標題: Titlebook: Game Theory; Stochastics, Informa Joachim Rosenmüller Book 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000 bargaining.economics.game th [打印本頁] 作者: 掩飾 時間: 2025-3-21 19:30
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Urgency 時間: 2025-3-21 20:51
Stochastic Games and Incomplete Information,hance is present as well and we conceive a time dependent process on which the players decisions have an impact and from the behavior of which the players deduce payoffs, then we speak of a stochastic game. Or, in other words, a stochastic game is a multi personally controlled stochastic process.作者: 人造 時間: 2025-3-22 03:45
Stochastic Games: Infinite Horizon,ers can proceed taking actions in a game infinitely often, rather it is our intuition that we are looking at a model within which the horizon of time is unsurmountably far away and hence the final outcome of the game cannot be taken into consideration. This seems to have a strong impact on the kind 作者: nutrients 時間: 2025-3-22 08:09
Folk Theorems,he sense that no one explicitly claimed the authorship. In a one shot game (the prisoner’s dilemma, the battle of sexes, the chicken game) various Nash equilibria may exist. They may be of different nature, lacking symmetry or providing symmetric and non symmetric solutions. There may be Nash equili作者: GONG 時間: 2025-3-22 11:40 作者: Regurgitation 時間: 2025-3-22 15:55
Replica Market Games, with market games, more precisely TU-market games or side payment market games. The convergence or “equivalence” of core and equilibrium is perhaps not so much a topic of game theory but rather of general equilibrium theory, there is an ample supply of literature on this field, see . [HDB74], . [MC作者: Regurgitation 時間: 2025-3-22 19:52
Bargaining,oes back to . [NASH50b]. In this context a bargaining problem is a static setup describing the feasible utility vectors a group of players may agree upon and the status quo point resulting from a failure of agreement.作者: 嚴厲譴責 時間: 2025-3-22 22:42
Konsistenz und Tiefenausdehnunghance is present as well and we conceive a time dependent process on which the players decisions have an impact and from the behavior of which the players deduce payoffs, then we speak of a stochastic game. Or, in other words, a stochastic game is a multi personally controlled stochastic process.作者: 才能 時間: 2025-3-23 02:45 作者: spinal-stenosis 時間: 2025-3-23 06:17 作者: Nausea 時間: 2025-3-23 09:48
Allgemeine Epidemiologie der Tuberkuloseoes back to . [NASH50b]. In this context a bargaining problem is a static setup describing the feasible utility vectors a group of players may agree upon and the status quo point resulting from a failure of agreement.作者: Flustered 時間: 2025-3-23 15:41
Stochastic Games and Incomplete Information,hance is present as well and we conceive a time dependent process on which the players decisions have an impact and from the behavior of which the players deduce payoffs, then we speak of a stochastic game. Or, in other words, a stochastic game is a multi personally controlled stochastic process.作者: 致敬 時間: 2025-3-23 19:58
Stochastic Games: Infinite Horizon,ers can proceed taking actions in a game infinitely often, rather it is our intuition that we are looking at a model within which the horizon of time is unsurmountably far away and hence the final outcome of the game cannot be taken into consideration. This seems to have a strong impact on the kind of strategic behavior we observe in equilibrium.作者: 額外的事 時間: 2025-3-24 01:32 作者: LARK 時間: 2025-3-24 03:22 作者: 不來 時間: 2025-3-24 09:00 作者: Predigest 時間: 2025-3-24 14:39
Konsistenz und Tiefenausdehnunghance is present as well and we conceive a time dependent process on which the players decisions have an impact and from the behavior of which the players deduce payoffs, then we speak of a stochastic game. Or, in other words, a stochastic game is a multi personally controlled stochastic process.作者: 消耗 時間: 2025-3-24 17:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-49766-7ers can proceed taking actions in a game infinitely often, rather it is our intuition that we are looking at a model within which the horizon of time is unsurmountably far away and hence the final outcome of the game cannot be taken into consideration. This seems to have a strong impact on the kind 作者: 百科全書 時間: 2025-3-24 22:58
Alexander von Weiss,Manfred Krausehe sense that no one explicitly claimed the authorship. In a one shot game (the prisoner’s dilemma, the battle of sexes, the chicken game) various Nash equilibria may exist. They may be of different nature, lacking symmetry or providing symmetric and non symmetric solutions. There may be Nash equili作者: Digest 時間: 2025-3-25 02:03 作者: 無效 時間: 2025-3-25 04:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-91773-8 with market games, more precisely TU-market games or side payment market games. The convergence or “equivalence” of core and equilibrium is perhaps not so much a topic of game theory but rather of general equilibrium theory, there is an ample supply of literature on this field, see . [HDB74], . [MC作者: ARBOR 時間: 2025-3-25 10:47 作者: venous-leak 時間: 2025-3-25 12:06
Allgemeine EnergiewirtschaftslehreThe topic of large games has been dealt with in the previous chapters by means of a replication procedure. This means that games or markets increase by replicating a fixed number of types of players and by considering the limiting behavior of solution concepts like the core, the Shapley value, or the Walrasian equilibrium.作者: vascular 時間: 2025-3-25 16:52 作者: 輕而薄 時間: 2025-3-25 22:54
978-1-4419-5114-4Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000作者: Mirage 時間: 2025-3-26 03:19
Game Theory978-1-4757-3212-2Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: Critical 時間: 2025-3-26 05:54
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3212-2bargaining; economics; game theory; incomplete information; mathematical economics; strategy作者: neutralize 時間: 2025-3-26 09:41 作者: 情感 時間: 2025-3-26 12:43
Book 2000mes withperfect information) on one hand and the coalitional function (simplegames, convex games, superadditive games, the core, the Shapleyvolume) on the other hand. .Some emphasis is laid on the probabilistic background; however, theauthor treats stochastic games using the language of probability 作者: 虛弱的神經(jīng) 時間: 2025-3-26 17:29
Folk Theorems,h equilibria may exist. They may be of different nature, lacking symmetry or providing symmetric and non symmetric solutions. There may be Nash equilibria which are not Pareto efficient and no other ones. This frequently leads to the effect that players are locked in a non efficient equilibrium.作者: 暗語 時間: 2025-3-27 00:56
Replica Market Games,ot so much a topic of game theory but rather of general equilibrium theory, there is an ample supply of literature on this field, see . [HDB74], . [MCL85], and others. However, we want to shortly touch some techniques and methods which are employed to obtain this kind of theorems. In particular we want to discuss the behavior of the Shapley value.作者: 影響帶來 時間: 2025-3-27 03:43
Book 2000ly from material compiled by ProfessorJoachim Rosenmüller when lecturing at IMW, the Institute ofMathematical Economics at the University of Bielefeld. On the otherhand, it also contains research topics that are not presented in atypical game theory textbook. Thus, the volume may provide the basisfo作者: 沒有貧窮 時間: 2025-3-27 08:12 作者: Common-Migraine 時間: 2025-3-27 13:31
Prerequisites: Probability, Conditional Expectation, Knowledge,the notational conventions would require much less effort than has been invested within this chapter, and in order to study the basic models of probability it might be much more advisable to consult one of the competent volumes in probability that are available in abundance on various levels of intricacy.作者: 排斥 時間: 2025-3-27 13:55 作者: Phenothiazines 時間: 2025-3-27 20:11
Alexander von Weiss,Manfred Krauseh equilibria may exist. They may be of different nature, lacking symmetry or providing symmetric and non symmetric solutions. There may be Nash equilibria which are not Pareto efficient and no other ones. This frequently leads to the effect that players are locked in a non efficient equilibrium.作者: 富饒 時間: 2025-3-28 01:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-91773-8ot so much a topic of game theory but rather of general equilibrium theory, there is an ample supply of literature on this field, see . [HDB74], . [MCL85], and others. However, we want to shortly touch some techniques and methods which are employed to obtain this kind of theorems. In particular we want to discuss the behavior of the Shapley value.作者: Aphorism 時間: 2025-3-28 04:50
Peter Hupfer,Wilhelm Kuttler,Frank-Michael Chmielewski,Hermann Petheth recent advances of computing the f-mode frequency of fast rotating neutron stars, he also derives a combined relation that relates the pre-merger binary tida978-3-658-36840-1978-3-658-36841-8Series ISSN 2625-3577 Series E-ISSN 2625-3615 作者: 祖先 時間: 2025-3-28 09:03
Water Efficiency Strategies for Improving Sustainability in Social Housing: Comparative Analysis Betparticularly social housing. This study introduces a framework for assessing water efficiency in social housing projects to measure the effectiveness of using water conservation strategies. This study also addresses the relation between the water efficiency in such projects and the urban water situa作者: 種屬關(guān)系 時間: 2025-3-28 13:28
An (Accidental) Exploration of Alternatives to Evolutionary Algorithms for SBSEgenerational reasoning to find interesting subspaces but relies on the underlying dimensions of the solution space. Experiments with Software Engineering (SE) models shows that SWAY’s performance improvement is competitive with standard MOEAs while, terminating over an order of magnitude faster.作者: Connotation 時間: 2025-3-28 15:37
