作者: beta-carotene 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:37
,Anarchy and Agreement — A Game Theoretic Analysis of Some Aspects of Contractarianism,N of concerned individuals who share a common interest decide whether or not they become members of a group S. Only after the group has been constituted its members may make decisions according to some collective decision rule. The decision of whether or not a rational player should join S depends o作者: reflection 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:20
Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement Without Guards,tors have the same payoffs, monitoring efficiencies, and norms of behavior. Then, we examine how stealing and monitoring rates are affected by changes in parameters including: number of irrigators. cost of monitoring, detection probabilities, relative benefits of stealing, losses felt when stealing 作者: forestry 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:01
Interaction between Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,he (known) structure of inconsistent prior beliefs about the level of uncertain market demand for the basic commodity. The hedging part is related to (known) levels of stocks of the resource available to the individual producers, and to their degree of risk aversion. The conditions under which each 作者: chemoprevention 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:52 作者: 有毒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:32 作者: 有毒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:22
Computing Resolutions Over Finite ,-Groups,tors have the same payoffs, monitoring efficiencies, and norms of behavior. Then, we examine how stealing and monitoring rates are affected by changes in parameters including: number of irrigators. cost of monitoring, detection probabilities, relative benefits of stealing, losses felt when stealing 作者: 半球 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:39 作者: 半導(dǎo)體 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:40
,Introduction to Volume II: “Methods, Morals and Markets”,ocieties, and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. The analysis throughout is strictly noncooperative, in the usual sense that players are expected to abrogate an agreement unless the nature of the agreement provides incentives to comply. A recurrent theme is the importance of timing and 作者: 溫順 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:49
On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion,e game over and over allows players to repond to others’ actions and forces each player to visualize the reactions of his opponents. Hence, if a game is repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agen作者: Coronary-Spasm 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:43 作者: 包租車船 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:43 作者: 牲畜欄 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:55 作者: Conflagration 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:57
Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement Without Guards,e rule—following and rule—enforcement rates of behavior adopted by irrigators on systems where rules are self—enforced rather than enforced by formal guards. To do this, we assume that irrigators rotate into the position of a turntaker. When in the position of a turntaker, they choose between taking作者: 吼叫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 03:49 作者: gene-therapy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:55
Interaction between Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,ic commodity, the purely speculative nature of most of futures trading and apparent availability of unlimited funds to the traders..Interaction between the extraction policy of duopolists and their futures trading is modelled with the help of a two-stage noncooperative game with incomplete informati作者: 不近人情 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:00
A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game,set is uncertain. This characteristic lends the common-value auction model (Wilson [1977], Milgrom and Weber [19821) much of its richness. It also makes the bidder’s strategic problem more complex: laboratory observations of common-value auctions have suggested that subjects exhibit substantially mo作者: 文藝 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:12
Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidedicts that users of open access common-pool resources will appropriate units from the resource at suboptimal rates near full rent depletion. We present evidence from laboratory experiments designed to investigate the accuracy of the rent dissipation prediction for such environments.作者: Lipoprotein 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:50
The work of T. Kawai on exact WKB analysisis repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agents. This is, in a very crude and simple fashion, the message of the Folk Theorem.作者: 背書 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:49
General Discussion of Lie Algebras, some people are better managers than others, that some people are better negotiators, etc. At a shallow level, there is an easy explanation. Certain tasks, including performance in strategic settings, require specific skills. People who have those skills perform the tasks better than those who do not.作者: GREEN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:06
A. Brini,F. Regonati,A. G. B. Teoliselements in the analysis are the study of primitive equilibria and of the tracing procedure. The analysis sheds light on the “evolutive” and the “eductive” aspects of Harsanyi and Selten’s theory and it also allows a better understanding of the older, non game theoretic literature on signaling.作者: Aspiration 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:02
Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game,elements in the analysis are the study of primitive equilibria and of the tracing procedure. The analysis sheds light on the “evolutive” and the “eductive” aspects of Harsanyi and Selten’s theory and it also allows a better understanding of the older, non game theoretic literature on signaling.作者: 誓言 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:15
On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion,is repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agents. This is, in a very crude and simple fashion, the message of the Folk Theorem.作者: 確保 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:01 作者: 惰性女人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:16
Abdallah Assi,Margherita Barilequilibria leaves only stationary equilibria in supergames. . ask when subgame-perfection may not pay appropriate attention to whether the group wishes to deviate from plans made, that is, to renegotiate.作者: spinal-stenosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:05 作者: predict 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:24
Connectedness, Smooth and Simplerstad [19881) than in the more artificial setting of private-values auctions (where each bidder knows for sure the asset’s value to him, cf. Kagel, Harstad and Levin [1987], Cox, Roberson and Smith [1982]).作者: reserve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:28
A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game,rstad [19881) than in the more artificial setting of private-values auctions (where each bidder knows for sure the asset’s value to him, cf. Kagel, Harstad and Levin [1987], Cox, Roberson and Smith [1982]).作者: Feedback 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:27
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07365-0Evolution; Spieltheorie; Wirtschaftstheorie; algebra; economics; equilibrium; evolutionary processes; evolu作者: 600 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:37 作者: Diastole 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:59
Algebra, Funktionalanalysis und CodierungThis paper has two purposes. The immediate purpose is to point out some difficulties with the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten, and show how they can be dealt with. The other purpose is to describe the theory of semi-algebraic sets and a few of its applications in game theory.作者: 攝取 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:59
Steven Peter Dugaro,Konrad PolthierIn this paper we discuss the conceptual foundations of one approach to modelling renegotiation in repeated games. Renegotiation-proof equilibria are viewed as social conventions that players continue to find beneficial after every history. The theory can be understood in terms of stationary stable sets of credible deviations.作者: Dri727 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:06
,Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”,Game equilibrium models are descriptions of interactive decision situations by games in extensive or normal form. The analysis of such models is based on the equilibrium point concept, often refined by additional requirements like subgame perfectness. The series consists of four volumes:作者: textile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:26
The Algebraic Geometry of Games and the Tracing Procedure,This paper has two purposes. The immediate purpose is to point out some difficulties with the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten, and show how they can be dealt with. The other purpose is to describe the theory of semi-algebraic sets and a few of its applications in game theory.作者: 好忠告人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:29
A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games,In this paper we discuss the conceptual foundations of one approach to modelling renegotiation in repeated games. Renegotiation-proof equilibria are viewed as social conventions that players continue to find beneficial after every history. The theory can be understood in terms of stationary stable sets of credible deviations.作者: 無(wú)瑕疵 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:18 作者: Visual-Field 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:11
Overview: 978-3-642-08109-5978-3-662-07365-0作者: misanthrope 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:57 作者: CAND 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:50
Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidedicts that users of open access common-pool resources will appropriate units from the resource at suboptimal rates near full rent depletion. We present evidence from laboratory experiments designed to investigate the accuracy of the rent dissipation prediction for such environments.作者: seroma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:38
Abdallah Assi,Margherita Barileocieties, and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. The analysis throughout is strictly noncooperative, in the usual sense that players are expected to abrogate an agreement unless the nature of the agreement provides incentives to comply. A recurrent theme is the importance of timing and 作者: linear 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:24
The work of T. Kawai on exact WKB analysise game over and over allows players to repond to others’ actions and forces each player to visualize the reactions of his opponents. Hence, if a game is repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agen作者: Axon895 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:49 作者: Hiatal-Hernia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:13
First-Order or Linear Equationsal contract issues by an appeal to Rubinstein-type bargaining arguments employed “in the original position”. The current paper is not “Part II” of this earlier paper, but a re-appraisal of the whole problem. The re-appraisal continues to defend a version of the Rawlsian position against Harsanyi’s u作者: ABIDE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:14
Analysis of AES Equation Systems,ly, that nothing short of free consent of all individuals concerned can justify an institutional order. The discussion is based on an extensive game of consensual choice of rules or institutions in prisoner’s dilemma situations. In this game the fundamental distinction between collective consent und作者: BOOR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:34 作者: ANN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:59 作者: JAMB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:19
Strategies for Polynomial Systemsic commodity, the purely speculative nature of most of futures trading and apparent availability of unlimited funds to the traders..Interaction between the extraction policy of duopolists and their futures trading is modelled with the help of a two-stage noncooperative game with incomplete informati作者: 美學(xué) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:52 作者: 溫室 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:42
Donald Sannella,Andrzej Tarleckidicts that users of open access common-pool resources will appropriate units from the resource at suboptimal rates near full rent depletion. We present evidence from laboratory experiments designed to investigate the accuracy of the rent dissipation prediction for such environments.作者: 易碎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:12 作者: 枯萎將要 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 10:57 作者: annexation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1135-9The cyclic behaviour of materials at high temperature is more complicated than its low-temperature equivalent, because the . and the . of the cycle both cause material damage.作者: 嚴(yán)峻考驗(yàn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 17:46 作者: BLINK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:29
978-3-658-23581-9Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2020
