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標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies; Interplay Between St Julia Poncela Casasnovas Book 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 Co [打印本頁]

作者: T-cell    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:35
書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies被引頻次




書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies年度引用




書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies讀者反饋




書目名稱Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies讀者反饋學(xué)科排名





作者: GEST    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:05
Some Basic Concepts on Complex Networks and Games, it, and two more sophisticated models that combine the growth with the play in the second), we consider that it is useful to state and explain first some notions on both networks and games. So, in this chapter, we want to provide just a few very basic concepts and definitions on Complex Networks an
作者: RAFF    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:07
The Prisoner’s Dilemma on Static Complex Networks and how cooperation arises and survives in an environment where it is clearly more expensive for the individual than defection in the short term have been subject of intense research for quite some time, and the PD turned out to be a very useful tool for this aim.
作者: Mangle    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:04
Other Games on Static Complex Networks [1] on static complex networks, where the payoff for a cooperator against a defector was fixed to . (strictly speaking, for this value of ., we are really at the border between the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Hawks and Doves -HD- game). In this chapter we want to address very briefly the issue
作者: 無彈性    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 09:35

作者: SPECT    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:11
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on Scale-Free Networks with Limited Number of Interactionster chances to survive, even when it gets very expensive. Specifically, it has been proved that heterogeneity not only reproduces much better some topological features of the social systems, such as the degree distribution, but also greatly favors cooperation.
作者: SPECT    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:59

作者: tenosynovitis    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:41
Complex Networks from Other Dynamic-Dependent Attachment Rulesace on top of it simultaneously, in such a way that the outcome of the game, meaning the benefits the nodes get out of the interaction, will affect the probability of the existing nodes to attract links from newcomers. So we will work with a model similar to the one introduced in Chap.?., but with t
作者: novelty    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:21

作者: 不可侵犯    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:52

作者: acquisition    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:52

作者: 公社    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:43

作者: Chameleon    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:56
Evolution und Kreationismus in Europa, [1] on static complex networks, where the payoff for a cooperator against a defector was fixed to . (strictly speaking, for this value of ., we are really at the border between the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Hawks and Doves -HD- game). In this chapter we want to address very briefly the issue
作者: 失誤    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-82708-1F) topologies greatly enhance cooperation [.–.], compared to other topologies as ER networks. It is also well known that the heterogeneity on the degree distribution of these structures is a crucial factor in order to achieve such high levels of cooperation in the system. More specifically, the hubs
作者: hieroglyphic    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-83430-0ter chances to survive, even when it gets very expensive. Specifically, it has been proved that heterogeneity not only reproduces much better some topological features of the social systems, such as the degree distribution, but also greatly favors cooperation.
作者: absorbed    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:32

作者: Ventilator    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:57

作者: periodontitis    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:48

作者: BRACE    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:20

作者: landfill    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:45

作者: 有機(jī)體    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:25

作者: 變化無常    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:13
Julia Poncela CasasnovasGives important insights into the emergence and evolution of cooperation.Interdisciplinary topic of interest to physicists, mathematicians and life scientists.Nominated as an outstanding contribution
作者: Pigeon    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:44
Springer Theseshttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/317951.jpg
作者: 漂白    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:16
The Integration of Theory and Historyord Wide Web or the Internet [.–.], were almost intractable just a few years ago due to both their large number of individuals and the complexity of the pattern of connections among them. They all have been recently characterized as . [.–.], opening a new and very promising subject for researchers all over the world.
作者: Entrancing    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:32

作者: 骯臟    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:51
Evolution und Kreationismus in Europa, [1] on static complex networks, where the payoff for a cooperator against a defector was fixed to . (strictly speaking, for this value of ., we are really at the border between the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Hawks and Doves -HD- game). In this chapter we want to address very briefly the issue of other evolutionary games on graphs.
作者: NADIR    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:26
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-83430-0ter chances to survive, even when it gets very expensive. Specifically, it has been proved that heterogeneity not only reproduces much better some topological features of the social systems, such as the degree distribution, but also greatly favors cooperation.
作者: Aesthete    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:40
Evolution?re Betrachtung der Marktdynamiktudy of the evolution of cooperation on complex networks, using among the different social dilemmas, mainly the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as a metaphor of the problem, analyzing the possible outcomes of the dynamics, depending on the underlying topology.
作者: heterogeneous    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:47

作者: 羽毛長(zhǎng)成    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:53
The Prisoner’s Dilemma on Static Complex Networks and how cooperation arises and survives in an environment where it is clearly more expensive for the individual than defection in the short term have been subject of intense research for quite some time, and the PD turned out to be a very useful tool for this aim.
作者: Generator    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:38

作者: immunity    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:38
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on Scale-Free Networks with Limited Number of Interactionster chances to survive, even when it gets very expensive. Specifically, it has been proved that heterogeneity not only reproduces much better some topological features of the social systems, such as the degree distribution, but also greatly favors cooperation.
作者: 開始沒有    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:01
Summarytudy of the evolution of cooperation on complex networks, using among the different social dilemmas, mainly the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as a metaphor of the problem, analyzing the possible outcomes of the dynamics, depending on the underlying topology.
作者: 自戀    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:39
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-89666-7of linear. On the other hand, we will also modify the imitation rule to a Fermi-like function, instead of using a Replicator-like probability, so irrational changes of strategy will be allowed now, meaning that a node can imitate a neighbor whose payoff is lower than its own.
作者: 精確    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:20

作者: archaeology    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:38
2190-5053 nd life scientists.Nominated as an outstanding contribution There are many examples of cooperation in Nature: cells cooperate to form tissues, organs cooperate to form living organisms, and individuals cooperate to raise their offspring or to hunt. However, why cooperation emerges and survives in ho
作者: 不能妥協(xié)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:25
Book 2012e to raise their offspring or to hunt. However, why cooperation emerges and survives in hostile environments, when defecting would be a much more profitable short-term strategy, is a question that still remains open. During the past few years, several explanations have been proposed, including kin a
作者: Glaci冰    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:38

作者: exophthalmos    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:52
Some Basic Concepts on Complex Networks and Games,d Game Theory that we will use later on during the full elaboration of this thesis. We hope they will help setting the foundations to understand our work perfectly, so the reader will not need any external help to comprehend, and also it will serve as an introduction to the two fundamental components on which this thesis is based.
作者: 箴言    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:56

作者: 興奮過度    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:00

作者: inchoate    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:22
Book 2012amely, the Prisoner‘s Dilemma Game). The first part of this work analyzes the case of a static system, where the pattern of connections is fixed, so it does not evolve over time. The second part develops two models for growing topologies, where the growth and the dynamics are entangled.
作者: Ordeal    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:54

作者: 斥責(zé)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:39
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-08487-7re the network grows coupled to the dynamical features of its components. Our aim here is to introduce for the first time an attempt in this direction, by linking the growth of the network to the dynamics taking place among its nodes.
作者: exclamation    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:25





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