標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models IV; Social and Political Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Wirtschaftstheo [打印本頁] 作者: 時間 時間: 2025-3-21 20:00
書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models IV影響因子(影響力)
作者: Servile 時間: 2025-3-21 23:01 作者: Inkling 時間: 2025-3-22 04:26
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85531-3odelling them as noncooperative games and analysing their equilibria. It should be mentioned that social interaction is not only the topic of this volume, but also the essential prerequisite of its contributions since they resulted from fruitful and stimulating interaction within the research group.作者: Delectable 時間: 2025-3-22 05:35
Mathematics and Its Applications amounts of altruism but not in accordance with the prescriptions of the normative model. It was concluded that subjects actually do want to make rational decisions but that the normative model is too complicated to be applied by them successfully.作者: adulterant 時間: 2025-3-22 11:55 作者: 注視 時間: 2025-3-22 13:40
,Altruism in Social Dilemmas — Failure to Catch It in a Parameter, amounts of altruism but not in accordance with the prescriptions of the normative model. It was concluded that subjects actually do want to make rational decisions but that the normative model is too complicated to be applied by them successfully.作者: 注視 時間: 2025-3-22 20:58 作者: CANON 時間: 2025-3-22 22:12 作者: Mumble 時間: 2025-3-23 04:23 作者: Yourself 時間: 2025-3-23 09:26 作者: 核心 時間: 2025-3-23 10:59
Resisting the Draft a Perfect Equilibrium Approach,ies out an agreed upon threat. The paper characterizes the class of perfect equilibria for this game. Also studied are institutional variations, such as the payment of commutation fees. The theory is illustrated with data drawn from the Civil and Vietnam War.作者: Pander 時間: 2025-3-23 14:09 作者: nonchalance 時間: 2025-3-23 20:41 作者: 出沒 時間: 2025-3-24 01:56
Classification Theorem of Compact Surfaces,ent paper it will be examined to what extent the outcome of the game changes if this assumption is dropped, that is (in our terminology), if the pressure group is . to use the punitive strategy even if the government takes the action which is preferred by the group.作者: Desert 時間: 2025-3-24 03:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-94709-3on about the inspectee’s payoff for undetected illegal action this instability disappears..For the purpose of illustration the results are applied to material accountancy and data verification problems, and it is shown that the inspector’s equilibrium strategies are the statistical tests commonly used in these contexts.作者: cumber 時間: 2025-3-24 07:56
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?,ent paper it will be examined to what extent the outcome of the game changes if this assumption is dropped, that is (in our terminology), if the pressure group is . to use the punitive strategy even if the government takes the action which is preferred by the group.作者: degradation 時間: 2025-3-24 13:51 作者: Carminative 時間: 2025-3-24 18:20
Book 1991y, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of作者: 中古 時間: 2025-3-24 22:22 作者: ferment 時間: 2025-3-25 02:38
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection,e no transitive social ordering of alternatives based on majority decisions. Here, we do not follow the welfare theoretic attempt to derive a transitive social ordering but rather consider the situation as a game where agents select among alternatives by majority decisions. Of course, the phenomenon作者: 膠狀 時間: 2025-3-25 07:09
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?,(punished) by a pressure group for not conceding to a certain claim. In the model it is . that the punitive (aggressive) action is not used by the pressure group if the government concedes to the claim. The same kind of assumption is used in similar models. In the models of Selten (1978), Kreps and 作者: 溝通 時間: 2025-3-25 10:57
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium,ers number from 1 up to several hundred million. Our current knowledge of what causes a language to gain more speakers than it loses or lose more speakers than it gains is limited to a few generalizations about bivariate, more-less effects (see Dressler, 1982; Laponce, 1984; Lieberson, 1982). One im作者: 真 時間: 2025-3-25 15:37
Resisting the Draft a Perfect Equilibrium Approach,nteer stage consists of a call for volunteers and its possible fulfillment. In case of a shortfall of volunteers, the remaining players enter the resistance formation stage, during which a resistance movement may take shape. In the conscription stage, conscripts are called up and the resistance carr作者: 前奏曲 時間: 2025-3-25 19:17 作者: 單調(diào)女 時間: 2025-3-25 23:30
The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in Mediaeval Literature,lenges are made and accepted. Children’s contests of daring provide a simple context to study challenging, and I argue that children seek a certain reputation; they want to be known for placing a high payoff weight on others’ estimate of that very weight. This definition might seem circular, but it 作者: Infelicity 時間: 2025-3-26 03:22
Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach, alliance formation. In the first model, various alliances can form from an initial state of nonalignment. It helps to answer questions like: will nonalignment continue, or are bipolarity or balance-of-power configurations more likely to develop? Next, we model arms races such that the effects on ar作者: 間諜活動 時間: 2025-3-26 05:43 作者: Bone-Scan 時間: 2025-3-26 11:38
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Partany major offensive operations can exploit the intrinsic defense advantage more efficiently than forces designed to operate in all combat modes including offensive operations. If this were true, conventional stability between two antagonistic parties could be brought about by a mutual adoption of de作者: 嚙齒動物 時間: 2025-3-26 13:43 作者: 難理解 時間: 2025-3-26 20:38
Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information,decision the inspector uses a well-defined procedure which is based on observations of random variables and which may or may not be announced to the inspectee..Whereas in the latter case (no announcement) in equilibrium the inspectee will behave illegally with positive probability, in the former cas作者: ENDOW 時間: 2025-3-26 22:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07369-8Evolution; Wirtschaftstheorie; economic theory; economics; efficiency; equilibrium; evolutionary processes作者: Mhc-Molecule 時間: 2025-3-27 02:34 作者: 緩和 時間: 2025-3-27 05:21 作者: Colonnade 時間: 2025-3-27 11:44
Classification Theorem of Compact Surfaces,(punished) by a pressure group for not conceding to a certain claim. In the model it is . that the punitive (aggressive) action is not used by the pressure group if the government concedes to the claim. The same kind of assumption is used in similar models. In the models of Selten (1978), Kreps and 作者: 尊重 時間: 2025-3-27 16:05 作者: rheumatism 時間: 2025-3-27 17:53 作者: commune 時間: 2025-3-28 01:20
Mathematics and Its Applications the group would fare worse than if nobody applied it. A normative solution for this dilemma assumes a multiattribute utility function with a positively weighted component for the payoff for others which was termed altruism. This model was tested in a series of empirical studies with imaginary scena作者: inspired 時間: 2025-3-28 03:46 作者: COLIC 時間: 2025-3-28 07:25
Elementare Eigenschaften von Polynomen alliance formation. In the first model, various alliances can form from an initial state of nonalignment. It helps to answer questions like: will nonalignment continue, or are bipolarity or balance-of-power configurations more likely to develop? Next, we model arms races such that the effects on ar作者: 加花粗鄙人 時間: 2025-3-28 13:38 作者: 英寸 時間: 2025-3-28 17:30
Mengen und Einführung in die Logikany major offensive operations can exploit the intrinsic defense advantage more efficiently than forces designed to operate in all combat modes including offensive operations. If this were true, conventional stability between two antagonistic parties could be brought about by a mutual adoption of de作者: interior 時間: 2025-3-28 18:53 作者: Perennial長期的 時間: 2025-3-28 23:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-94709-3decision the inspector uses a well-defined procedure which is based on observations of random variables and which may or may not be announced to the inspectee..Whereas in the latter case (no announcement) in equilibrium the inspectee will behave illegally with positive probability, in the former cas作者: absolve 時間: 2025-3-29 06:22
978-3-642-08111-8Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991作者: 溫和女人 時間: 2025-3-29 07:19
Algebraic Theory of Generalized InversesGame equilibrium models are descriptions of interactive decision situations by games in extensive or normal form. The analysis of such models is based on the equilibrium point concept, often refined by additional requirements like subgame perfectness. The series consists of four volumes:作者: 殘暴 時間: 2025-3-29 15:13
,K?rper der rationalen und reellen Zahlen,The idea of balance of power in a system of sovereign states has a long history. Already 300 B.C., Artha-Sastra Kautilya has written on the subject (Kautilya, 1957). A recent book by Bernholz (1985) looks at the historical facts in the light of the theory. A more detailed account of the literature can be found here.作者: Amnesty 時間: 2025-3-29 17:39 作者: 怕失去錢 時間: 2025-3-29 21:43
Balance of Power in a Parlor Game,The idea of balance of power in a system of sovereign states has a long history. Already 300 B.C., Artha-Sastra Kautilya has written on the subject (Kautilya, 1957). A recent book by Bernholz (1985) looks at the historical facts in the light of the theory. A more detailed account of the literature can be found here.作者: Eructation 時間: 2025-3-30 03:51
Book 1991ction. contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria ar作者: 苦澀 時間: 2025-3-30 06:57
cal Interaction. contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria ar978-3-642-08111-8978-3-662-07369-8作者: 縮短 時間: 2025-3-30 09:31
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection,es including the status quo which results if none of the three proposals is accepted. It is an interesting fact that the set of uniformly perfect equilibrium points depends crucially on cardinal utilities although they always imply the same cyclical majorities. Furthermore, the staus quo will only s作者: Carminative 時間: 2025-3-30 14:47 作者: 比賽用背帶 時間: 2025-3-30 17:33
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Partch the antagonistic parties are free to choose between offensive and defensive force structures given the DEH were true..First, it is assumed that both parties know each other’s intentions — expressed by the payoffs of the antagonists. Thereafter, it is assumed that one party knows about the other’s作者: 洞穴 時間: 2025-3-30 22:37 作者: 生氣地 時間: 2025-3-31 04:34
Covering Spaces and Fibrations,es including the status quo which results if none of the three proposals is accepted. It is an interesting fact that the set of uniformly perfect equilibrium points depends crucially on cardinal utilities although they always imply the same cyclical majorities. Furthermore, the staus quo will only s