作者: Grievance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:50 作者: 集合 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:24
Anatoliy K. Prykarpatsky,Ihor V. Mykytiukong players? We present a two-person repeated bargaining game in which players can negotiate for a long-term contract on their actions in the supergame model. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium point of our game necessarily leads to a Pareto efficient outcome if the equilibrium strategies fo作者: 農(nóng)學(xué) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:24 作者: Factual 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58095-6perative game-th oretic approach to analyze bargaining in a class of games . sidepayments in which a point from a Euclidean set of decision alternatives is to be selected in accordance with a simple collective decision rule (Laing, Nakabayashi, and Slotznick, 1983), such as any weighted or unweighte作者: Hirsutism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:03
An Algebraic Specification Language,the apex player and any one of the minor players or else all of the minor players. The demand commitment model is a bargaining procedure, i.e. an extensive form game. This paper investigates the payoffs that result (as subgame perfect outcomes) for apex games when players use the demand commitment b作者: Hirsutism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80278-1ision environment. This paper analyzes data from a computer-aided laboratory study of decision making in spatially represented, majority rule games to identify influences of prominent features of the problem environment on the processes and outcomes of decision, and the way in which these influences作者: 持續(xù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:29
Mathematics and Its Applicationst. The object can be either of high value or of low value. Whereas the seller knows the real value, the buyer is not completely informed in that respect. With probability w he expects that the object is of low value and with the probability 1-w that it is of high value. The parameter w is common kno作者: 縮短 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:58 作者: FAST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:18 作者: Minutes 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:36
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4Evolution; Spieltheorie; Wirtschaftstheorie; economics; equilibrium; evolutionary processes; evolution?re 作者: Reverie 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:53 作者: overwrought 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:07
Algebraic Methods in Operator TheoryIn the tradition of folk theorems, this paper shows that nearly anything can be a bargaining outcome of the proposal-making model.作者: addict 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:21 作者: Cuisine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:07
,Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”,Game equilibrium models are descriptions of interactive decision situations by games in extensive or normal form. The analysis of such models is based on the equilibrium point concept, often refined by additional requirements like subgame perfectness. The series consists of four volumes:作者: Macronutrients 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:27
Folk Theorems for the Proposal-Making Model,In the tradition of folk theorems, this paper shows that nearly anything can be a bargaining outcome of the proposal-making model.作者: instulate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:17
Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game,Wage bargaining between “capital” and “l(fā)abor” is analyzed as an alternating offer game, where disagreement leads to surplus sharing according to the contractual status quo or to a strike.作者: incisive 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:11
Mathematics and Its Applications a bargaining theory model. Despite the differences in the approach of these three models and the resulting differences in the nature of their solutions, all three models make similar predictions of bargaining outcomes.作者: 邪惡的你 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80278-1ision environment. This paper analyzes data from a computer-aided laboratory study of decision making in spatially represented, majority rule games to identify influences of prominent features of the problem environment on the processes and outcomes of decision, and the way in which these influences change through competition and learning.*作者: 減少 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:13
Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU Games, a bargaining theory model. Despite the differences in the approach of these three models and the resulting differences in the nature of their solutions, all three models make similar predictions of bargaining outcomes.作者: 罐里有戒指 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:33
Prominence, Competition, Learning, and the Generation of Offers in Computer-Aided Experimental Spatision environment. This paper analyzes data from a computer-aided laboratory study of decision making in spatially represented, majority rule games to identify influences of prominent features of the problem environment on the processes and outcomes of decision, and the way in which these influences change through competition and learning.*作者: 和音 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:29
,Introduction to Volume III: “Strategic Bargaining”,g. The inspiration came from papers by Binmore (1985), Rubinstein (1982) and Selten (1981) which were carefully studied and critically discussed at the time the research project started. All the papers collected in this volume, except the one by ., deal with bargaining under conditions of complete i作者: BLANK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:36 作者: 上下連貫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:39 作者: ALT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:40
Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU Games, a bargaining theory model. Despite the differences in the approach of these three models and the resulting differences in the nature of their solutions, all three models make similar predictions of bargaining outcomes.作者: Herd-Immunity 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:46
A Noncooperative Model of Bargaining in Simple Spatial Games,perative game-th oretic approach to analyze bargaining in a class of games . sidepayments in which a point from a Euclidean set of decision alternatives is to be selected in accordance with a simple collective decision rule (Laing, Nakabayashi, and Slotznick, 1983), such as any weighted or unweighte作者: Pruritus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:25 作者: 必死 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:42
Prominence, Competition, Learning, and the Generation of Offers in Computer-Aided Experimental Spatision environment. This paper analyzes data from a computer-aided laboratory study of decision making in spatially represented, majority rule games to identify influences of prominent features of the problem environment on the processes and outcomes of decision, and the way in which these influences作者: agitate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:19
,Original or Fake — A Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information,t. The object can be either of high value or of low value. Whereas the seller knows the real value, the buyer is not completely informed in that respect. With probability w he expects that the object is of low value and with the probability 1-w that it is of high value. The parameter w is common kno作者: 騷擾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:25 作者: 新字 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:36 作者: Cirrhosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:59 作者: 共同確定為確 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:45 作者: Affiliation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:40
Algebraic Structures and Operator Calculusonverge to core payoffs of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions (f-core payoffs). The static continuum game provides an idealization of the limit of the dynamic games for small waiting costs. Thus our research initiates providing a noncooperative foundation for the core as a solu作者: 智力高 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:16
,Introduction to Volume III: “Strategic Bargaining”,rocedures. The . paper is restricted to games with transferable utility, while . considers general NTU games. . and . consider bargaining in a spatial context where the problem is which location to choose. . provides a theoretical analysis whereas . present experimental results obtained in this sett作者: 松果 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:19 作者: 愛(ài)花花兒憤怒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:13 作者: 不愛(ài)防注射 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:47
A Game Equilibrium Model of Thin Markets,onverge to core payoffs of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions (f-core payoffs). The static continuum game provides an idealization of the limit of the dynamic games for small waiting costs. Thus our research initiates providing a noncooperative foundation for the core as a solu作者: SPALL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:40 作者: 手工藝品 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:50
ning. contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.978-3-642-08110-1978-3-662-07367-4作者: Throttle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:02 作者: CRACY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:37 作者: 柔軟 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:38
Book 1991y, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of作者: obligation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:36
Algebraic Geometry for Beginnersndependently. The disagreement point of the Nash bargaining solution is determined to be a Nash equilibrium point of the normal form game. If short-term contracts only are enforceable, the Nash bargaining solution can not be implemented.作者: AMPLE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:54
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58095-6d majority rule. It builds from foundations established in Selten’s (1981) noncooperative analysis of bargaining in zero-normalized, one-stage characteristic function games. It models simple spatial bargaining games, and characterizes noncooperative stationary equilibrium strategies and their relation to demand equilibria (Albers, 1975, 1987).*作者: Obsessed 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 12:53 作者: 掃興 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:36 作者: EWE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:48
A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts,e model. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium point of our game necessarily leads to a Pareto efficient outcome if the equilibrium strategies for both players have .. We also point out that the question above is answered negatively if the equilibrium strategies for players have ..作者: Desert 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:48
Ghita Ibrahimi,Bouchra Benchekrountzt sind. Eines der Fallbeispiele erz?hlt Yuris Geschichte. Geschildert wird ein in westlichen Augen unfassbarer Skandal: In der Stadt La Unión im Norden Perus wurde 2003 ein achtj?hriges M?dchen ermordet auf der Stra?e vor dem Haus ihrer wohlhabenden Peiniger gefunden, wo es vor dem Mord brutal ver
