標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions; Amnon Rapoport Book 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990 USA.bargaining.competition.conflic [打印本頁] 作者: Blandishment 時間: 2025-3-21 18:21
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions被引頻次
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions年度引用
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions讀者反饋
書目名稱Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 整潔漂亮 時間: 2025-3-21 22:33
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-25712-8mposed of several PD subgames (conflicts) which are interconnected in the sense that each joint decision determines, in addition to the payoff for each player, the next subgame (conflict) to be played. Several experiments are reported, using both male and female players. The results show that player作者: frenzy 時間: 2025-3-22 00:40 作者: cognizant 時間: 2025-3-22 07:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3459-3her when he should take action. The minimax solution to games of timing with incomplete information and equal accuracy functions is presented. An experimental paradigm of such games is provided by a computer-controlled two-person, zero-sum, infinite game that simulates the Western style silent duel.作者: vitreous-humor 時間: 2025-3-22 12:17 作者: Criteria 時間: 2025-3-22 16:39
Leopold Scha?fer,Rudolf Lehmanners alternately make and respond to each other’s offers through time. He further characterized the perfect equilibrium outcomes, which depend on the players’ time preferences and order of moves. Using both equal and unequal bargaining cost conditions and an unlimited number of rounds, two experiment作者: Criteria 時間: 2025-3-22 19:47
,Aufwertung von Versicherungsansprüchen,haracteristic function form. The extensive vocabulary of the program and its mode of operation are presented nontechnically, followed by an examination of a protocol from a sample four-person game. Improvements over a previous version of the program and applications to other experimental paradigms i作者: NUL 時間: 2025-3-23 00:11 作者: 傻瓜 時間: 2025-3-23 04:39
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-32957-3on games in characteristic function form, namely, the bargaining set and two of its subsets, the competitive bargaining set and the kernel..Twelve groups of subjects participated in several four-person and five-person Apex games. The effects of group size, order of communication, learning, and value作者: Desert 時間: 2025-3-23 07:37 作者: Atrium 時間: 2025-3-23 13:09
Gesetzgebung und Verwaltungsrechtents, that modeled negotiable conflicts in which two of the players are weak and one is considerably stronger. Both the degree to which the strong player was powerful and the type of communication were experimentally manipulated. The 90 game outcomes rejected any solution concept that predicts a sin作者: 熟練 時間: 2025-3-23 17:00 作者: nostrum 時間: 2025-3-23 18:55
Gesetzgebung mit Bürgerbeteiligung coalition forming behavior in such games and to test the descriptive power of four major solution concepts that yield differing prescriptions for market games, 11 pentads of students each played 6 different market games presented in characteristic function form through a computer-controlled experim作者: BIDE 時間: 2025-3-24 00:16 作者: 細(xì)胞學(xué) 時間: 2025-3-24 04:32
Die Steuerungsfunktion des Gesetzes, (1957) and in the tetrad by Kalisch et al. (1954). The former experiment was instigated by theoretical research in the social sciences and the latter was inspired by the mathematical theory of games. Having witnesses much progress in the last three decades, these two disciplines have continued to s作者: 使高興 時間: 2025-3-24 08:12
§?10: Verkehrspflicht zur Offenbarungrrespondents were each asked (a) to assess the political power ratios of the 10 parties represented in the Knesset and (b) to judge the ideological similarity between them. As ascertained by Saaty’s analytic hierarchy scaling technique, the power ratio judgments proved sufficiently consistent to jus作者: Temporal-Lobe 時間: 2025-3-24 13:56 作者: 事與愿違 時間: 2025-3-24 17:42 作者: Decimate 時間: 2025-3-24 20:27
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1992-1USA; bargaining; competition; conflict; conflict situation; conflicts; cooperative games; decision making; d作者: 填料 時間: 2025-3-25 01:26 作者: BOON 時間: 2025-3-25 03:36 作者: bypass 時間: 2025-3-25 08:28 作者: conspicuous 時間: 2025-3-25 14:15
Optimal Policies for the Prisoner’s Dilemmas perceived by the players, an optimal policy is prescribed to each player maximizing his long-run expected gain. The dilemma is “resolved” by restructuring the game as a supergame composed of several component games such that transitions among them are possible. Dynamic programming is used to derive the optimal policy.作者: promote 時間: 2025-3-25 19:35 作者: 變化 時間: 2025-3-25 21:16 作者: epidermis 時間: 2025-3-26 02:33
,Aufwertung von Versicherungsansprüchen,n of a protocol from a sample four-person game. Improvements over a previous version of the program and applications to other experimental paradigms investigating coalition formation and bargaining are discussed in the last two sections of the paper.作者: 和藹 時間: 2025-3-26 06:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-25712-8 is perceived as an individual decision task, the percentage of cooperative behavior increases. A normative model for the MPD game is presented. Its failure to account for the observed results is discussed briefly.作者: Circumscribe 時間: 2025-3-26 10:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50673-4 function, but the starting number of bullets available to each player in the dyad was varied systematically. The results of this experiment are analyzed and discussed in terms of variables that relate to predictions arising from the mathematical theory of duels.作者: boisterous 時間: 2025-3-26 13:00 作者: Hiatus 時間: 2025-3-26 18:40
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-32957-3y depend upon group size and order of communication..Models describing the bargaining process, rather than the final outcomes only, are presented, tested, and partially supported. The relationships between the final outcomes of the present study and those of previous studies of Apex games are briefly discussed.作者: 啞劇 時間: 2025-3-26 21:59 作者: degradation 時間: 2025-3-27 01:12
Decisions of Timing in Bipolarized Conflict Situations with Complete Information function, but the starting number of bullets available to each player in the dyad was varied systematically. The results of this experiment are analyzed and discussed in terms of variables that relate to predictions arising from the mathematical theory of duels.作者: 變化 時間: 2025-3-27 06:09
Effects of Fixed Costs in Two-Person Sequential Bargainingst offers, and number of bargaining rounds, which provide limited support to the perfect equilibrium model, and then conclude by recommending a shift in focus from model testing to specification of the conditions favoring one model over another.作者: dissent 時間: 2025-3-27 12:29 作者: GUILE 時間: 2025-3-27 17:12
,Anzeigepflicht bei Verkrüppelungen,ing a silent version (where unsuccessful fire is unknown to the opponent). Several game-theoretic implications were tested, some of which demonstrate the efficacy of the theory of games of timing as an explicatory mechanism for decision behavior in experimental duels.作者: 商店街 時間: 2025-3-27 18:04
Gesetzgebung und Verwaltungsrechtgle payoff vector for a given coalition structure, but supported the recently developed single-parameter a-power model that allows range predictions. Both the degree of power and type of communication were found to affect game outcomes and to determine the predictive power of models that make point predictions in 3-person games.作者: 集合 時間: 2025-3-28 01:12 作者: Intractable 時間: 2025-3-28 05:41
Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung,en tested with ideological proximity measures from 52 parliament members, reporters, and students of political science collected immediately after the 1981 elections to the tenth Israeli Knesset but before the formation of a coalition government. Theoretical implications of the model are briefly discussed.作者: 猛然一拉 時間: 2025-3-28 07:49 作者: 樣式 時間: 2025-3-28 14:22 作者: 猛烈責(zé)罵 時間: 2025-3-28 14:34
The Power of a Coalition and Payoff Disbursement in Three-Person Negotiable Conflictslition. Estimation procedures for α and measures of goodness of fit of the model are provided, and the relationships between the model and previously advocated solution concepts are explored. The model is then examined in a review of the outcomes of nine previously published experiments using 3-person games in characteristic function form.作者: 脫毛 時間: 2025-3-28 22:40
Dominated, Connected, and Tight Coalitions in the Israeli Knesseten tested with ideological proximity measures from 52 parliament members, reporters, and students of political science collected immediately after the 1981 elections to the tenth Israeli Knesset but before the formation of a coalition government. Theoretical implications of the model are briefly discussed.作者: Cumulus 時間: 2025-3-29 01:35 作者: 信任 時間: 2025-3-29 05:51
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-13376-6rt the bargaining set and kernel models as predictors of final outcomes, reveal significant effects due to the latter two independent variables but not the former, and provide useful information about the nature of the bargaining process.作者: Fibroid 時間: 2025-3-29 08:51
Gesetzgebung mit Bürgerbeteiligung the equal share solution, and a recently developed model, that encompasses the predictions of the bargaining set and equal shares, served jointly as the first-order determinants of both the decision of which coalition to form and the allocation of payoff to coalition members.作者: 過剩 時間: 2025-3-29 13:17
Zusammenfassung und Folgerungen which generalizes previous research by assigning different values to the three 2-person coalitions, introducing dependency between successive characteristic functions, and eliminating face-to-face bargaining. The results support the mixed-signal model over its competitors.作者: 匍匐 時間: 2025-3-29 18:51
Decisions of Timing in Conflict Situations of Incomplete Informationiment are analyzed and discussed in terms of variables that relate to predictions arising from the mathematical theory of silent duels. Differences between results from the silent duel and previous research on noisy duels (Kahan & Rapoport, 1971) are discussed.作者: 花費 時間: 2025-3-29 22:26 作者: 使堅硬 時間: 2025-3-30 02:24
Coalition Formation in a Five-Person Market Game the equal share solution, and a recently developed model, that encompasses the predictions of the bargaining set and equal shares, served jointly as the first-order determinants of both the decision of which coalition to form and the allocation of payoff to coalition members.作者: 收到 時間: 2025-3-30 05:19 作者: 委派 時間: 2025-3-30 12:18
A PDP-11/45 Program for Playing N-Person Characteristic Function Gamesn of a protocol from a sample four-person game. Improvements over a previous version of the program and applications to other experimental paradigms investigating coalition formation and bargaining are discussed in the last two sections of the paper.作者: 施加 時間: 2025-3-30 14:44 作者: separate 時間: 2025-3-30 19:37
0924-6126 Fouraker. I %0; Stone. 1958). However. only in the last ten or fifteen years has laboratory experimentation in economics started its steady transformation from 978-94-010-7391-2978-94-009-1992-1Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: Adherent 時間: 2025-3-30 21:18
Standards of Fairness in 4-Person Monopolistic Cooperative Gamese. Two quartets’ standards were well within the prediction of the bargaining set; one quartet supported the power model. Analysis of the patterns of coalition structure and rudimentary analyses of the bargaining processes indicate that the central concept of standards of fairness underlying the powe作者: STAT 時間: 2025-3-31 04:01 作者: arbiter 時間: 2025-3-31 08:33 作者: DEAWL 時間: 2025-3-31 10:22 作者: prostatitis 時間: 2025-3-31 14:29 作者: 博識 時間: 2025-3-31 18:29
§?10: Verkehrspflicht zur Offenbarungs were then compared to the predictions of six power indices, three of which only consider the seat distributions. Of the six models, the generalized Banzhaf power index best accounted for the perceived power of 62% of the subjects, whereas the classical Shapley-Shubik index provided the best fit fo
