標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games; Essays in Honour of Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri Book 2016 Springer [打印本頁] 作者: Considerate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:05
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games被引頻次
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games年度引用
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games讀者反饋
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: oracle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:18
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: An Expository Treatment,lasticity and technology has a convex cost function. Our treatment uses the ‘share function’, which exploits the aggregative structure of the resulting game. In this setting, the best response functions are not monotonic, ruling out the use of techniques previously applied to analyze submodular and 作者: 無節(jié)奏 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:05
On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue andwith concave industry revenue and convex costs are refined and conceptualised. For this class of oligopolies also new results concerning the geometric structure of the equilibrium set . are provided. In particular, a subclass is identified for which . is a non-empty polytope on which the aggregator 作者: 不可思議 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:35 作者: 斜坡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:44 作者: 做事過頭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:55
Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: The Exponential Model,Cournot equilibrium. This model predicts a monotonic relationship between the markup of a firm and its output. We present evidence, based on a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, that this relationship is inverse.作者: 做事過頭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:38
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy,overnment gives the optimal subsidy to both public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly. Unlike the existing literature that has assumed that a uniform subsidy is given to public and private firms, we demonstrate that if the discriminatory subsidy rates are adopted even when there is firm asymmetr作者: Cougar 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:22 作者: 序曲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:07 作者: 混沌 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:55
Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities,Stud 35:9–17, 1998) and Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (Seoul J Econ 11(3):321–330, 1998) and Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Seoul J Econ 13:471–476, 2000) on oligopoly competition in international fisheries, which are based on the assumptions of homogeneous fish population, homogeneous space and continuous 作者: 變色龍 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:41 作者: 財(cái)主 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:58
Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups,p-proof Nash equilibrium. Such a refinement of the Nash equilibrium prescribes the same communication possibilities as those required by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium—in the precise sense of Bernheim et al. (J Econ Theory 42:1–12, 1987)—only among the contenders of the same group and between th作者: 大量 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:20
On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests, players in a group may evaluate the prize of the contest differently. We prove that such an asymmetric public-good contest with a general contest success function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group作者: 口味 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:59 作者: GROVE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:44 作者: 馬具 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:21 作者: cavity 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:43
Independent or weakly interacting customers, structure of the equilibrium set . are provided. In particular, a subclass is identified for which . is a non-empty polytope on which the aggregator is constant and a subclass for which . is a 1-dimensional polytope on which the aggregator is injective.作者: intercede 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:35
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26293-2cess function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group is uniquely determined. We also present some comparative statics in the model.作者: Cardioversion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:52
Margarita Genius,Elisabetta Strazzera of different types’ equilibria. We search for the optimal transmission capacity that maximizes the social welfare, recall the previous results for a perfectly competitive two-node market and study the problem for the Cournot oligopoly.作者: 東西 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:50
Przemys?aw Kazienko,Nitesh Chawlallison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, pp?97–112). The paper also studies existence and uniqueness of equilibria extending the results of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games Econ Behav 18:135–140, 1997) and Cornes and Hartley (Econ Theory 26:923–946, 2005) to patent races.作者: 深淵 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:52 作者: Detonate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:31
Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests,llison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, pp?97–112). The paper also studies existence and uniqueness of equilibria extending the results of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games Econ Behav 18:135–140, 1997) and Cornes and Hartley (Econ Theory 26:923–946, 2005) to patent races.作者: 雜役 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:09 作者: 殘廢的火焰 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:34
On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests,cess function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group is uniquely determined. We also present some comparative statics in the model.作者: HACK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:53 作者: esoteric 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:45 作者: inculpate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:09 作者: Affirm 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:38 作者: 沒花的是打擾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:40
Applications of Soft Computing for the Webe two groups. We show how a fictitious game with “most inefficient fictitious contenders” can be constructed to prove the existence of a unique group-proof Nash equilibrium of the original two-group contest game. An example evidences that cautious arguments on the (twice) differentiability of cost functions must be used in such a construction.作者: judicial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:50 作者: Project 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:02
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discreteng other things, that if the industry revenue function is concave, the inverse demand function is nonincreasing, and the cost function is convex, then the payoff function of the firm satisfies the conditions and this symmetric game has a pure strategy equilibrium.作者: 顛簸地移動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:22 作者: 恃強(qiáng)凌弱的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:56
Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups,e two groups. We show how a fictitious game with “most inefficient fictitious contenders” can be constructed to prove the existence of a unique group-proof Nash equilibrium of the original two-group contest game. An example evidences that cautious arguments on the (twice) differentiability of cost functions must be used in such a construction.作者: 堅(jiān)毅 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:17 作者: IST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:16 作者: 虛構(gòu)的東西 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:31
Graeme Hammer,Peter Carberry,Roger Stoneality by adopting the discriminatory subsidy and, as a result, can achieve social welfare maximization. Our result suggests that even when there exists firm asymmetry between public and private firms, it is not important for privatization authorities to determine whether to privatize the public firm作者: 反抗者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:10
Sundarapandian Vaidyanathan,Chang-Hua Liensome variables evolve in continuous time whereas other ones change in (event-driven) discrete time. Fishery models where the aquatic environment is subdivided into adjacent patches, characterized by different fishing policies including, as a particular case, Marine Protected Areas, are also describe作者: enfeeble 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:04 作者: DENT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:26
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy,ality by adopting the discriminatory subsidy and, as a result, can achieve social welfare maximization. Our result suggests that even when there exists firm asymmetry between public and private firms, it is not important for privatization authorities to determine whether to privatize the public firm作者: –scent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 13:22 作者: Seizure 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:53 作者: 愛國者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 22:13
Pierre von Mouche,Federico QuartieriPresents a state-of-the-art collection of studies on oligopoly theory.Covers topics including equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and w作者: hieroglyphic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:08 作者: 斗爭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:37 作者: 編輯才信任 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:49 作者: Ataxia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:53
Independent or weakly interacting customers,with concave industry revenue and convex costs are refined and conceptualised. For this class of oligopolies also new results concerning the geometric structure of the equilibrium set . are provided. In particular, a subclass is identified for which . is a non-empty polytope on which the aggregator 作者: intoxicate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:22
Luigi Campajola,Francesco Di Capuauilibrium exists if the payoff function is concave with respect to the own strategy and satisfies a pair of symmetrical conditions near the symmetric strategy profiles. As an application, we consider a symmetric Cournot game in which each firm chooses an integer quantity of product. It is shown, amo作者: 債務(wù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:50 作者: Expurgate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:55 作者: Aspiration 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:59 作者: Canary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:56 作者: Psychogenic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:35
Yassine Bouteraa,Ismail Ben Abdallahreflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantia作者: fastness 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 19:47
Sundarapandian Vaidyanathan,Chang-Hua LienStud 35:9–17, 1998) and Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (Seoul J Econ 11(3):321–330, 1998) and Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Seoul J Econ 13:471–476, 2000) on oligopoly competition in international fisheries, which are based on the assumptions of homogeneous fish population, homogeneous space and continuous 作者: adumbrate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:39
Przemys?aw Kazienko,Nitesh Chawlats or substitutes (Acemoglu and Jensen, Games Econ Behav 81:27–49, 2013). This paper establishes such comparative statics results for contests improving upon existing results by (i) allowing payoff functions to be discontinuous at the origin, and (ii) allowing for asymmetric rent-seeking contests an作者: 祝賀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 02:18
Applications of Soft Computing for the Webp-proof Nash equilibrium. Such a refinement of the Nash equilibrium prescribes the same communication possibilities as those required by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium—in the precise sense of Bernheim et al. (J Econ Theory 42:1–12, 1987)—only among the contenders of the same group and between th作者: jettison 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 06:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26293-2 players in a group may evaluate the prize of the contest differently. We prove that such an asymmetric public-good contest with a general contest success function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group作者: NATAL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:17 作者: forager 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:21
David B. Cordes,Paul D. Lickissne the games characterized by this structure as Cournotian games and we show that the archetypical Cournot model of oligopolistic competition and other models of economic interest are special instances of these games. We then pass to a brief summary of the contributions collected in this volume that are related to Cournotian?games.作者: 一再遛 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 18:41
P. John Williams,Belinda von MengersenCournot equilibrium. This model predicts a monotonic relationship between the markup of a firm and its output. We present evidence, based on a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, that this relationship is inverse.
