing literature. As a point of reference, we refer to the research works mentioned in Chap.?.. The literature discussed in Chap.?. points towards four major challenges in cyber deception.作者: adhesive 時間: 2025-3-23 10:00 作者: 撫育 時間: 2025-3-23 14:40 作者: 詳細(xì)目錄 時間: 2025-3-23 18:48 作者: 膽小鬼 時間: 2025-3-24 00:58 作者: ALE 時間: 2025-3-24 02:36 作者: Ebct207 時間: 2025-3-24 10:27
Albert Y. Sun,Grace Y. Sun,Laurie L. Foudin matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games. This chapter introduces the structure of the game and the solution concept of Stackelberg equil作者: Thymus 時間: 2025-3-24 14:32 作者: FUME 時間: 2025-3-24 15:29 作者: Palliation 時間: 2025-3-24 21:59 作者: MUTE 時間: 2025-3-25 00:48 作者: encyclopedia 時間: 2025-3-25 05:37
Christine Hartmann,Marcus Hillinger and dependability. Unfortunately, the dynamic and plug-n-play nature of the IoT makes reputation-based trust systems insufficient. Hence, this chapter develops a framework for predictive or strategic trust in which agents make decisions in view of the incentives of the agents with whom they are com作者: maroon 時間: 2025-3-25 09:15 作者: Detoxification 時間: 2025-3-25 14:24 作者: evanescent 時間: 2025-3-25 18:35
Rahmenbedingungen für ein Altern mit Zukunfton that are found more broadly in the existing literature. As a point of reference, we refer to the research works mentioned in Chap.?.. The literature discussed in Chap.?. points towards four major challenges in cyber deception.作者: Barrister 時間: 2025-3-25 23:16
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48670-8ess of threats to cyberspace has helped spur private and public investment in cyberdefense. Yet in the past 10 years, cyberthreats have not only continued to exist, but have also developed new forms based on the evolution of new technologies. This book can be seen as an attempt to confront that reality.作者: notice 時間: 2025-3-26 03:52
Albert Y. Sun,Grace Y. Sun,Laurie L. Foudin matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games. This chapter introduces the structure of the game and the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium.作者: 發(fā)牢騷 時間: 2025-3-26 07:12 作者: Diastole 時間: 2025-3-26 08:44
Das Ausscheidungssystem: Niere und Blase, a species of crypsis (Sect.?.). But in other species of deception, the defender aims to create a specific false belief. This is called mimesis. The present chapter studies static mimesis, or, ., which takes its name from technologies related to honeypots, honeytokens, etc.作者: MEET 時間: 2025-3-26 13:54 作者: ANIM 時間: 2025-3-26 19:32 作者: 新娘 時間: 2025-3-26 22:32 作者: CONE 時間: 2025-3-27 03:57 作者: CRATE 時間: 2025-3-27 08:56
Introductioness of threats to cyberspace has helped spur private and public investment in cyberdefense. Yet in the past 10 years, cyberthreats have not only continued to exist, but have also developed new forms based on the evolution of new technologies. This book can be seen as an attempt to confront that reality.作者: 貞潔 時間: 2025-3-27 12:50 作者: NOVA 時間: 2025-3-27 16:24 作者: cortisol 時間: 2025-3-27 18:35
Honey-X a species of crypsis (Sect.?.). But in other species of deception, the defender aims to create a specific false belief. This is called mimesis. The present chapter studies static mimesis, or, ., which takes its name from technologies related to honeypots, honeytokens, etc.作者: Facilities 時間: 2025-3-27 23:06
Attacker Engagementorked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies create and exploit information asymmetry for defenders. If these active defenses are also dynamic, then we have the species of deception that Chap.?. calls ..作者: 織物 時間: 2025-3-28 05:22
Strategic Trust and dependability. Unfortunately, the dynamic and plug-n-play nature of the IoT makes reputation-based trust systems insufficient. Hence, this chapter develops a framework for predictive or strategic trust in which agents make decisions in view of the incentives of the agents with whom they are communicating.作者: 打算 時間: 2025-3-28 09:54
Insights and Future Directionssons learned during its completion. These insights are situated within the current state of cybersecurity research, and more importantly, within current societal challenges. Second, we outline an ambitious range of future research which could be carried out using this book as a foundation.作者: Defiance 時間: 2025-3-28 11:24
Current Challenges in Cyber Deceptionon that are found more broadly in the existing literature. As a point of reference, we refer to the research works mentioned in Chap.?.. The literature discussed in Chap.?. points towards four major challenges in cyber deception.作者: 同步左右 時間: 2025-3-28 17:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04774-0In this chapter, we introduce games with incomplete information. The chapter first gives an overview of Bayesian games and then presents signaling games as an example of two-stage games of incomplete information. Signaling games will be used in several chapters within the book (Chaps.?., .-.).作者: 和平主義 時間: 2025-3-28 21:12 作者: acolyte 時間: 2025-3-28 22:56
978-3-030-66067-3Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021作者: cipher 時間: 2025-3-29 04:21 作者: Palpitation 時間: 2025-3-29 08:32 作者: Arroyo 時間: 2025-3-29 11:59 作者: fulcrum 時間: 2025-3-29 18:48
Book 2021m the past 10 years, the authors develop a taxonomy of six species of defensive cyber deception. Three of these six species are highlighted in the context of emerging problems such as privacy against ubiquitous tracking in the Internet of things (IoT), dynamic honeynets for the observation of advanc作者: APNEA 時間: 2025-3-29 21:24 作者: 完成才能戰(zhàn)勝 時間: 2025-3-30 02:26
A Taxonomy of Defensive Deception an empirical study of 25 recent articles in game theory for defensive cyber deception. The taxonomy provides a systematic foundation for understanding the three types of defensive deception that we study in Chaps.?.–..作者: demote 時間: 2025-3-30 07:11
2363-8516 fy and investigate emerging problems in cybersecurity.Includ.This book introduces game theory as a means to conceptualize, model, and analyze cyber deception. Drawing upon a collection of deception research from the past 10 years, the authors develop a taxonomy of six species of defensive cyber dece
