標題: Titlebook: Game Theory; A Multi-Leveled Appr Hans Peters Textbook 2015Latest edition Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2015 Applic [打印本頁] 作者: expenditure 時間: 2025-3-21 18:05
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Game Theory網絡公開度
書目名稱Game Theory網絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: 脫毛 時間: 2025-3-21 20:30 作者: Sinus-Rhythm 時間: 2025-3-22 02:41 作者: Servile 時間: 2025-3-22 06:12 作者: Mitigate 時間: 2025-3-22 08:44 作者: lambaste 時間: 2025-3-22 14:36 作者: lambaste 時間: 2025-3-22 18:51 作者: 蔑視 時間: 2025-3-22 21:44 作者: 溫和女孩 時間: 2025-3-23 05:09 作者: 狂亂 時間: 2025-3-23 05:41 作者: 去掉 時間: 2025-3-23 10:29 作者: agnostic 時間: 2025-3-23 15:40
Matrix GamesIn this chapter we study finite two-person zero-sum games—matrix games—more rigorously. In particular, von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem is proved. The chapter extends . in Part?I. Although it is self-contained, it may be useful to (re)read . first.作者: anatomical 時間: 2025-3-23 19:21
Evolutionary GamesIn this chapter we go deeper into evolutionary game theory. The concepts of evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics, introduced in ., are further explored. It may be helpful to study . first, although the present chapter is largely self-contained.作者: 中古 時間: 2025-3-24 00:13 作者: 失誤 時間: 2025-3-24 04:48 作者: colostrum 時間: 2025-3-24 06:56 作者: 壓迫 時間: 2025-3-24 13:44 作者: 責問 時間: 2025-3-24 16:39 作者: 談判 時間: 2025-3-24 20:36 作者: 消音器 時間: 2025-3-25 00:37
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-93128-3n is that in such games special results hold, such as the existence of a value and optimal strategies for two-person zero-sum games, and the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for finite nonzero-sum games.作者: morale 時間: 2025-3-25 06:51
Exkurs: Das Rechnungswesen der Unternehmunga Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even if the game is repeated a finite number of times, cf. Problem?4.10. As we will see in this chapter, this bad outcome can be avoided if the game is repeated an infinite number of times. This, however, is coming at a price, namely the existen作者: concise 時間: 2025-3-25 10:53 作者: PLAYS 時間: 2025-3-25 15:12
Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehrese coalitions. A cooperative game is more abstract than a noncooperative game in the sense that strategies are not explicitly modelled: rather, the game describes what each possible coalition can earn by cooperation. In a cooperative game with . it is assumed that the earnings of a coalition can be 作者: 結合 時間: 2025-3-25 19:25
Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehretegic possibilities of a player; instead, a detailed description of what players and coalitions can attain in terms of outcomes or utilities; solution concepts based on strategic considerations and/or considerations of fairness, equity, efficiency, etc.; if possible, an axiomatic characterization of作者: 沖突 時間: 2025-3-25 22:36 作者: hematuria 時間: 2025-3-26 04:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-00213-0e moves occur, and what the final payoffs are. Such games are discussed in Chaps.?. and?5, and also occur in Chaps.?. and?7. The present chapter extends the material introduced in Chaps.?. and?5, and it may be useful to (re)read these chapters before continuing.作者: 使高興 時間: 2025-3-26 06:35
Hans PetersTeaches the basics of game theory on a thorough level.Adapted for the needs of both undergraduate and graduate students.Covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory作者: Awning 時間: 2025-3-26 08:37
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7Applications of game theory; Bargaining; Cooperative games; Duality; Equilibrium; Game theory; Nash equili作者: Collected 時間: 2025-3-26 14:39
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-94599-0trast to . it is no longer required that the sum of the players’ payoffs is zero (or, equivalently, constant). This allows for a much larger class of games, including many games relevant for economic or other applications. Famous examples are the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes discussed in Sect.?.作者: inscribe 時間: 2025-3-26 20:33
Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehree-shot’: players move sequentially, and one and the same player may move more often than once. Such games are best described by drawing a decision tree which tells us whose move it is and what a player’s information is when that player has to make a move.作者: 誘拐 時間: 2025-3-26 22:57 作者: 頌揚本人 時間: 2025-3-27 02:58
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39395-3trix game are interpreted as shares of the population. Individuals within the same part of the population play the same pure strategy. The main ‘solution’ concept is the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy.作者: Desert 時間: 2025-3-27 06:07
Produktions- und Kostentheorie,er, which offers a more rigorous treatment of finite games, i.e., games with finitely many players—often two—who have finitely many pure strategies over which they can randomize. We only discuss games with complete information. In the terminology of ., each player has only one type.作者: META 時間: 2025-3-27 10:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-00213-0e moves occur, and what the final payoffs are. Such games are discussed in Chaps.?. and?5, and also occur in Chaps.?. and?7. The present chapter extends the material introduced in Chaps.?. and?5, and it may be useful to (re)read these chapters before continuing.作者: Ballerina 時間: 2025-3-27 14:46 作者: 破布 時間: 2025-3-27 19:10 作者: fledged 時間: 2025-3-28 01:58 作者: badinage 時間: 2025-3-28 05:24 作者: Connotation 時間: 2025-3-28 08:47 作者: 庇護 時間: 2025-3-28 11:28
Extensive Form Gamese moves occur, and what the final payoffs are. Such games are discussed in Chaps.?. and?5, and also occur in Chaps.?. and?7. The present chapter extends the material introduced in Chaps.?. and?5, and it may be useful to (re)read these chapters before continuing.作者: incisive 時間: 2025-3-28 17:25
Textbook 2015Latest editionversion of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topic作者: depreciate 時間: 2025-3-28 20:14 作者: 埋伏 時間: 2025-3-29 00:37 作者: 善于騙人 時間: 2025-3-29 03:52
Cooperative Game Models such solution concepts. For instance, one can argue that the core for TU-games is based on strategic considerations whereas the Shapley value is based on a combination of efficiency and symmetry or fairness with respect to contributions. The latter is made precise by an axiomatic characterization as in Problem?9.17.作者: vertebrate 時間: 2025-3-29 10:13 作者: 婚姻生活 時間: 2025-3-29 14:53
Exkurs: Das Rechnungswesen der Unternehmung chapter, this bad outcome can be avoided if the game is repeated an infinite number of times. This, however, is coming at a price, namely the existence of a multitude of outcomes attainable in equilibrium. Such an . is expressed by a so-called ..作者: 矛盾 時間: 2025-3-29 15:56
Exkurs: Das Rechnungswesen der Unternehmung over the types of the other players. Often, these probability distributions are assumed to be consistent in the sense that they are the marginal probability distributions derived from a basic commonly known distribution over all combinations of player types.作者: Trypsin 時間: 2025-3-29 21:02 作者: cutlery 時間: 2025-3-30 03:52
Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehreng negative payments—if the coalition is actually formed. More generally, it is an amount of . and the implicit assumption is that it makes sense to transfer this utility among the players—for instance, due to the presence of a medium like money, assuming that individual utilities can be expressed in monetary terms.作者: 完成才能戰(zhàn)勝 時間: 2025-3-30 04:12
Cooperative Games with Transferable Utilityng negative payments—if the coalition is actually formed. More generally, it is an amount of . and the implicit assumption is that it makes sense to transfer this utility among the players—for instance, due to the presence of a medium like money, assuming that individual utilities can be expressed in monetary terms.作者: 是剝皮 時間: 2025-3-30 10:30
Finite Two-Person Gamestrast to . it is no longer required that the sum of the players’ payoffs is zero (or, equivalently, constant). This allows for a much larger class of games, including many games relevant for economic or other applications. Famous examples are the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes discus作者: 鉆孔 時間: 2025-3-30 14:48 作者: 繁殖 時間: 2025-3-30 16:59
Finite Games with Incomplete Informationect information. In a game of . information players may be uninformed about certain characteristics of the game or of the players. For instance, a player may have incomplete information about actions available to some other player, or about payoffs of other players. Incomplete information is modelle作者: 按等級 時間: 2025-3-31 00:05
Noncooperative Games: Extensionsn is that in such games special results hold, such as the existence of a value and optimal strategies for two-person zero-sum games, and the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for finite nonzero-sum games.作者: 命令變成大炮 時間: 2025-3-31 02:00 作者: institute 時間: 2025-3-31 06:28 作者: Coronary 時間: 2025-3-31 13:08
Cooperative Games with Transferable Utilityse coalitions. A cooperative game is more abstract than a noncooperative game in the sense that strategies are not explicitly modelled: rather, the game describes what each possible coalition can earn by cooperation. In a cooperative game with . it is assumed that the earnings of a coalition can be
