標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Essay in Cooperative Games; In Honor of Guillerm Gianfranco Gambarelli Book 2004 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004 Owen value. [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Coarctation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:59
書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games被引頻次
書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games年度引用
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書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱Essay in Cooperative Games讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 歪曲道理 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:02 作者: 帳單 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:59
D. W. Trent,J. T. Roehrig,T. F. Tsaiualifies an index as a valid yardstick for measuring power. This paper questions if such claims are really warranted. In the light of features of real-world collective decision making such as coalition formation processes, ideological affinities, a priori unions, and strategic interaction, standard 作者: recede 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:37 作者: Haphazard 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:35 作者: Engulf 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:50 作者: Engulf 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:48 作者: 相信 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:05 作者: 歌曲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:22
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39959-6ith the diversification implied by the latter. The models which have so far dealt with takeovers have been based on Cooperative Game Theory (more specifically on power indices) integrated with the classical models of Portfolio Theory. There was still a need to perfect a model to forecast the price c作者: 火車車輪 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:08
Rosa Bellmann-Weiler,Romuald Bellmannes by using the marginal worth vectors and the dividends. First, we prove a formula for the marginal worth vectors with respect to compatible orderings. Next, we consider the direct market generated by a game. This model of utility function, proposed by Shapley and Shubik in 1969, is the concave bic作者: mechanism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:29 作者: 拱墻 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:40 作者: 格言 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:47
The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Gamesames. In the proposed approach non-coalitionists play either Nash strategies or choose one of two pure strategies. In the first case it is proved that non-coalitionists are asymptotically eliminated. In the second case coalitionists can propagate without eliminating all non-coalitionists.作者: neutralize 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:40
Book 2004lues, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games). A contribution on Minimax Theorem (by Ken Binmore) and a brief history of early Game Theory (by Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen) are also enclosed..作者: 上漲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 03:28 作者: nurture 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:04
Essay in Cooperative Games978-1-4020-2936-3Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: 單色 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:05 作者: MORPH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:16 作者: 我邪惡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:18
Common Hyperpigmented DermatosesThe paper distils the essence of Owen’s elementary proof of the minimax theorem by using transfinite induction in an abstract setting.作者: Inflated 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:38 作者: 令人作嘔 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:51 作者: 知識(shí)分子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:42 作者: Ardent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:11
Genevieve Mezoh,Nigel J. CrowtherIn this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances.作者: Flounder 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:14
Patient Requests in Primary Care ClinicsIn this paper we associate a strategic non-cooperative game to a linear programming game; we analyze the relations between the core of the given game and the Nash equilibria of the strategic game.作者: 搖曳 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:24 作者: meritorious 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:51
The Coming of Game TheoryThis is a brief historical note on game theory. We cover its historical roots (prior to its formal definition in 1944), and look at its development until the late 1960’s.作者: 享樂(lè)主義者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:25
Guillermo Owen’s Proof of the Minimax TheoremThe paper distils the essence of Owen’s elementary proof of the minimax theorem by using transfinite induction in an abstract setting.作者: CHYME 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:08 作者: RACE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:06 作者: SOB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:24
α-Decisiveness in Simple GamesWe introduce here a generalized decisiveness index for simple games that is able to encompass both normative and strategic features of collective decision-making mechanisms. The mathematical properties of this index and also a related Banzhaf index are studied.作者: 偽書(shū) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:26 作者: 飲料 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:59 作者: Outwit 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:52 作者: 奴才 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:16 作者: Collar 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:12
Vladimir Raikov,Marianne Barabaszorresponding mcst game, and when applied also to the mcst subsituations it delivers a population monotonic allocation scheme. A cone-wise positive linearity property is one of the basic ingredients of an axiomatic characterization of the .-value.作者: 愛(ài)好 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:20 作者: 新陳代謝 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:46 作者: 不整齊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:54 作者: GLOOM 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:38 作者: Adenocarcinoma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:19 作者: Integrate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:08
How Many People Can Be Controlled in a Group Pursuit Gameticipants of the game that can be kept in submission. For every evader we construct a realizability area of punishment strategy and investigate the question of its existence depending on various initial positions of the players . and ... 1,..., ..作者: 去掉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:55
Takeover Prices and Portfolio Theoryurve, for use as a benchmark to establish a takeover bid. This paper tackles the problem by means of a non-cooperative approach. The proposed model also makes it possible to consider takeover and portfolio theories from a single viewpoint.作者: Spinal-Fusion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:59
The Lovász Extension of Market Gamesonjugate extension of the game. Then we obtain the following characterization: The utility function of a market game is the Lovász extension of the game if and only if the market game is supermodular. Finally, we present some preliminary problems about the relationship between cooperative games and combinatorial optimization.作者: predict 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:13 作者: 角斗士 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:22 作者: ethnology 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:42
Dynamic Coalition Formation in the Apex Gameerfect equilibrium and we show that in the apex game stable coalition structures depend on the cost for making a proposal and who the first proposer is. As opposed to the static analysis by Hart and Kurz (1983), it turns out that the apex may form a two-person coalition with a minor player.作者: CRP743 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:46 作者: 公社 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:18 作者: reperfusion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:05 作者: Suppository 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:03 作者: 失望未來(lái) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:23 作者: JUST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39959-6urve, for use as a benchmark to establish a takeover bid. This paper tackles the problem by means of a non-cooperative approach. The proposed model also makes it possible to consider takeover and portfolio theories from a single viewpoint.作者: 希望 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 16:35 作者: 心胸狹窄 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:27 作者: Herbivorous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 01:58
The ,-Value for Cost Sharing in Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Situationstree (mcst) situations. The .-value is related to the Kruskal algorithm for finding an mcst. Moreover, the .-value leads to a core allocation of the corresponding mcst game, and when applied also to the mcst subsituations it delivers a population monotonic allocation scheme. A cone-wise positive lin作者: modish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 05:42 作者: 運(yùn)動(dòng)性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:18
Monotonicity of Power and Power Measuresualifies an index as a valid yardstick for measuring power. This paper questions if such claims are really warranted. In the light of features of real-world collective decision making such as coalition formation processes, ideological affinities, a priori unions, and strategic interaction, standard 作者: SHRIK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:25 作者: 我要威脅 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 19:21
“Counting” Power Indices for Games with a Priori Unions those computed by counting appropriately weighted contributions of players to winning coalitions — to simple games with a priori unions. This class contains most well-known indices, including Banzhaf, Johnston, Holler and Deegan—Packel indices. The Shapley—Shubik index for simple games with a prior作者: 多產(chǎn)魚(yú) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 22:31
The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Gamesames. In the proposed approach non-coalitionists play either Nash strategies or choose one of two pure strategies. In the first case it is proved that non-coalitionists are asymptotically eliminated. In the second case coalitionists can propagate without eliminating all non-coalitionists.
