標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Environmental Policy and Market Structure; Carlo Carraro,Yiannis Katsoulacos,Anastasios Xepap Book 1996 Springer Science+Business Media B. [打印本頁] 作者: 請回避 時間: 2025-3-21 20:07
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure被引頻次
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure年度引用
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure讀者反饋
書目名稱Environmental Policy and Market Structure讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 小母馬 時間: 2025-3-21 22:56 作者: 他姓手中拿著 時間: 2025-3-22 00:53
Book 1996omena - simultaneously. This volumecontains a new research effort of the `Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei‘a(chǎn)nd explores the theoretical underpinnings of environmental policy ina sub-optimal world. .Topics considered link economic issues (oligopolistic marketstructures, firm heterogeneity, and the strate作者: 靦腆 時間: 2025-3-22 06:39
Book 1996me were chosen to achieve a balance betweenbreadth and depth and were written by leading experts in the field. Inshort, this book is rich in policy implications and raises new issuesand questions for future research.作者: 倫理學(xué) 時間: 2025-3-22 11:39 作者: 侵略 時間: 2025-3-22 15:29
,Now You See Me. Now?You Don’t.,or the case of monopoly. Complete internalization of external damages created by a monopolist, will impose additional social cost by further restricting the already suboptimal output of the monopolist. In this case, the optimal effluent fee will be less than marginal external damages (Barnett, 1980; Misiolek, 1980).作者: 侵略 時間: 2025-3-22 18:35
Adenosine A3 Receptors in Muscle Protectionpolicy. Even when transboundary pollution is neglected, trade effects must be accounted for, when analysing environmental taxation (see Conrad’s article in this volume). New problems also arise in a domestic context, when introducing the environment in an endogenous growth model.作者: nostrum 時間: 2025-3-22 22:09 作者: 鑒賞家 時間: 2025-3-23 04:17
Emission taxes and market structureor the case of monopoly. Complete internalization of external damages created by a monopolist, will impose additional social cost by further restricting the already suboptimal output of the monopolist. In this case, the optimal effluent fee will be less than marginal external damages (Barnett, 1980; Misiolek, 1980).作者: 語源學(xué) 時間: 2025-3-23 09:29
Environmental taxation, market share, and profits in oligopolypolicy. Even when transboundary pollution is neglected, trade effects must be accounted for, when analysing environmental taxation (see Conrad’s article in this volume). New problems also arise in a domestic context, when introducing the environment in an endogenous growth model.作者: Gudgeon 時間: 2025-3-23 09:44
Innovation under the threat of stricter environmental standardsear, Germany’s automobile manufacturers, in particular Volkswagen, ran to establish efficient disassembly systems [Schmidheiny (1992)].. This paper therefore examines the transition process towards new environmental standards and the innovation effort of a monopolist threatened by a change of environmental regulation.作者: 進(jìn)取心 時間: 2025-3-23 16:49 作者: SCORE 時間: 2025-3-23 18:24 作者: 衰老 時間: 2025-3-23 23:39
Environmental policy and the choice of production technologyut and to raise prices., thus reducing consumers’ surplus and possibly employment (this latter effect depends on the degree of substitutability of production factors, on the degree of competitiveness of the labour market, and on the way in which the tax is recycled; these issues are analyzed in Carraro-Galeotti-Gallo, 1994).作者: 增強(qiáng) 時間: 2025-3-24 03:37
Emission taxes and market structureting environmental externalities. Emission taxes internalize the external damages associated with polluting activities. The internalization is complete when the fees equal the marginal external damages of pollution, such as in the case of Pigouvian taxes. It has been shown, however, that the sociall作者: LITHE 時間: 2025-3-24 08:45
Environmental taxation, market share, and profits in oligopolynd other variables under their control. These price-induced effects are well known in economics. Therefore, it could be argued that economic theory has already provided the analytical tools to assess the impact of environmental taxation on a given industry. As the recent literature has shown, this i作者: Gorilla 時間: 2025-3-24 13:58
Naive use of environmental instrumentsnty, complete information, and perfect competition, Pigouvian taxes and standards are equivalent. Furthermore, the optimal tax should be equal to marginal damage. Of course this solution to the problem of internalizing externalities is too simple if confronted with reality. Rather quickly economists作者: diabetes 時間: 2025-3-24 18:19
Optimal environmental policy for oligopolistic industries under intra-industry tradeve multiplied, environmental issues have played an increasing role in trade negotiations. Negotiating environmental regulations mutilaterally is especially problematic because of differences in preferences, in income levels or in production cost across countries. In addition, environmental considera作者: 吹牛大王 時間: 2025-3-24 21:46
Choosing emission taxes under international price competitiont expenditures are likely to affect production costs and prices of many products will increase, especially for those products that involve a relatively pollution intensive production process. The result of an enforcement of the national environmental policy will be the loss in international competit作者: 南極 時間: 2025-3-25 02:10 作者: dendrites 時間: 2025-3-25 03:59
Innovation under the threat of stricter environmental standardsemission-abatement subsidies, direct regulation through technical standards and tradeable permits [see Baumol and Oates (1988)]. Little attention has been given so far to the . of environmental regulation. In a recent paper, Glazer and McMillan (1992) argue, however, that “Regulation does not always作者: transdermal 時間: 2025-3-25 11:02
Environmental innovation, spillovers and optimal policy rulesstant. Then once environmental policy is introduced, firms either reduce their output or engage in abatement which mainly represents end-of-pipe emissions reduction (e.g., Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Baumol and Oates, 1988; Barnett, 1980). Recently, however, increasing attention has been di作者: 書法 時間: 2025-3-25 14:09 作者: ESPY 時間: 2025-3-25 17:25 作者: 落葉劑 時間: 2025-3-25 20:40
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8642-9environment; environmental policy; production作者: esculent 時間: 2025-3-26 01:11
,Now You See Me. Now?You Don’t.,ting environmental externalities. Emission taxes internalize the external damages associated with polluting activities. The internalization is complete when the fees equal the marginal external damages of pollution, such as in the case of Pigouvian taxes. It has been shown, however, that the sociall作者: 壓碎 時間: 2025-3-26 07:05 作者: 雀斑 時間: 2025-3-26 08:50 作者: 帶子 時間: 2025-3-26 12:54
A. G. Eguiluz,A. A. Maradudin,R. J. Elliottve multiplied, environmental issues have played an increasing role in trade negotiations. Negotiating environmental regulations mutilaterally is especially problematic because of differences in preferences, in income levels or in production cost across countries. In addition, environmental considera作者: ROOF 時間: 2025-3-26 20:03
Extending ABAP Development Tools,t expenditures are likely to affect production costs and prices of many products will increase, especially for those products that involve a relatively pollution intensive production process. The result of an enforcement of the national environmental policy will be the loss in international competit作者: 清晰 時間: 2025-3-26 21:02
Das Management globaler übergangsstadiens the Single European Market, the Uruguay Round of GATT and especially NAFTA — that in the absence of the ability to use trade instruments to protect domestic industries governments might seek to weaken their domestic environmental policies as a means of covert protection. Conventional trade models 作者: 粗糙 時間: 2025-3-27 05:02
Ascariasis (Worm Bolus Obstruction),emission-abatement subsidies, direct regulation through technical standards and tradeable permits [see Baumol and Oates (1988)]. Little attention has been given so far to the . of environmental regulation. In a recent paper, Glazer and McMillan (1992) argue, however, that “Regulation does not always作者: arousal 時間: 2025-3-27 07:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/979-8-8688-0134-1stant. Then once environmental policy is introduced, firms either reduce their output or engage in abatement which mainly represents end-of-pipe emissions reduction (e.g., Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Baumol and Oates, 1988; Barnett, 1980). Recently, however, increasing attention has been di作者: transient-pain 時間: 2025-3-27 10:19 作者: engrossed 時間: 2025-3-27 13:44
Relation to Secondary Subjects,ed a number of extreme claims. On the one hand there have been concerns expressed by environmentalists that such moves will damage the environment. One aspect is that the consequent expansion of consumption, production and trade will lead to increased pollution and use of scarce natural resources, u作者: deficiency 時間: 2025-3-27 20:04
Economics, Energy and Environmenthttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/312817.jpg作者: 人類的發(fā)源 時間: 2025-3-27 23:23
978-90-481-4600-0Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1996作者: painkillers 時間: 2025-3-28 03:31
AAL- und E-Health-Gesch?ftsmodelleto be taken into account. Other obstacles are market imperfections or strategic behavior of firms. Furthermore, the regulator is often not able to gather or observe the information necessary for a reasonable or optimal policy. The lack of information concerns the behavior and possibilities of firms 作者: 忙碌 時間: 2025-3-28 07:22
A. G. Eguiluz,A. A. Maradudin,R. J. Elliottbatement activities, or taxes on emissions combined with subsidies for inputs heavily taxed by emission taxes (e.g. coal). An example for such a package of instruments would be a CO. emission tax in Germany together with the present subsidy of DM 260 ($150) per ton of hard coal. The endorsement in 1作者: VERT 時間: 2025-3-28 11:19 作者: 線 時間: 2025-3-28 16:03 作者: 泰然自若 時間: 2025-3-28 18:56 作者: 小畫像 時間: 2025-3-29 00:36
Carlo Carraro,Yiannis Katsoulacos,Anastasios Xepap作者: chisel 時間: 2025-3-29 03:14
Naive use of environmental instrumentsto be taken into account. Other obstacles are market imperfections or strategic behavior of firms. Furthermore, the regulator is often not able to gather or observe the information necessary for a reasonable or optimal policy. The lack of information concerns the behavior and possibilities of firms
