標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory and Networks; New Perspectives and Surajit Borkotokey,Rajnish Kumar,Sudipta Sarangi Book 2021 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and [打印本頁] 作者: 縮寫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:53
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory and Networks讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: micronized 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:29 作者: 放氣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:51 作者: ORE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:05 作者: painkillers 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:11 作者: 門窗的側(cè)柱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:43 作者: 門窗的側(cè)柱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:06 作者: preeclampsia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:16 作者: 宣稱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:46 作者: Allergic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:19
,Reaktive ABZ auf spezielle Au?enreize,s is always supported through a Nash equilibrium of this signalling game. This theoretical result leads to the conclusion that network formation under mutual consent has to be considered as difficult, even impossible. This would contradict the well-established understanding of human nature as that of a social networker [., .].作者: Bricklayer 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:12
Assembly Problemsssembly Problem is the exchange problem described by the graph, the minimal size of a feasible subset, and the valuations of the agents. This chapter surveys two alternative approaches to Assembly Problems, viz., bargaining under complete information and exchange with asymmetric information.作者: 季雨 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:58 作者: 坦白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:32 作者: overbearing 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:21
Replicator Dynamics and Weak Pay-Off Positive Selection Dynamics: An Overview have been discussed. We examine the convergence results related to these two dynamical systems. We also give some examples of games exhibiting limit cycles in replicator and weak pay-off positive dynamics.作者: 菊花 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 03:18
Linear Games and Complementarity Problemsbi-linear games is equivalent to the existence of solutions of a corresponding conic optimization problem. Also, we characterize the equilibrium strategies of completely mixed bi-linear games corresponding to .-transformations. In addition to that, we prove the converse of Theorem 3.6 in [.].作者: Ballad 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:34
Rationing Rules Under Uncertain Claims: A Surveyual-quantile rules, and expected waste-constrained uniform gains rules in this framework. We provide an axiomatic characterization of these rules using adaptations of standard axioms in the literature and some new axioms pertaining to uncertainty.作者: 改進(jìn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:55
Praktische Ethiker von A bis Z,attack and defense) and helps us identify a new class of networks—windmill graphs—that minimize conflict. We then study security choices by individual nodes. Our analysis identifies the externalities and shows that the welfare costs of decentralized defense in networks can be very large.作者: 廚師 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:06 作者: limber 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:44 作者: 承認(rèn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:37 作者: Arbitrary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:18
Linear Operators on Banach Spaces,has been reinvigorated by parallel developments of network theory and applications in physics, computer science, biology, and sociology. We have summarized some of these developments here along with references to the original works so that the reader can directly consult the relevant material. We wo作者: 可憎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:24
2523-3114 ematics, statistics, economics, computer science, political science, sociology and psychology. It aims at providing a suitable learning experience to beginners on the basics of cooperative games, networks and m978-981-16-4737-6Series ISSN 2523-3114 Series E-ISSN 2523-3122 作者: considerable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:56 作者: 字謎游戲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:17
Linear Games and Complementarity ProblemsThen we extend some of the bimatrix game results of Parthasarthy and Raghavan to bi-linear games. We show that the existence of equilibrium pairs for bi-linear games is equivalent to the existence of solutions of a corresponding conic optimization problem. Also, we characterize the equilibrium strat作者: occult 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:05 作者: 事先無準(zhǔn)備 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:22 作者: Synapse 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:18
The Efficient, Symmetric and Linear Values for Cooperative Games and Their Characterizationsnsferable utilities, popularly known as the ESL values of TU games. The second part introduces a particular subclass of the ESL values which we call the class of extended generalized egalitarian Shapley values. We provide a characterization of the proposed value that builds on the characterization p作者: 方舟 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:18 作者: 嚴(yán)厲批評 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:56 作者: watertight, 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:32
Rationing Rules Under Uncertain Claims: A Survey claims or probability distributions. A rule must distribute shares before uncertainty resolves. We introduce proportional rules, parametric rules, equal-quantile rules, and expected waste-constrained uniform gains rules in this framework. We provide an axiomatic characterization of these rules usin作者: subordinate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:58 作者: 輕信 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:59
Analysis of Biological Data by Graph Theory Approach Searching of Iron in Biological Cells extend them for obtaining the segmentation of biological objects and elements. We improve and bring a new optimization of the algorithm. We show how the segmentation of iron is important in the connection of Alzheimer’s disease.作者: 雪白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:33
How Do You Defend a Network?ks are pervasive, the investments needed to protect them are very large; this motivates the study of targeted defense. What are the “key” nodes to defend to maximize functionality of the network? What are the incentives of individual nodes to protect themselves in a networked environment and how do 作者: Cpr951 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:54
Macroeconomic and Financial Networks: Review of Some Recent Developments in Parametric and Non-paramade or so, many of the traditional topics in economics and finance have been recast in the form of networks. Examples range from international trade, production process based on input–output structure, entangled financial markets to social linkages in labor markets, among others. Interestingly, the 作者: interference 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:58 作者: jagged 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:38 作者: 沒有準(zhǔn)備 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:18 作者: filial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:48 作者: 半球 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:24 作者: PANT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:54
Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice FunctionsWe briefly survey some recent results on strategy-proof random social choice functions in voting models.作者: 連累 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:23
On Different Ranking MethodsIn this note we present a short overview of different ranking methods. We recall the ranking methods for directed graphs and focus on axiomatic characterizations of the ranking methods by outdegree, Copeland score, and the .-measure.作者: Albumin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:56 作者: NEEDY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:16 作者: EXALT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:07
Wetterprognosen und Finanzmarktprognosen, game is to free ride; however, experimental evidence shows that players frequently cooperate. When an individual’s utility function accounts for social preferences, it can explain cooperative behavior and contribution to public goods. This chapter surveys a number of different models of social pref作者: Oligarchy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:40 作者: transplantation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:46 作者: 兵團(tuán) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-92305-9ased on identifying a new class of games as a basis for the kernel of the discounted Shapley values. The extension of this class eventually makes a basis for the space of all cooperative games with transferable utilities. It is shown that, when a game is expressed as a linear combination of this ext作者: 松緊帶 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:17
Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder Soziologen no-envy. From this, we also identify the complete subset of allocation rules that are also Pareto efficient. Finally, we identify the Lorenz optimal allocation rule from this subset of allocation rules that satisfy no-envy and Pareto efficiency.作者: 把手 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:57 作者: 大雨 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:19 作者: 枯燥 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:44 作者: drusen 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:51
