標題: Titlebook: Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security; Traffic and Transpor Kjell Hausken,Jun Zhuang Book 2015 Springer International [打印本頁] 作者: antibody 時間: 2025-3-21 17:19
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書目名稱Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security影響因子(影響力)學科排名
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書目名稱Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security網絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security被引頻次學科排名
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書目名稱Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security讀者反饋學科排名
作者: DEI 時間: 2025-3-21 20:36
1614-7839 urs, which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or inter.Maximizing reader insights into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between different research approaches and throug作者: 搜集 時間: 2025-3-22 02:38 作者: floaters 時間: 2025-3-22 06:31
Invasion Films and the 1990s Interregnum,esults. Numerical experiments are conducted to examine factors that influence the application of this method. Specifically, we compare the efficiency of this method when applied to different Cartesian grid-like networks. Managerial insights into the vulnerability and defense of road networks are drawn from the analysis.作者: 燈絲 時間: 2025-3-22 10:29
Align Client and Provider Perspectives of Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to cope with the fact that NE may not exist in the game, we propose a “.-. scheme, allowing the government to enforce pre-described NE (analogous first-best pricing schemes). We further discuss the stability of this taxing mechanism.作者: BRINK 時間: 2025-3-22 13:49 作者: BRINK 時間: 2025-3-22 19:09
A Psycho-Social Agent-Based Model of Driver Behavior Dynamics,contrast with the aggregate statistical-probabilistic models, this agent-based model can offer valuable insights into the role of both cognitive processes and interactions of drivers on their actual driving behavior. The findings may have useful implications for improving the level of service, safety and security in roads.作者: 酷熱 時間: 2025-3-22 23:47 作者: arousal 時間: 2025-3-23 04:58
Multiple Stakeholders in Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic Approach, of Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to cope with the fact that NE may not exist in the game, we propose a “.-. scheme, allowing the government to enforce pre-described NE (analogous first-best pricing schemes). We further discuss the stability of this taxing mechanism.作者: Narcissist 時間: 2025-3-23 09:13
Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Road Pricing Games: State of the Art and Future Research,r the road authority. This chapter reviews existing results on this topic, discusses our recent case studies within this framework, develops new properties, and brings forward the open issues within this area.作者: Cuisine 時間: 2025-3-23 10:37
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-9572-7ible alternative for traffic control. Distributed strategies decompose the whole traffic network into different subnetworks with local optimal controllers that make decisions on actions to be taken by the actuators responsible for traffic control (traffic lights, routing signals, variable speed limi作者: 量被毀壞 時間: 2025-3-23 16:34 作者: 配置 時間: 2025-3-23 21:14 作者: 休息 時間: 2025-3-24 01:38 作者: Notorious 時間: 2025-3-24 04:31
Alien Vertebrates and Insect Conservation,undamental empirical features of traffic breakdown at a highway bottleneck (transition from free flow (.) to congested traffic at the bottleneck) that is the basic empiric of traffic theory. Kerner argued that traffic breakdown is probabilistic, can be spontaneous (emerging internally at the bottlen作者: fatuity 時間: 2025-3-24 09:13 作者: creditor 時間: 2025-3-24 10:41
Align Client and Provider Perspectives, partly conflicting traffic externalities (congestion, air pollution, noise, safety, etcetera) are represented by corresponding players acting on a common network, we obtain a non-cooperative game where each player pursues a different road pricing strategy to control a specific externality. The gam作者: 凹處 時間: 2025-3-24 18:19 作者: Heart-Attack 時間: 2025-3-24 22:46 作者: 鴿子 時間: 2025-3-25 02:44
Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security978-3-319-11674-7Series ISSN 1614-7839 Series E-ISSN 2196-999X 作者: 膠狀 時間: 2025-3-25 03:22
Kjell Hausken,Jun ZhuangIntroduces aspects of safety, security and game theory into discussions focused on excessive crowding.Considers systems where congestion occurs, which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or inter作者: 管理員 時間: 2025-3-25 10:33
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11674-7Congestion Modelling; Excessive Crowding; Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security; I作者: accessory 時間: 2025-3-25 14:11 作者: Ingenuity 時間: 2025-3-25 16:34 作者: Coeval 時間: 2025-3-25 20:55
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7473-9-based traffic flow model. We show that the proposed approach can solve a dynamic user-optimal route guidance problem based on users’ local outgoing link choice decisions. The numerical studies are implemented by considering two classes of users in the system: informed and non-informed users. The re作者: QUAIL 時間: 2025-3-26 00:09
Alien Vertebrates and Insect Conservation,lified, i.e. the chicken game, battle of the sexes, prisoner’s dilemma, and coordination game. The four developments and Kerner’s theory are linked to game theory, and especially to the chicken game. For the first .?→?. transition the density increases at a constant flow rate. Increasing density inc作者: 道學氣 時間: 2025-3-26 05:57 作者: Airtight 時間: 2025-3-26 09:44
1614-7839 describes how governments and authorities may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these ?tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats..This game-t978-3-319-11674-7Series ISSN 1614-7839 Series E-ISSN 2196-999X 作者: 箴言 時間: 2025-3-26 14:40 作者: GUILT 時間: 2025-3-26 18:16 作者: Hiatal-Hernia 時間: 2025-3-26 22:18
Solving a Dynamic User-Optimal Route Guidance Problem Based on Joint Strategy Fictitious Play,-based traffic flow model. We show that the proposed approach can solve a dynamic user-optimal route guidance problem based on users’ local outgoing link choice decisions. The numerical studies are implemented by considering two classes of users in the system: informed and non-informed users. The re作者: 者變 時間: 2025-3-27 04:21
,Game-Theoretic Context and Interpretation of Kerner’s Three-Phase Traffic Theory,lified, i.e. the chicken game, battle of the sexes, prisoner’s dilemma, and coordination game. The four developments and Kerner’s theory are linked to game theory, and especially to the chicken game. For the first .?→?. transition the density increases at a constant flow rate. Increasing density inc作者: inchoate 時間: 2025-3-27 07:27 作者: 動作謎 時間: 2025-3-27 10:51 作者: EXCEL 時間: 2025-3-27 16:48
Advanced Information Feedback Coupled with an Evolutionary Game in Intelligent Transportation Systeportation systems (ITSs). It, however, has still remained as an unresolved issue and an active research topic due to the complexity of real traffic systems. In this study, we propose two concise and efficient feedback strategies, namely mean velocity difference feedback strategy and congestion coeff作者: 江湖郎中 時間: 2025-3-27 21:47
Solving a Dynamic User-Optimal Route Guidance Problem Based on Joint Strategy Fictitious Play,oute choices for users. In this study, we consider the problem as a multi-player repeated game in a dynamic multi-agent transportation system. We propose a game theory approach based on joint strategy fictitious play by explicitly modeling users’ compliances to route recommendations as an inertia te作者: 河潭 時間: 2025-3-28 01:34
A Psycho-Social Agent-Based Model of Driver Behavior Dynamics,te the drivers’ behavior dynamics under various types of interaction among vehicles. The HESIOD model allows representing the heterogeneity and dynamical processes involved in such control dimensions as risk assessment and time responsiveness of driving behavior (controlled dimension). It is shown t作者: CHANT 時間: 2025-3-28 02:07 作者: 植物群 時間: 2025-3-28 08:58 作者: gangrene 時間: 2025-3-28 10:48
Multiple Stakeholders in Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic Approach,, partly conflicting traffic externalities (congestion, air pollution, noise, safety, etcetera) are represented by corresponding players acting on a common network, we obtain a non-cooperative game where each player pursues a different road pricing strategy to control a specific externality. The gam作者: Foreknowledge 時間: 2025-3-28 17:16
Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Road Pricing Games: State of the Art and Future Research,xcellent tool to investigate possible strategies to analyze such a problem, in which one has to take drivers’ reaction to toll and consequent changes in the traffic flow into account. Depending on the toll structure, the problem may be formulated as a Stackelberg game (when toll is uniform or time-v作者: 截斷 時間: 2025-3-28 21:33
The Later Plays,O’Casey’s later plays all offer some sort of positive criticism of society. This distinguishes them from the early plays, although mostly he uses the same technique of setting his characters against a specific period or public event. The rest are pastoral fantasies.作者: Substitution 時間: 2025-3-29 02:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-94902-9ben Aktivist:innen, Wissenschaftler:innen und politischen Entscheidungstr?ger:innen Hoffnung, dass die Mobilisierung der Bev?lkerung etwas bewirken kann. Diese Einleitung fasst die aktuellen überlegungen zu gewaltfreiem Widerstand zusammen und stellt das im Projekt verwendete Mehr-Methoden-Forschungsdesign vor.
