標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory; An Introduction with Ana Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Mu?oz-Garcia Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: CK828 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:54
書(shū)目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
作者: 種植,培養(yǎng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:40 作者: 石墨 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:08
R. Pabst Prof. Dr. med.,A. Chaker Dr. med.h directly search for the strategy (or strategies) that yield the highest possible payoff to a player, strict dominance seeks to just rule out those strategies that a rational player “would never choose.”作者: 訓(xùn)誡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:05 作者: SSRIS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:07 作者: 印第安人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:54 作者: 印第安人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:55 作者: avenge 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:44 作者: 鋼筆記下懲罰 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:58
Carlos E. Baena-Cagnani,R. Maximiliano Gómezvery player privately knows her valuation for the object being sold (e.g., a painting), but does not observe other bidders’ valuations. Bids, then, are a player’s strategy, and are a function of her privately observed valuation for the object.作者: glowing 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:31
Jeffrey M. Lehman,Michael S. Blaiss role of education in the labor market, to pricing strategies seeking to deter firms’ entry in an industry, to car warranties by new automakers operating in a market. However, we found that this class of games may yield a large number of PBEs and, more importantly, some of these equilibria can only 作者: adduction 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:32 作者: 含沙射影 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:09
Ana Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Mu?oz-GarciaProvides step-by-step "tools" or "recipes" to help readers solve different classes of games.Focuses on the application of solution concepts to different settings in economics, business, and more.Suppl作者: Inertia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:36 作者: Mundane 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:02
Extranasale Allergien und Pseudoallergien,In previous chapters, we considered games that had at least one NE, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Battle of the Sexes, and the Chicken games. But, do all games have at least one NE? If we restrict players to choose a specific strategy with certainty, some games may not have an NE.作者: insert 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:32 作者: 火車車輪 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:19
Juha Punnonen MD, PhD,Jan E. de Vries PhDIn this chapter, we explore a class of signaling games where the sender incurs no costs in sending different messages. Unlike in the previous chapter, where messages were costly, such as acquiring years of education, we now consider ., often known as “cheap talk.作者: Alienated 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:20 作者: 點(diǎn)燃 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:05
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium,In previous chapters, we considered games that had at least one NE, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Battle of the Sexes, and the Chicken games. But, do all games have at least one NE? If we restrict players to choose a specific strategy with certainty, some games may not have an NE.作者: 膽大 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:50
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,In this chapter, we extend the incomplete information games studied in Chapter 8 to allow for sequential interaction. We also extend the sequential-move games of Chapter 6 to allow for incomplete information, that is, at least one of the players observes some information that her rivals do not observe.作者: agnostic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:27
Cheap Talk Games,In this chapter, we explore a class of signaling games where the sender incurs no costs in sending different messages. Unlike in the previous chapter, where messages were costly, such as acquiring years of education, we now consider ., often known as “cheap talk.作者: palliate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:08
978-3-031-37576-7The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl作者: WITH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:02
R. Pabst Prof. Dr. med.,A. Chaker Dr. med.h directly search for the strategy (or strategies) that yield the highest possible payoff to a player, strict dominance seeks to just rule out those strategies that a rational player “would never choose.”作者: Inoperable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:09
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05660-8a of the game. This solution concept, known as the Nash Equilibrium after Nash (1950), builds upon the notion that every player finds the strategy that maximizes her payoff against each of her rivals’ strategies, which we refer as her “best response.作者: Fierce 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:01
Superantigens and Allergic Diseasehese games, we show that this solution concept would yield several equilibrium outcomes, thus not being very precise. More importantly, several NEs in this type of game are based on beliefs that cannot be credible in a dynamic setting.作者: Mhc-Molecule 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:25
Carlos E. Baena-Cagnani,R. Maximiliano Gómezvery player privately knows her valuation for the object being sold (e.g., a painting), but does not observe other bidders’ valuations. Bids, then, are a player’s strategy, and are a function of her privately observed valuation for the object.作者: hypnotic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:50
Ingrid Melkild,Berit Granum,Martinus L?vik firm). More general settings, however, may allow for the sender to choose her message from a continuous action space (e.g., years of education, .) and, similarly, the receiver to respond with a continuous action (e.g., a wage .).作者: pantomime 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:08
Equilibrium Dominance,h directly search for the strategy (or strategies) that yield the highest possible payoff to a player, strict dominance seeks to just rule out those strategies that a rational player “would never choose.”作者: 易于 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:56
Nash Equilibrium,a of the game. This solution concept, known as the Nash Equilibrium after Nash (1950), builds upon the notion that every player finds the strategy that maximizes her payoff against each of her rivals’ strategies, which we refer as her “best response.作者: 愛(ài)好 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:45 作者: hermitage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:14
Auction Theory,very player privately knows her valuation for the object being sold (e.g., a painting), but does not observe other bidders’ valuations. Bids, then, are a player’s strategy, and are a function of her privately observed valuation for the object.作者: 臨時(shí)抱佛腳 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:17
Signaling Games with Continuous Messages, firm). More general settings, however, may allow for the sender to choose her message from a continuous action space (e.g., years of education, .) and, similarly, the receiver to respond with a continuous action (e.g., a wage .).作者: maintenance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:28 作者: surmount 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:04 作者: 先鋒派 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:10
,Nash Equilibria in?Games with?Continuous Action Spaces,s). While helpful to understand the notion of best response in simultaneous-move games, many economic settings allow for continuous, rather than discrete, action spaces, such as firms choosing how much output to produce, which price to set for their products, or how much to invest in advertising. A 作者: 話 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:57
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium,hese games, we show that this solution concept would yield several equilibrium outcomes, thus not being very precise. More importantly, several NEs in this type of game are based on beliefs that cannot be credible in a dynamic setting.作者: 高貴領(lǐng)導(dǎo) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:04
Repeated Games,ral rounds, which are known as “repeated games.” In real life, agents often interact for long periods of time, facing the same institutional or industry characteristics in each period (i.e., the same “rules of the game”). In this respect, repeated games can help us describe many observed settings an作者: certain 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:45 作者: 使糾纏 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:54 作者: 支形吊燈 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:03
Equilibrium Refinements, role of education in the labor market, to pricing strategies seeking to deter firms’ entry in an industry, to car warranties by new automakers operating in a market. However, we found that this class of games may yield a large number of PBEs and, more importantly, some of these equilibria can only 作者: extemporaneous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:01 作者: 造反,叛亂 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:36
,Nash Equilibria in?Games with?Continuous Action Spaces,ete, action spaces, such as firms choosing how much output to produce, which price to set for their products, or how much to invest in advertising. A similar argument applies to other social sciences, such as the political platform that candidates choose when they run for office, or how much each donor contributes to a charity.作者: 行業(yè) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:04 作者: 細(xì)胞學(xué) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:41
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,ayers are uninformed about some piece of information, such as auctions where every bidder privately observes her valuation for the object on sale but does not observe the valuation that other bidders assign to the object.作者: ELUDE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:26
Textbook 2023undergraduate and Masters-level students in economics and finance. Paired with the exercises published on the accompanying website, students will improve both their theoretical and practical understandings of game theory...Readers will walk away from this book understanding complete and incomplete information modelsas well as signaling games..作者: 鉆孔 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:50 作者: follicular-unit 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:55
Jeffrey M. Lehman,Michael S. Blaiss labor-market signaling game, we found th at a PBE where no worker type acquires education can be supported if, upon observing the surprising event of an educated worker, the firm believes she must be of low productivity.作者: incontinence 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:21
Equilibrium Refinements, labor-market signaling game, we found th at a PBE where no worker type acquires education can be supported if, upon observing the surprising event of an educated worker, the firm believes she must be of low productivity.作者: 漸變 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:05
to different settings in economics, business, and more.Suppl.An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples..?..This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts. Specifically, this textbook provides “tools” or “recipes” to solve different classes 作者: Armory 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:07 作者: Brochure 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:12 作者: INCH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:45
