標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Endogenous Public Policy and Contests; Gil S. Epstein,Shmuel Nitzan Book 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007 Contests.Endogenous P [打印本頁] 作者: Awkward 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:50
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests被引頻次
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests年度引用
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests讀者反饋
書目名稱Endogenous Public Policy and Contests讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: ear-canal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:31
http://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/309798.jpg作者: DALLY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:47
978-3-642-09139-1Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007作者: Anticoagulants 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:05
David Lloyd,Miguel A. Aon,Sonia CortassaIn this chapter we present a simple version of the extended contest where the policy is determined endogenously, not by the government, but rather by one of the contestants. To clarify the relationship between this model and the existing literature and to illustrate its significance, we present the model applying a monopoly–consumer context.作者: 財(cái)政 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:48
The Social Cost of Rent Seeking when Consumer Opposition Influences Monopoly BehaviorIn this chapter we present a simple version of the extended contest where the policy is determined endogenously, not by the government, but rather by one of the contestants. To clarify the relationship between this model and the existing literature and to illustrate its significance, we present the model applying a monopoly–consumer context.作者: 動(dòng)脈 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:32 作者: 動(dòng)脈 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:30 作者: 顯赫的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:22
Medical Management of Acute Rhinosinusitis,al agents under alternative given institutional settings, see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) and the references therein. Typically, in the overall game-theoretic equilibria in these settings, economic and political outcomes are mutually consistent. A major advantage of 作者: 品牌 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:49
PGPR in Management of Soil Toxicity,nterest groups. In government there are two levels of decision making. Bureaucrats work out the details of the proposed public policy while elected politicians make the final decision on the approval or rejection of the proposed policy. Our stylized model thus captures the hierarchical nature of the作者: 大火 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:08
Baruch Sneh,Suha Jabaji-Hare,Gerda Dijst the contestants and, in turn, the extent of rent dissipation. This comparative statics analysis focused on such parameters as the nature of the rent, the number of contestants, the form of the contest success function, the contestants’ valuations of the prize, the contestants’ attitude toward risk 作者: precede 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:07 作者: N防腐劑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:22
Alfredo Salom?o Filho,Tanja Tillmannsf winning a prize. In most studies of contests, however, the source of the prize or, more generally, the source of the contestants’ prize valuations has been ignored. Despite the fact that in some studies the source of the prize system was based on the existence of monopoly profits (rents) or variou作者: PALL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:13
B. Münzenberger,M. Schulz,R. F. Hüttlhe contestants and the nature of the information they have) affect their equilibrium efforts and the extent of relative prize dissipation, Hillman and Riley (1989), Hurley and Shogren (1998), Konrad (2002), Nitzan (1994) and Nti (1997). In addition, attention has been paid to the effect of changes i作者: FID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:49
Musical Composition and Recomposition,or rent-avoidance efforts) are spent by interest groups that attempt to influence the outcome of the political decision-making process in their favor. The outcome of this process is usually uncertain. When some inefficient public policy is proposed, for example, because of some effective political c作者: LAVA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 03:46
Marc-Thorsten Hütt,Ulrich Lüttgenvolves a struggle between one group that defends the status-quo and other groups that challenge it by fighting for alternative policies. For example, a tax reform may involve a struggle between different industries. Existing pollution standards may be defended by the industry and challenged by an e作者: 離開就切除 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-2059-7tor, a politician) that proposes the pricing policy and the pressures exerted by the producer, the potential monopoly, and by the consumers on the ruling politicians who approve or reject the proposed price. The producer is interested in securing the rent associated with the approval of the proposed作者: Digitalis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:45 作者: 厭食癥 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:18 作者: terazosin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74818-2Contests; Endogenous Public Policy; Government; Interest Groups; Lobby; Lobbying; Rent Seeking; political c作者: 收藏品 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:53
f the interest groups and their efforts. Comprehensive illustrations of the usefulness of the proposed approach are provided in five specific cases: the determination of monopoly price, privatization policy, migration quotas, minimum wage and promotion in tournaments.?????978-3-642-09139-1978-3-540-74818-2作者: colloquial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:40 作者: 失誤 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:16 作者: perjury 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:53 作者: PATHY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:38
Lobbying and Compromiseheir elaborate model, the equilibrium policy outcome is always a compromise between the policy preferences of the elected candidate and those of the (at most two) lobbies chosen by the policy maker. In contrast to this literature, Glazer, Gradstein and Konrad (1998) demonstrate that extreme policies作者: Inordinate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:48 作者: LATE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:47
Privatizationt the politicians with the aim of gaining the privatization rents. Note, however, that when a proposal for privatization is submitted to the politicians, it takes into account how it can be implemented in the second stage of the privatization process.作者: 性行為放縱者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:45
Book 2007trations of the usefulness of the proposed approach are provided in five specific cases: the determination of monopoly price, privatization policy, migration quotas, minimum wage and promotion in tournaments.?????作者: Capture 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:34
Rollin K. Daniel MD,Péter Pálházi MDamely the approval of ., is reached in probability Pr.. The probability of player .’s preferred contest outcome is Pr., Pr. = 1? r.. These winning probabilities depend on the efforts made by the two contestants, . and ..作者: Fantasy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:03
Medical Management of Acute Rhinosinusitis,ptions regarding the nature of the policy space or the agents’ preferences. Our claim is that the study of such regularities can be based on the complementing, reduced-form, simple contest approach presented in the preceding chapter that captures the basic forces affecting the relationship between p作者: interrogate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:50
Baruch Sneh,Suha Jabaji-Hare,Gerda Dijst prize of the contest or, more generally, if the contest prize system is exogenous, then the preferences of the government determine whether the contest exists or not and, in turn, whether some lobbying efforts are incurred, but they have no effect on their value. Specifically, if the government is 作者: 壓艙物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:26 作者: gospel 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:54 作者: etiquette 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:19
History of Rib Fracture Management,t the politicians with the aim of gaining the privatization rents. Note, however, that when a proposal for privatization is submitted to the politicians, it takes into account how it can be implemented in the second stage of the privatization process.作者: Employee 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:20 作者: 提升 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:29
The Policy Contest ., compete on the approval or rejection of .. Approval is the preferred policy of one player, say player ., whereas rejection of the proposed policy is the preferred policy of the other player. Approval implies that player . wins the contest. The present discounted value of the preferred outcome to作者: 信任 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:06
Contest Rationalization ? Microfoundationsal agents under alternative given institutional settings, see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) and the references therein. Typically, in the overall game-theoretic equilibria in these settings, economic and political outcomes are mutually consistent. A major advantage of 作者: ASSAY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:06
Endogenous Public Policynterest groups. In government there are two levels of decision making. Bureaucrats work out the details of the proposed public policy while elected politicians make the final decision on the approval or rejection of the proposed policy. Our stylized model thus captures the hierarchical nature of the作者: 其他 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:48
Culture, Politicization and Relative Rent Dissipation the contestants and, in turn, the extent of rent dissipation. This comparative statics analysis focused on such parameters as the nature of the rent, the number of contestants, the form of the contest success function, the contestants’ valuations of the prize, the contestants’ attitude toward risk 作者: 斷斷續(xù)續(xù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:22 作者: SOB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:51
Effort and Performancef winning a prize. In most studies of contests, however, the source of the prize or, more generally, the source of the contestants’ prize valuations has been ignored. Despite the fact that in some studies the source of the prize system was based on the existence of monopoly profits (rents) or variou作者: Limpid 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:44
Prizes (Size and Distribution) and Effortshe contestants and the nature of the information they have) affect their equilibrium efforts and the extent of relative prize dissipation, Hillman and Riley (1989), Hurley and Shogren (1998), Konrad (2002), Nitzan (1994) and Nti (1997). In addition, attention has been paid to the effect of changes i作者: 松果 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:49
Asymmetry and Corrective Public Policyor rent-avoidance efforts) are spent by interest groups that attempt to influence the outcome of the political decision-making process in their favor. The outcome of this process is usually uncertain. When some inefficient public policy is proposed, for example, because of some effective political c作者: 有節(jié)制 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:15 作者: 觀察 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:10 作者: 就職 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:11
Privatizationion, the effects of privatization, the extent of its success, and the possible reasons for the failure of different privatization methods. This chapter does not deal with these aspects, but rather with the political struggle among the various interest groups involved in privatization. Chronologicall作者: MANIA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:16
Migration Policy see for example, Benhabib (1996), Borjas (1994), (1995), Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994), Schmidt, Stilz, and Zimmermann (1994), Zimmermann (1995) and more recently, Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002). One thing is apparent, except in unusual circumstances, Western countries tend to spend significant 作者: 大廳 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:15 作者: 增強(qiáng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:12
Surgical Anatomy of the Paranasal Sinuseso face the challenge of taking into account economic as well as political factors. Regardless of the institutional and political setting, such factors seem to be essential to the plausibility of such a theory.作者: 燕麥 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:12
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-2059-7ing politicians who approve or reject the proposed price. The producer is interested in securing the rent associated with the approval of the proposed price while the consumers prefer that the proposed price be rejected, thus avoiding a reduction in their surplus.作者: Generosity 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:49
PGPR in Management of Soil Toxicity,icant role of the agenda setters as well as the important role of the actual decision makers, the politicians. The dichotomous nature of the decisions made by the politicians (approve or reject) and the dual nature of the public decision-making process that consists of . proposals and . approval of these proposals are also taken into account.作者: armistice 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:30 作者: 疲憊的老馬 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 14:35 作者: FLAT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 17:59
Migration Policyresources towards limiting the number and/or type of immigrants they allow into their countries. These limits are upheld via both border controls, through which undesired people are blocked from entering, and via internal enforcement, whereby undesired people are apprehended and expelled from the country (see, for example, Ethier (1986)).作者: acetylcholine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:53
Book 2007licy. Applying strategic contest theory as the basic methodology, it clarifies the fundamental parameters that determine the behavior of the?government and the interest groups - the two contestants for the "prizes" associated with public policy. The fundamental parameters are the objective of the go作者: NOMAD 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 04:41 作者: 反對(duì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 05:06
Monopoly-price Determinationing politicians who approve or reject the proposed price. The producer is interested in securing the rent associated with the approval of the proposed price while the consumers prefer that the proposed price be rejected, thus avoiding a reduction in their surplus.作者: 打谷工具 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:13
Alfredo Salom?o Filho,Tanja Tillmannss forms of protective trade policies, see, for example, Mueller (2003), the general role of public policy as a determinant of the contest prize system has not been adequately studied. The main objective of this chapter is to accomplish this task.
