標題: Titlebook: Game Theory; Steven N. Durlauf,Lawrence E. Blume Book 2010 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2010 Area.field. [打印本頁] 作者: fungus 時間: 2025-3-21 19:01
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Game Theory網絡公開度
書目名稱Game Theory網絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: 輕率的你 時間: 2025-3-21 22:31 作者: persistence 時間: 2025-3-22 02:05 作者: Metastasis 時間: 2025-3-22 05:16 作者: 僵硬 時間: 2025-3-22 11:05
IT-spezifische AGB-Klauseln der Lieferanten,of the main themes of work in the area, with a focus on the work in computer science. Given the length constraints, I make no attempt at being comprehensive, especially since other surveys are also available, including Halpern (2003), Linial (1994), Papadimitriou (2001), and a comprehensive survey book (Nisan et al., 2007).作者: Agronomy 時間: 2025-3-22 14:41 作者: Agronomy 時間: 2025-3-22 17:31 作者: irritation 時間: 2025-3-22 23:02 作者: affinity 時間: 2025-3-23 05:10 作者: Aspiration 時間: 2025-3-23 08:49
,Anzeigen und Willenserkl?rungen,e normal form, have permitted the development of a theory relating network topology to equilibrium properties, and have played a central role in recent results on the computational complexity of computing Nash equilibria. They have also been generalized to exchange economies, evolutionary game theory, and other strategic settings.作者: Meditative 時間: 2025-3-23 19:37 作者: biopsy 時間: 2025-3-24 00:37 作者: 駕駛 時間: 2025-3-24 04:14
Book 2010Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.作者: Fracture 時間: 2025-3-24 09:31 作者: Commentary 時間: 2025-3-24 13:11 作者: 使聲音降低 時間: 2025-3-24 17:29
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39632-2The following three articles survey some aspects of the foundations of non-cooperative game theory. The goal of work in foundations is to examine in detail the basic ingredients of game analysis.作者: Adornment 時間: 2025-3-24 21:42
Spezielle Anwendungen der Quantenstatistik,Under the epistemic approach, the traditional description of a game is augmented by a mathematical framework for talking about the rationality or irrationality of the players, their beliefs and knowledge, and related ideas.作者: arterioles 時間: 2025-3-25 01:03
Allgemeine HaftpflichtversicherungIn their seminal book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced two theories of games: strategic and coalitional. Strategic game theory concentrates on the selection of strategies by payoff-maximizing players, coalitional game theory concentrates on coalition formation and the distribution of payoffs.作者: 制造 時間: 2025-3-25 04:23 作者: 飛來飛去真休 時間: 2025-3-25 09:40 作者: 隱士 時間: 2025-3-25 15:36
Epistemic Game Theory: Complete Information,Under the epistemic approach, the traditional description of a game is augmented by a mathematical framework for talking about the rationality or irrationality of the players, their beliefs and knowledge, and related ideas.作者: intrigue 時間: 2025-3-25 18:31
Games in Coalitional Form,In their seminal book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced two theories of games: strategic and coalitional. Strategic game theory concentrates on the selection of strategies by payoff-maximizing players, coalitional game theory concentrates on coalition formation and the distribution of payoffs.作者: uveitis 時間: 2025-3-25 22:38
Biogeographische Regionen der Erde, preference relation) over possible payoff-relevant outcomes while his cognitive limitations are described as incomplete information. Thus, the standard economic theory of the individual is couched in the language of constrained maximization and statistical inference.作者: Duodenitis 時間: 2025-3-26 00:11
,Beispiel: EVB-IT überlassung Typ A,ayers will do, given the economic structure of the game and history; in equilibrium, these beliefs are correct. Analytical game theory is enormously powerful, but it has two shortcomings as a complete model of behaviour by people (and other possible players, including non-human animals and organizations).作者: 得罪 時間: 2025-3-26 05:29
Meinhard Erben,Wolf G. H. Günthercial exchange of goods, the payment of taxes to finance public goods, team production, common pool resource management, collusion among firms, voting for income redistribution to others, participating in collective actions such as demonstrations, and adhering to socially beneficial norms.作者: Adjourn 時間: 2025-3-26 10:01
Allgemeine Grundlagen der Krankenpflegey noted that his formalism was not limited to modelling a player’s beliefs about payoff-relevant variables: rather, its strength was precisely the ease with which Ann’s beliefs about Bob’s beliefs about payoff variables, Ann’s beliefs about Bob’s beliefs about Ann’s beliefs about payoff variables, and so on, could be represented.作者: 含糊 時間: 2025-3-26 15:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-20214-1teraction. The private information of a player may be about the payoff functions in the game, as well as about some exogenous, payoff-irrelevant events. The player may also form beliefs about other players’ beliefs about payoffs and exogenous events, about their beliefs about the beliefs of others, and so forth.作者: 確認 時間: 2025-3-26 17:16 作者: 緯度 時間: 2025-3-26 22:32 作者: 凹處 時間: 2025-3-27 04:27 作者: 提煉 時間: 2025-3-27 09:10 作者: 是限制 時間: 2025-3-27 11:42 作者: 極肥胖 時間: 2025-3-27 15:52 作者: braggadocio 時間: 2025-3-27 21:35
Epistemic Game Theory: Incomplete Information,teraction. The private information of a player may be about the payoff functions in the game, as well as about some exogenous, payoff-irrelevant events. The player may also form beliefs about other players’ beliefs about payoffs and exogenous events, about their beliefs about the beliefs of others, and so forth.作者: 靈敏 時間: 2025-3-27 23:04 作者: 伸展 時間: 2025-3-28 05:51
Learning and Evolution in Games: An Overview, and when disequilibrium behaviour will resolve in equilibrium play, and, if it does, on predicting which equilibrium will be played. But the theory also offers techniques for characterizing perpetual disequilibrium play.作者: 的’ 時間: 2025-3-28 08:32
Biogeographische Regionen der Erde, preference relation) over possible payoff-relevant outcomes while his cognitive limitations are described as incomplete information. Thus, the standard economic theory of the individual is couched in the language of constrained maximization and statistical inference.作者: hematuria 時間: 2025-3-28 14:16 作者: 不溶解 時間: 2025-3-28 15:22
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01475-8should be contrasted with more standard signalling models. In the latter, informed agents communicate private information indirectly via their choices — concerning, say, levels of education attained — and these choices are costly. Indeed, signalling is credible precisely because choices are differen作者: custody 時間: 2025-3-28 19:18 作者: Radiation 時間: 2025-3-28 23:52 作者: Insatiable 時間: 2025-3-29 05:28
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-07079-5o provide an explicitly dynamic foundation for the static evolutionary stability concept of Maynard Smith and Price (1973). But one can find precursors to this approach in the beginnings of game theory: Brown and von Neumann (1950) introduced differential equations as a tool for computing equilibria作者: apropos 時間: 2025-3-29 09:26
Allgemeine Grundlagen der Krankenpflegey noted that his formalism was not limited to modelling a player’s beliefs about payoff-relevant variables: rather, its strength was precisely the ease with which Ann’s beliefs about Bob’s beliefs about payoff variables, Ann’s beliefs about Bob’s beliefs about Ann’s beliefs about payoff variables, a作者: 表示向下 時間: 2025-3-29 12:12 作者: 擦掉 時間: 2025-3-29 17:08
Allgemeine Haftpflichtversicherung of animal fighting behaviour was among the first applications and it was in this context that Maynard Smith and Price (1973) developed the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) (see .: ESS). Cooperative interactions (Trivers, 1971) and signalling interactions (Grafen, 1991), such as wh作者: overrule 時間: 2025-3-29 23:36 作者: 使出神 時間: 2025-3-30 01:55 作者: 樂器演奏者 時間: 2025-3-30 08:06 作者: 移植 時間: 2025-3-30 11:58 作者: CRANK 時間: 2025-3-30 14:15 作者: Foment 時間: 2025-3-30 19:13 作者: Inoperable 時間: 2025-3-30 23:52
978-0-230-23890-9Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2010作者: 離開真充足 時間: 2025-3-31 01:02
Game Theory978-0-230-28084-7Series ISSN 2947-4582 Series E-ISSN 2947-4590 作者: 時代 時間: 2025-3-31 05:01 作者: eucalyptus 時間: 2025-3-31 11:12 作者: Offbeat 時間: 2025-3-31 17:09
Behavioural Game Theory,ayers will do, given the economic structure of the game and history; in equilibrium, these beliefs are correct. Analytical game theory is enormously powerful, but it has two shortcomings as a complete model of behaviour by people (and other possible players, including non-human animals and organizat作者: GROG 時間: 2025-3-31 17:50 作者: Generosity 時間: 2025-3-31 22:01
Computer Science and Game Theory,component of some major computer science conferences (see, for example, Kearns and Reiter, 2005; Sandholm and Yokoo, 2003); leading computer scientists are often invited to speak at major game theory conferences, such as the World Congress on Game Theory 2000 and 2004. In this article I survey some 作者: 脆弱吧 時間: 2025-4-1 03:44
Cooperation,cial exchange of goods, the payment of taxes to finance public goods, team production, common pool resource management, collusion among firms, voting for income redistribution to others, participating in collective actions such as demonstrations, and adhering to socially beneficial norms.作者: 軟弱 時間: 2025-4-1 09:09 作者: DNR215 時間: 2025-4-1 10:22 作者: pericardium 時間: 2025-4-1 17:51 作者: Lice692 時間: 2025-4-1 19:22 作者: 吵鬧 時間: 2025-4-2 01:42
Global Games, multiplicity. Carlsson and van Damme (1993) (CvD) introduced an original and attractive approach to doing so. A complete information model entails the implicit assumption that there is common knowledge among the players of the payoffs of the game. In practice, such common knowledge will often be la作者: Conduit 時間: 2025-4-2 05:46
Graphical Games,e the payoffs of all others, but rather there is some notion of ‘locality’ to the direct strategic interactions. These interactions are represented as an undirected graph or network, where we assume that each player is identified with a vertex, and that the payoff of a given player is a function of 作者: 盟軍 時間: 2025-4-2 10:41
