標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution; Anatol Rapoport Book 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1974 bargaining [打印本頁] 作者: metamorphose 時間: 2025-3-21 19:20
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書目名稱Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Carcinoma 時間: 2025-3-21 20:23 作者: CRAMP 時間: 2025-3-22 03:37
Tineke Dirks,Annelies Diesfeldt theories an important phase in the development of each has been that of experimental testing. The purpose of this paper is to report fully one of these experimental testing programmes and to outline the factors that must be considered in planning programmes of this sort.作者: 嚴重傷害 時間: 2025-3-22 05:28 作者: Myofibrils 時間: 2025-3-22 09:10
Book 1974e theory, involve (1) a set of decision makers, called players; (2) a set of strategies available to each player; (3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a result of particular choices of strategies made by the players on a given play of the game; and (4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in 作者: 宮殿般 時間: 2025-3-22 15:09
Als er noch in der Chaise fuhr...s rather than uni-dimensional quantities (such as ‘utility’); and (iii) a view of interaction processes and context as a system (Buckley, 1967) and, in particular, the thesis that evaluation, decision, and interaction processes cannot be understood apart from the social context in which they occur (Burns, 1973).作者: 宮殿般 時間: 2025-3-22 19:02 作者: 駕駛 時間: 2025-3-22 22:27 作者: dragon 時間: 2025-3-23 02:52
A Shapley Value for Cooperative Games with Quarrellinging a quarreller’s extended Shapley value from his extended Shapley value when he is removed from the set of quarrellers, we determine the value to him of cooperation with the other quarrellers. Similarly, we can find the value to any player of cooperation among the quarrellers (if it were possible).作者: Dislocation 時間: 2025-3-23 07:01 作者: 預(yù)兆好 時間: 2025-3-23 13:26 作者: 殘暴 時間: 2025-3-23 15:16
Testing Nash’s Solution of the Cooperative Gamee a Pareto-optimal outcome, the strategy choices of the two players must, in general, be coordinated. Moreover, a Pareto-optimal outcome may not be an equilibrium; so that it may be in the interest of each player to ‘move away’ from it, even though if . move away, both may suffer an impairment of payoffs.作者: 虛構(gòu)的東西 時間: 2025-3-23 18:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-7987-3has proposed such a method. As described by Luce and Raiffa ([2], pp. 148–150), Braithwaite’s normalizing transformation operates by equating the gains of the two players when each performs a certain change of strategy. In essence, Braithwaite’s arbitration scheme rests on a particular ‘symmetrization’ of the game.作者: 加強防衛(wèi) 時間: 2025-3-23 22:10
Wat is angst en wat is een angststoornis?,rt the bargaining set and kernel models as predictors of final outcomes, reveal significant effects due to the latter two independent variables but not the former, and provide useful information about the nature of the bargaining process.作者: liaison 時間: 2025-3-24 02:45 作者: OCTO 時間: 2025-3-24 08:22 作者: 逗留 時間: 2025-3-24 14:16
Test of the Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-Person Gamesrt the bargaining set and kernel models as predictors of final outcomes, reveal significant effects due to the latter two independent variables but not the former, and provide useful information about the nature of the bargaining process.作者: Inertia 時間: 2025-3-24 15:28 作者: 殘酷的地方 時間: 2025-3-24 19:05 作者: 懸掛 時間: 2025-3-25 01:49
Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-Person Gamesy depend upon group size and order of communication..Models describing the bargaining process, rather than the final outcomes only, are presented, tested, and partially supported. The relationships between the final outcomes of the present study and those of previous studies of Apex games are briefly discussed.作者: Mortar 時間: 2025-3-25 06:25 作者: 滋養(yǎng) 時間: 2025-3-25 09:08
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-5171-8 for a single trial; these data offer strong and persistent support for the models. Then, turning to the primary focus of this paper, we generate successful predictions about coalitions and payoffs in the initiation, maintenance and disruption of long-term agreements to ally.作者: 粘連 時間: 2025-3-25 11:56 作者: Gastric 時間: 2025-3-25 16:09 作者: Nonporous 時間: 2025-3-25 23:20 作者: 噱頭 時間: 2025-3-26 00:29
Prisoner’s Dilemma — Recollections and Observationsy can be convicted of a lesser offense, incurring a penalty of one month in prison. If both plead guilty of the major crime, both receive a reduced sentence, five years. If one confesses and the other does not, the first goes free (for having turned State’s evidence), while the other receives the fu作者: 食物 時間: 2025-3-26 06:30
Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game 1960; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965) and to indicate resolutions of the dilemma under specified conditions. The theory is characterized by (i) descriptive models rather than normative or prescriptive models of social behavior; (ii) emphasis on multi-dimensional processes and on structural relationship作者: slow-wave-sleep 時間: 2025-3-26 11:45
On 2×2 Games and Braithwaite’s Arbitration Schemebetween the two players are possible, a difficulty has arisen. For, if utilities are measured on an interval scale, an arbitrated result should not be affected by the application of different positive linear transformations to the payoffs of the two players. A natural solution is to distinguish cert作者: absorbed 時間: 2025-3-26 15:35 作者: exceptional 時間: 2025-3-26 19:59 作者: 殺人 時間: 2025-3-27 00:28
Test of the Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-Person Gamesrson games in characteristic function form. Each group played four iterations each of 5 three-person games in which .(.) = .(.) = .(.) = .(.) = 0, and .(.) > .(.) > .(.) > 0. The effects of (i) the communication rules governing the negotiations, (ii) the differences among the payoffs assigned to eac作者: OASIS 時間: 2025-3-27 01:06
Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-Person Gameson games in characteristic function form, namely, the bargaining set and two of its subsets, the competitive bargaining set and the kernel..Twelve groups of subjects participated in several four-person and five-person Apex games. The effects of group size, order of communication, learning, and value作者: Occlusion 時間: 2025-3-27 08:31 作者: Ossification 時間: 2025-3-27 10:52 作者: ORBIT 時間: 2025-3-27 17:14
The Application of Compromise Solutions to Reporting Gamesirst show that the distance parameter . for group regret has the interesting property that as . is increased, individual regrets are more emphasized and the sum of individual utilities resulting from the compromise scheme is decreased. In particular, when .=1, the sum of individual utilities is most作者: 做作 時間: 2025-3-27 18:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6bargaining; cooperative games; game theory作者: ACME 時間: 2025-3-28 01:09 作者: Ingredient 時間: 2025-3-28 02:43 作者: AGONY 時間: 2025-3-28 07:17
,Die Soldaten der k?mpfenden Truppe,e theory, involve (1) a set of decision makers, called .; (2) a set of . available to each player; (3) a set of ., each of which is a result of particular choices of strategies made by the players on a given play of the game; and (4) a set of . accorded to each player in each of the possible outcome作者: PHONE 時間: 2025-3-28 10:33
https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-31251-Xy can be convicted of a lesser offense, incurring a penalty of one month in prison. If both plead guilty of the major crime, both receive a reduced sentence, five years. If one confesses and the other does not, the first goes free (for having turned State’s evidence), while the other receives the fu作者: lymphedema 時間: 2025-3-28 15:44 作者: 熒光 時間: 2025-3-28 22:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-7987-3between the two players are possible, a difficulty has arisen. For, if utilities are measured on an interval scale, an arbitrated result should not be affected by the application of different positive linear transformations to the payoffs of the two players. A natural solution is to distinguish cert作者: Spangle 時間: 2025-3-29 00:24
Tineke Dirks,Annelies Diesfeldty have been a modified theory of stability by Hildebrand [1], and a theory on bargaining moves by Thomas [6]. Since all three are empirical scientific theories an important phase in the development of each has been that of experimental testing. The purpose of this paper is to report fully one of the作者: VERT 時間: 2025-3-29 05:21 作者: 放肆的你 時間: 2025-3-29 09:05 作者: 一致性 時間: 2025-3-29 12:17
Aus der Praxis der Budgetprüfungon games in characteristic function form, namely, the bargaining set and two of its subsets, the competitive bargaining set and the kernel..Twelve groups of subjects participated in several four-person and five-person Apex games. The effects of group size, order of communication, learning, and value作者: entice 時間: 2025-3-29 18:57 作者: Generator 時間: 2025-3-29 21:29
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-5171-8ng only in the planning horizon that we assume players use in calculating their strategies. Proceeding from . assumptions concerning the players’ preference orderings over the various possible coalition outcomes and heuristic rules-of-thumb the players use in calculating their strategies, and assump作者: patriarch 時間: 2025-3-30 01:17 作者: 一窩小鳥 時間: 2025-3-30 05:51
978-90-277-0489-4D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1974作者: 爭吵 時間: 2025-3-30 10:42 作者: 極為憤怒 時間: 2025-3-30 12:31 作者: saphenous-vein 時間: 2025-3-30 18:38
