標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory; Third East Asia Inte Deng-Feng Li Conference proceedings 2019 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 artificial intelligence. [打印本頁] 作者: 誤解 時間: 2025-3-21 16:22
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: BROTH 時間: 2025-3-21 22:23
XGBoost-Driven Harsanyi Transformation and Its Application in Incomplete Information Internet Loan n 24,000 training data and 6,000 testing data. The experiment shows the accuracy (.) and harmonic mean (.) of the enterprise loan decision based on . on 6,000 testing data are 0.900833 and 0.945864 respectively. The test experiment demonstrates the XGBoost-driven Harsanyi transformation can help the作者: gerontocracy 時間: 2025-3-22 03:15 作者: 大笑 時間: 2025-3-22 07:30
Eigenmittel und deren Verwendung use of intuitionistic fuzzy set theory, Choquet integrals and continuous ordered weighted average operator. It’s also proofed that the defined Shapley value satisfies three axioms. Finally, the effectiveness and rationality of Shapley is illustrated by a numerical example.作者: Pedagogy 時間: 2025-3-22 08:58 作者: accrete 時間: 2025-3-22 13:07
Vieweg Programmbibliothek Taschenrechner the consensus incentives from Bitcoin ecosystems in financial technology (Fintech), we then establish the general existence results for consensus equilibria of consensus games in terms of corresponding interpretation based on the viewpoint of Blockchain consensus in Fintech by applying the concept 作者: accrete 時間: 2025-3-22 18:32 作者: Fortuitous 時間: 2025-3-22 22:07 作者: 可以任性 時間: 2025-3-23 01:38 作者: BOLT 時間: 2025-3-23 06:26
Banken, deren Sicherung und Beaufsichtigunge Aubin’s form. However, it is always not true in?reality. This paper defines a cooperative game with communication structure and intuitionistic fuzzy coalition, in which the partners have some hesitation degrees and different risk preferences when they take part in limited coalitions. There are low作者: JUST 時間: 2025-3-23 11:06 作者: Medicare 時間: 2025-3-23 17:17 作者: Insul島 時間: 2025-3-23 21:08 作者: HAVOC 時間: 2025-3-24 00:24
Exkurs: Das Rechnungswesen der Unternehmunguzzy sets (IFSs), which are called IFS bi-matrix games for short. In this method, using the equivalent relation between IFSs and interval-valued fuzzy sets (IVFSs) and the operations of IVFSs, we propose a new order relation of IFSs through introducing a ranking function, which is proven to be a tot作者: 閑聊 時間: 2025-3-24 02:45
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0657-4artificial intelligence; autonomous agents; coalition formations; coalitional game; cooperative game; fuz作者: PATHY 時間: 2025-3-24 09:49 作者: 性滿足 時間: 2025-3-24 11:24
Game Theory978-981-15-0657-4Series ISSN 1865-0929 Series E-ISSN 1865-0937 作者: 是剝皮 時間: 2025-3-24 16:07
The Consensus Games for Consensus Economics Under the Framework of Blockchain in Fintech, the consensus incentives from Bitcoin ecosystems in financial technology (Fintech), we then establish the general existence results for consensus equilibria of consensus games in terms of corresponding interpretation based on the viewpoint of Blockchain consensus in Fintech by applying the concept 作者: STEER 時間: 2025-3-24 20:44
Characterizations of the Position Value for Hypergraph Communication Situations,e uniform hyperlink game or the .-augmented uniform hyperlink game, which are obtained from a given hypergraph communication situation. These results generalize the non-axiomatic characterization of the position value from communication situations in Kongo (.) (Int J Game Theory (2010) 39: 669–675) 作者: 外表讀作 時間: 2025-3-24 23:47
A Class of Social-Shapley Values of Cooperative Games with Graph Structure,rianism of the Shapley value and the egalitarianism of the Solidarity value, in which the sociality is reflected by the Solidarity value. Through defining the corresponding properties in graph-restricted games, the paper axiomatically characterizes the Social-Shapley value when the coefficient is gi作者: 脖子 時間: 2025-3-25 04:17
The Extension of Combinatorial Solutions for Cooperative Games,e in terms of a coalition forming weight coefficient ., which is called the SCE value for cooperative games are presented. The efficiency, linearity, symmetry and .-dummy player property of the SCE value are proved. By proposing a procedural interpretation, we define the . as the coalition forming w作者: 社團(tuán) 時間: 2025-3-25 08:03 作者: 平庸的人或物 時間: 2025-3-25 13:42 作者: 決定性 時間: 2025-3-25 16:44 作者: Aprope 時間: 2025-3-25 22:57 作者: 溫順 時間: 2025-3-26 02:31
The Method for Solving Bi-matrix Games with Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set Payoffs,uzzy sets (IFSs), which are called IFS bi-matrix games for short. In this method, using the equivalent relation between IFSs and interval-valued fuzzy sets (IVFSs) and the operations of IVFSs, we propose a new order relation of IFSs through introducing a ranking function, which is proven to be a tot作者: 強制令 時間: 2025-3-26 05:48 作者: 思考 時間: 2025-3-26 09:33 作者: 系列 時間: 2025-3-26 13:52 作者: 免費 時間: 2025-3-26 17:23 作者: vitreous-humor 時間: 2025-3-27 00:05 作者: Etymology 時間: 2025-3-27 04:13
Conference proceedings 2019 the volume are focused on non-cooperative and cooperative games and cover such subjects or disciplines as game theory, operations research, mathematics, decision science, management science, economics, experiment economics, system engineering, psychology and control theory.?.作者: 持續(xù) 時間: 2025-3-27 05:44
Conference proceedings 2019China, in March 2019.?.The 10 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 146 submissions. The papers in the volume are focused on non-cooperative and cooperative games and cover such subjects or disciplines as game theory, operations research, mathemati作者: 為現(xiàn)場 時間: 2025-3-27 11:46 作者: 偽造 時間: 2025-3-27 15:21 作者: 開始沒有 時間: 2025-3-27 20:20
The Consensus Games for Consensus Economics Under the Framework of Blockchain in Fintech, mining pool-games for miners by applying consensus games shows that the concept of consensus equilibria could be used as a fundamental tool for the study of consensus economics under the framework of Blockchain economy in Fintech.作者: arthrodesis 時間: 2025-3-27 23:24 作者: 嘲弄 時間: 2025-3-28 02:35
Banken, deren Sicherung und Beaufsichtigung players’ risk preferences, and the existence of the solution according to axioms system is proved. Finally, the effectiveness of this method is demonstrated by a practical example of profit allocation. This research extends the cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions, and integrates individual preferences information of players in cooperation.作者: 分貝 時間: 2025-3-28 09:33 作者: Synovial-Fluid 時間: 2025-3-28 11:10
An Allocation Value of Cooperative Game with Communication Structure and Intuitionistic Fuzzy Coali players’ risk preferences, and the existence of the solution according to axioms system is proved. Finally, the effectiveness of this method is demonstrated by a practical example of profit allocation. This research extends the cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions, and integrates individual preferences information of players in cooperation.作者: CRAB 時間: 2025-3-28 14:51
The Method for Solving Bi-matrix Games with Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set Payoffs,matrix game. The latter can be obtained through solving the auxiliary parametric bilinear programming model. The models and method proposed in this paper are demonstrated with a real example of the e-commerce retailers’ strategy choice problem.作者: monochromatic 時間: 2025-3-28 22:25
1865-0929 n Fuzhou, China, in March 2019.?.The 10 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 146 submissions. The papers in the volume are focused on non-cooperative and cooperative games and cover such subjects or disciplines as game theory, operations research,
