標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models; Koji Okuguchi Book 1976 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1976 Stability.calculus.functi [打印本頁] 作者: 要旨 時間: 2025-3-21 19:09
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models被引頻次
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models年度引用
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models讀者反饋
書目名稱Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 鋸齒狀 時間: 2025-3-21 21:44 作者: 挖掘 時間: 2025-3-22 01:37 作者: olfction 時間: 2025-3-22 06:50 作者: 確定方向 時間: 2025-3-22 12:32
Book 1976ssumption is too naive to be realistically supported. However, the Cournot profit maximizing oligopoly model characterized by this assumption has many important and attractive properties from the view- point of economic theory and provides a frame of reference for more realistic theories of oligopol作者: NUL 時間: 2025-3-22 16:29 作者: NUL 時間: 2025-3-22 21:01 作者: 下邊深陷 時間: 2025-3-22 23:37 作者: VAN 時間: 2025-3-23 04:03 作者: sinoatrial-node 時間: 2025-3-23 07:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41570-8’s paradise in which interdependence is never considered. In making its more radical decisions, such as launching of a major advertizing campaign or the introduction of a radically new line of products, management usually does not consider the probable competitive response”..作者: 審問 時間: 2025-3-23 12:00
Revenue Maximizing Duopoly,’s paradise in which interdependence is never considered. In making its more radical decisions, such as launching of a major advertizing campaign or the introduction of a radically new line of products, management usually does not consider the probable competitive response”..作者: 拍下盜公款 時間: 2025-3-23 14:45
Adaptive Expectations and Stability of Oligopoly Equilibrium, .No sign restriction is imposed on parameter d. of the cost function. If d. is negative, however, marginal as well as total costs might become negative for a sufficiently large output, which is absurd. We, therefore, assume away this absurd situation for profit maximizing output x. for all i.作者: eustachian-tube 時間: 2025-3-23 19:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25452-9listic consideration in choosing their optimal policies. Once they formed subjective estimates of the relevant function(s), no revision of estimates occurred. Subjective estimates were rather of a definite nature and probability distribution of the estimates was beyond consideration.作者: Radiculopathy 時間: 2025-3-24 00:21 作者: cancellous-bone 時間: 2025-3-24 03:32 作者: Communicate 時間: 2025-3-24 09:57 作者: Chromatic 時間: 2025-3-24 13:19
Introduction,r close substitutes are limited in number. The fewness of firms in oligopoly gives rise to interdependence which they have to take into account in choosing their optimal output or pricing policies in each production period. Since each firm’s profit is a function of all firms’ outputs in an oligopoly作者: grieve 時間: 2025-3-24 16:25
Existence and Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution(or Equilibrium),ist. According to Cournot, each firm in any oligopolistic industry determines its optimal profit maximizing output in any period on the naive assumption that all of its rivals’ outputs will remain at the same levels as in the immediately preceding period.作者: 防銹 時間: 2025-3-24 20:46 作者: Throttle 時間: 2025-3-25 01:42
Revenue Maximizing Duopoly,a constraint of attainment of minimum necessary profit is more commonly observed among large firms than unconstrained profit maximization, and has formulated a model of revenue maximization under minimum profit constraint. Though Baumol is well aware of interdependence among firms, he has ignored th作者: PANEL 時間: 2025-3-25 03:21 作者: THE 時間: 2025-3-25 11:22
Adaptive Expectations and Stability of Oligopoly Equilibrium,aptive expectations on all others’ outputs. The market demand function, and the cost and profit functions of the i-th firm are given, respectively, by .No sign restriction is imposed on parameter d. of the cost function. If d. is negative, however, marginal as well as total costs might become negati作者: hypertension 時間: 2025-3-25 12:32
Unknown Demand Function and Stability, information of market demand function for its product as well as for the market price and rivals’ outputs in the past. In this chapter we drop this assumption of complete in formation. Thus although each firm does not in general have exact knowledge of the true market demand function, it is assumed作者: alabaster 時間: 2025-3-25 17:35
Probability Models, function will perceive them subjectively. Oligopolists in Chapter 8 were assumed to perceive subjectively only the unknown market demand function. Notwithstanding their perceptions of the unknown marginal cost and/or market demand function, firms in both chapters were given no allowance for probabi作者: 云狀 時間: 2025-3-25 22:37
Reinhold Sellien,Helmut Sellienr close substitutes are limited in number. The fewness of firms in oligopoly gives rise to interdependence which they have to take into account in choosing their optimal output or pricing policies in each production period. Since each firm’s profit is a function of all firms’ outputs in an oligopoly作者: cumber 時間: 2025-3-26 00:56 作者: defile 時間: 2025-3-26 05:09
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59558-0due to Mayberry, Nash and Shubik(1953)(see also Shubik (1959)), let two firms’ cost functions in a Cournot duopoly under no product differentiation be given by . and let . be the market demand function. If two firms act in perfect competition, marginal costs of both must equal the competitively give作者: Misgiving 時間: 2025-3-26 09:41 作者: Pelvic-Floor 時間: 2025-3-26 16:25
Gaelic Games and Player Violence,von Stackelberg(1934) has almost been outside the scope of concern of economists. J.M.Henderson and R.E.Quandt(1958) in now a classic on mathematical microeconomics have given an excellent summary of Stackelberg’s fundamental idea on duopoly without, however, giving any systematic analysis of dynami作者: Eclampsia 時間: 2025-3-26 20:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2190-6aptive expectations on all others’ outputs. The market demand function, and the cost and profit functions of the i-th firm are given, respectively, by .No sign restriction is imposed on parameter d. of the cost function. If d. is negative, however, marginal as well as total costs might become negati作者: Institution 時間: 2025-3-26 22:30 作者: 向下五度才偏 時間: 2025-3-27 04:36 作者: 事情 時間: 2025-3-27 07:44 作者: Carbon-Monoxide 時間: 2025-3-27 10:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99915-4Though the stability condition for the Cournot oligopoly solution in a discrete (difference equation) system in the previous chapter ensured uniqueness of the solution, we assumed its uniqueness in our analysis of global stability in continuous (differential equation) systems.作者: 步兵 時間: 2025-3-27 14:30
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-68196-1The Cournot assumption on rivals’ behavior in oligopoly is undoubtedly naive. Two more general formulae for formation of expectations exist in economic theory. One is extrapolative and the other adaptive. Under the former, the expected value of an economic variable x in period t, x., is given by . or 作者: 骯臟 時間: 2025-3-27 20:17
Uniqueness of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution,Though the stability condition for the Cournot oligopoly solution in a discrete (difference equation) system in the previous chapter ensured uniqueness of the solution, we assumed its uniqueness in our analysis of global stability in continuous (differential equation) systems.作者: 努力趕上 時間: 2025-3-27 23:50
Extrapolative Expectations and Stability of Oligopoly Equilibrium,The Cournot assumption on rivals’ behavior in oligopoly is undoubtedly naive. Two more general formulae for formation of expectations exist in economic theory. One is extrapolative and the other adaptive. Under the former, the expected value of an economic variable x in period t, x., is given by . or 作者: DEVIL 時間: 2025-3-28 05:51 作者: debris 時間: 2025-3-28 07:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59558-0due to Mayberry, Nash and Shubik(1953)(see also Shubik (1959)), let two firms’ cost functions in a Cournot duopoly under no product differentiation be given by . and let . be the market demand function. If two firms act in perfect competition, marginal costs of both must equal the competitively given market price.作者: Invigorate 時間: 2025-3-28 12:51 作者: aptitude 時間: 2025-3-28 16:40 作者: 友好 時間: 2025-3-28 21:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46347-1Stability; calculus; function; proof; theorem作者: 剛開始 時間: 2025-3-29 02:29
978-3-540-08056-5Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1976作者: 異端 時間: 2025-3-29 05:44
Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models978-3-642-46347-1Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 作者: 痛苦一生 時間: 2025-3-29 09:20 作者: 脆弱吧 時間: 2025-3-29 13:28 作者: 責(zé)難 時間: 2025-3-29 17:37 作者: bronchiole 時間: 2025-3-29 22:55 作者: avenge 時間: 2025-3-30 02:37
