標題: Titlebook: Essentials of Game Theory; A Concise Multidisci Kevin Leyton-Brown,Yoav Shoham Book 2008 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2008 [打印本頁] 作者: 緩和緊張狀況 時間: 2025-3-21 19:44
書目名稱Essentials of Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
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書目名稱Essentials of Game Theory被引頻次
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書目名稱Essentials of Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Essentials of Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: indubitable 時間: 2025-3-21 21:05 作者: exquisite 時間: 2025-3-22 01:46 作者: Peculate 時間: 2025-3-22 08:13 作者: 直覺好 時間: 2025-3-22 09:52
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5787-1. This implies that players know the node they are in, and—recalling that in such games we equate nodes with the histories that led to them—all the prior choices, including those ofother agents. For this reason we have called these ..作者: 葡萄糖 時間: 2025-3-22 16:26
Games in Normal Form,ly mean that they want to cause harm to each other, or even that they care only about themselves. Instead, it means that each agent has his own description of which states of the world he likes—which can include good things happening to other agent—and that he acts in an attempt to bring about these states of the world.作者: 葡萄糖 時間: 2025-3-22 18:59 作者: 凝乳 時間: 2025-3-23 00:41
978-3-031-00417-9Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2008作者: 連接 時間: 2025-3-23 02:57
Essentials of Game Theory978-3-031-01545-8Series ISSN 1939-4608 Series E-ISSN 1939-4616 作者: Missile 時間: 2025-3-23 08:38 作者: abnegate 時間: 2025-3-23 12:35 作者: DRILL 時間: 2025-3-23 14:37
Coping with Accession to the European Unionubsets of the outcomes ofa game. While the most important solution concept is the Nash equilibrium, there are also a large number of others, only some of which we will discuss here. Some of these concepts are more restrictive than the Nash equilibrium, some less so, and some noncomparable. In subseq作者: 饒舌的人 時間: 2025-3-23 18:24
Patricia L. Brantingham,Paul J. Brantinghamconceptually straightforward, and most game theorists see it as fundamental. While many other representations exist to describe finite games, we will see in this chapter and in those that follow that each of them has an “induced normal form”: a corresponding normal-form representation that preserves作者: CARE 時間: 2025-3-23 22:19 作者: maladorit 時間: 2025-3-24 04:25 作者: 高深莫測 時間: 2025-3-24 09:54
Coping with Chronic Illness and Disabilityo known as .. As was mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1, when we introduced noncooperative game theory, the term “cooperative” can be misleading. It does not mean that each agent is agreeable and will follow arbitrary instructions. Rather, it means that the basic modeling unit is the group rath作者: Fabric 時間: 2025-3-24 12:54
1939-4608 tically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professio作者: Obscure 時間: 2025-3-24 16:25 作者: Ancestor 時間: 2025-3-24 20:11
Further Solution Concepts for Normal-Form Games, of which we will discuss here. Some of these concepts are more restrictive than the Nash equilibrium, some less so, and some noncomparable. In subsequent chapters we will introduce some additional solution concepts that are only applicable to game representations other than the normal form.作者: Coronation 時間: 2025-3-25 01:57
Patricia L. Brantingham,Paul J. Brantingham game-theoretic properties such as Nash equilibria. Thus the results given in previous chapters hold for all finite games, no matter how they are represented; in that sense the normal-form representation is universal.作者: Immortal 時間: 2025-3-25 03:44 作者: Corroborate 時間: 2025-3-25 09:36
Coping with Chronic Illness and Disabilityer than the individual agent. More precisely, in coalitional game theory we still model the individual preference of agents, but not their possible actions. Instead, we have a coarser model of the capabilities of different groups.作者: assail 時間: 2025-3-25 14:06
Book 2008is Lecture aims to fill this gap by providing a concise and accessible introduction to the field. It covers the main classes of games, their representations, and the main concepts used to analyze them.作者: enmesh 時間: 2025-3-25 17:23 作者: 都相信我的話 時間: 2025-3-25 21:50 作者: 善于騙人 時間: 2025-3-26 04:06 作者: Minatory 時間: 2025-3-26 06:34
Uncertainty About Payoffs: Bayesian Games, incomplete information, allow us to represent players’ uncertainties about the very game being played.. This uncertainty is represented as a probability distribution over a set of possible games. We make two assumptions.作者: 思想靈活 時間: 2025-3-26 11:44 作者: forestry 時間: 2025-3-26 15:51 作者: Charlatan 時間: 2025-3-26 17:55 作者: Compass 時間: 2025-3-26 21:44
Games in Normal Form,ly mean that they want to cause harm to each other, or even that they care only about themselves. Instead, it means that each agent has his own description of which states of the world he likes—which can include good things happening to other agent—and that he acts in an attempt to bring about these作者: fetter 時間: 2025-3-27 02:01
Analyzing Games: From Optimality To Equilibrium,games. In single-agent decision theory the key notion is that of an ., that is, a strategy that maximizes the agent’s expected payoff for a given environment in which the agent operates. The situation in the single-agent case can be fraught with uncertainty, since the environment might be stochastic作者: 善變 時間: 2025-3-27 05:51 作者: 殘廢的火焰 時間: 2025-3-27 11:19
Games With Sequential Actions: The Perfect-Information Extensive Form,conceptually straightforward, and most game theorists see it as fundamental. While many other representations exist to describe finite games, we will see in this chapter and in those that follow that each of them has an “induced normal form”: a corresponding normal-form representation that preserves作者: 生來 時間: 2025-3-27 15:12 作者: Entropion 時間: 2025-3-27 21:01 作者: 現(xiàn)代 時間: 2025-3-27 23:02
Coalitional Game Theory,o known as .. As was mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1, when we introduced noncooperative game theory, the term “cooperative” can be misleading. It does not mean that each agent is agreeable and will follow arbitrary instructions. Rather, it means that the basic modeling unit is the group rath作者: Influx 時間: 2025-3-28 05:58 作者: 騎師 時間: 2025-3-28 10:17
Epilog: In the Long Run We Are All Dead!,ociational’ (or an alternative ‘centripetal’, see Horowitz, 1985) model of ethnic integration has been implemented, but the same question whether the inclusion of groups increases or decreases the stability of these systems remains of interest. While Turks in Bulgaria are well integrated in politica
