標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research; T. Parthasarathy,B. Dutta,A. Sen Book 1997 Springer Science+Business M [打印本頁] 作者: 空格 時間: 2025-3-21 20:01
書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research被引頻次學(xué)科排名
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書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 軟膏 時間: 2025-3-21 20:54 作者: padding 時間: 2025-3-22 03:06 作者: 毛細血管 時間: 2025-3-22 06:13
Autotoxicity in Agriculture and Forestrymin vertex in balanced connected games. Nucleolus has also been characterized via a set of anxioms based on subgame consistency. This is exploited for standard tree games to arrive at an efficient and intuitively explainable algorithm. Improvements on the pivoting manipulations to locate coalitions 作者: 愚蠢人 時間: 2025-3-22 10:44 作者: 熄滅 時間: 2025-3-22 13:07 作者: 熄滅 時間: 2025-3-22 20:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2640-4algorithms; decision theory; game theory; mathematical economics; operations research作者: 集中營 時間: 2025-3-23 00:18 作者: 不幸的人 時間: 2025-3-23 04:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91540-5For each non transferable utility game a strategic game is introduced. All Nash equilibria of the strategic game are strict equilibria and the equilibrium payoffs are the same as the payoffs in core allocations of the NTU-game. Relations between the payoff map of the strategic game and the remainder map of Driessen and Tijs (1985) are derived.作者: 切碎 時間: 2025-3-23 08:00
Alleinleben — Chance oder DefizitEvery two person game of incomplete information in which the information to both player is identical and deterministic has an equilibrium.作者: 共同時代 時間: 2025-3-23 12:35 作者: Keratin 時間: 2025-3-23 17:37 作者: 用樹皮 時間: 2025-3-23 18:39
Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information the Deterministic Symmetric CaseEvery two person game of incomplete information in which the information to both player is identical and deterministic has an equilibrium.作者: Cosmopolitan 時間: 2025-3-24 01:06 作者: 叫喊 時間: 2025-3-24 03:35 作者: 使痛苦 時間: 2025-3-24 07:49 作者: 悲痛 時間: 2025-3-24 14:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-92408-3hese modified solutions take into account both, the ‘power’, i.e. the worth, and the ‘blocking power’ of a coalition, i.e. the amount which the coalition cannot be prevented from by the complement coalition, in a totally symmetric way. As a direct consequence of the corresponding definitions they ar作者: conjunctivitis 時間: 2025-3-24 17:33 作者: myelography 時間: 2025-3-24 19:42 作者: Offensive 時間: 2025-3-25 00:26
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-92527-5already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of作者: Evocative 時間: 2025-3-25 04:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90327-9ith an equicontinuous family of payoff functions, and an identical action set given by [–1,1]. This example is sharper than that recently presented by Rath-Sun-Yamashige in that the relationship between societal responses and individual payoffs is linear. We also present a theorem on the existence o作者: Seizure 時間: 2025-3-25 09:29 作者: chronicle 時間: 2025-3-25 15:37 作者: 動物 時間: 2025-3-25 19:39
W. Oleszek,M. Jurzysta,P. M. Górskiverage of the expected costs for each player. Using linear complementarity theory, we present a computational scheme for computing a set of stationary equilibrium strategies and the corresponding costs for this game with the additional assumption that under any choice of stationary strategies for th作者: Flinch 時間: 2025-3-25 20:56
A. Koocheki,B. Lalegani,S. A. Hosseinis. In each of these cases, we show that the solution map is (globally) Lipschitzian if and only if the solution map is single-valued. These generalize a similar result of Murthy, Parthasarathy, and Sabatini proved in the LCP setting.作者: appall 時間: 2025-3-26 01:31 作者: 鄙視 時間: 2025-3-26 07:43 作者: 柏樹 時間: 2025-3-26 09:03
Autotoxicity in Agriculture and Forestrye last three years. The paper motivates through examples how the recent algorithms work efficiently for certain structured class of coperative games. Though the data of a cooperative game grows exponentially in size with the number of players, assignment games, and balanced connected games, grow onl作者: ACTIN 時間: 2025-3-26 14:17 作者: 毛細血管 時間: 2025-3-26 19:52 作者: Generosity 時間: 2025-3-26 23:41
Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research978-1-4757-2640-4Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: Hyperlipidemia 時間: 2025-3-27 01:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13554-6btained in this way satisfy the properties of the Kohlberg-Mertens program except Invariance. In order to overcome this problem our solution concept is modified in such a way that all properties formulated by Kohlberg and Mertens are satisfied.作者: ENDOW 時間: 2025-3-27 06:24 作者: rectocele 時間: 2025-3-27 13:28 作者: 憤世嫉俗者 時間: 2025-3-27 14:27 作者: 輕浮女 時間: 2025-3-27 19:25 作者: Insatiable 時間: 2025-3-28 01:03 作者: 廣口瓶 時間: 2025-3-28 02:16
Probability of Obtaining a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Matrix Games with Random Payoffsuilibrium, p, will be a weighted sum of the probabilities of obtaining a pure strategy equilibrium, p., with s distinct payoffs, the weights, q. being the probabilities of obtaining s distinct payoffs from N. However, as N → ∞ the probability q. → 1. In this limiting case p = P. Although p. has been作者: CHAR 時間: 2025-3-28 09:58
Nonlinear Self Dual Solutions for TU-Gameshese modified solutions take into account both, the ‘power’, i.e. the worth, and the ‘blocking power’ of a coalition, i.e. the amount which the coalition cannot be prevented from by the complement coalition, in a totally symmetric way. As a direct consequence of the corresponding definitions they ar作者: Airtight 時間: 2025-3-28 12:49 作者: 畏縮 時間: 2025-3-28 17:21
Consistency Properties of the Nontransferable Cooperative Game Solutions both the prenucleolus and the prekernel don’t possess the reduced game property and the converse reduced game property for all excess functions satisfying the Kalai’s (Kalai (1978)) conditions. The ε-core may possess these properties or not in dependence on excess functions. Axiomatic characterizat作者: arabesque 時間: 2025-3-28 21:03
Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Gamesalready allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of作者: 雄偉 時間: 2025-3-29 02:43 作者: Delectable 時間: 2025-3-29 04:24 作者: vascular 時間: 2025-3-29 09:34
A Chain Condition for Qo-Matricesethods to verify whether a given general matrix is in .. or not. In this note, we present a simple and elegant proposition which provides a necessary condition on ..-matrices. We demonstrate the usefulness of this result in studying a number of examples and in answering Stone’s conjecture that princ作者: Immunoglobulin 時間: 2025-3-29 13:35
Linear Complementarity and the Irreducible Polystochastic Game with the Average Cost Criterion When verage of the expected costs for each player. Using linear complementarity theory, we present a computational scheme for computing a set of stationary equilibrium strategies and the corresponding costs for this game with the additional assumption that under any choice of stationary strategies for th作者: Parley 時間: 2025-3-29 16:04 作者: 泥土謙卑 時間: 2025-3-29 21:50 作者: 故意 時間: 2025-3-30 00:42
Genetic Algorithm for Finding the Nucleolus of Assignment Gamess follow. The first step is to maintain a set of possible solutions of the core, called population. With the concept of nucleolus, the lexicographic order is the function of fitness. The second step is to improve the population by a cyclic three-stage process consisting of a reproduction (selection)作者: 因無茶而冷淡 時間: 2025-3-30 07:51
Some Recent Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Structured Cooperative Gamese last three years. The paper motivates through examples how the recent algorithms work efficiently for certain structured class of coperative games. Though the data of a cooperative game grows exponentially in size with the number of players, assignment games, and balanced connected games, grow onl作者: 送秋波 時間: 2025-3-30 11:53
The Characterisation of the Uniform Reallocation Rule Without Side Payments several properties of reallocation rules such as individual rationality, endowment monotonicity, no-envy, and bilateral consistency. Our main result is the proof that individual rationality and endowment monotonicity imply Pareto optimality. This result is used to provide two characterizations of t作者: 止痛藥 時間: 2025-3-30 12:43
Book 1997R related problems. It brings togetherthe contributions of a wide spectrum of disciplines such asStatistics, Mathematics, Mathematical Economics and OR. Thecontributions include decision theory, stochastic games, cooperativeand noncooperative games. The papers in the volume are classifiedunder five 作者: 原告 時間: 2025-3-30 16:36 作者: FECK 時間: 2025-3-30 23:07
Alleinerziehen im Lebensverlaufity game to guarantee that the ENPAC-value coincides with the well-known solution called prenucleolus. The main conditions require that the largest excesses at the ENPAC-value are attained at the (n — 2)-person coalitions, whereas the excesses of (n — 2)-person coalitions at the ENPAC-value do not differ.作者: Mets552 時間: 2025-3-31 03:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-92527-5 individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.作者: 圓桶 時間: 2025-3-31 09:01 作者: 不近人情 時間: 2025-3-31 10:54 作者: Fabric 時間: 2025-3-31 16:15 作者: 得罪人 時間: 2025-3-31 17:46
Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.作者: Myosin 時間: 2025-3-31 22:58
The Characterisation of the Uniform Reallocation Rule Without Side Paymentshe uniform reallocation rule. The first characterization states that the uniform reallocation rule is the unique reallocation rule satisfying individual rationality, endowment monotonicity, and no-envy. In the second characterization, no-envy is replaced by bilateral consistency.作者: Omniscient 時間: 2025-4-1 04:09 作者: compel 時間: 2025-4-1 08:10
Linear Complementarity and the Irreducible Polystochastic Game with the Average Cost Criterion When ionary equilibrium strategies and the corresponding costs for a polystochastic game in which the transition probabilities depend on the actions of a single player and the criterion is the total discounted expected cost for each player.
