標題: Titlebook: Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government; Carl Dahlstr?m (Professor),Lena W?ngnerud (Profess Book 2015 The Editor(s) (if applica [打印本頁] 作者: 抵押證書 時間: 2025-3-21 16:59
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作者: compassion 時間: 2025-3-21 21:34
Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leashpower of elites obviously needs to be restrained to avoid corruption and bad rule (Werlin, 2007, 359). The power-corruption malaise is supposedly true for all kinds of power, but, as stated in the introduction to this volume, especially so for political power. History abounds with examples of poorly作者: 無所不知 時間: 2025-3-22 00:41
Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?ay be one mechanism, but is that the only possibility? Can a country with a corrupt ruler have a civil service that operates honestly in its day-to-day interactions with citizens? Conversely, can an honest, public-spirited president or prime minister stay in office with high levels of corruption in 作者: BOOR 時間: 2025-3-22 04:44
Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruptionffairs as an elite and high-prestige area as it offers individuals the potential for sustained “visibility and significant control over policy.” It is also an institution that has traditionally been populated by an elite political class – such as the nobility in Europe – which continues to provide d作者: 亞麻制品 時間: 2025-3-22 09:58
The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behaviorachieving quality of government (Klitgaard, 1988; Goldsmith, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 2012; North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009; Fukuyama, 2011). The influence of political elites is assumed to travel through direct as well as indirect channels. The powerful position of elites gives them a d作者: INERT 時間: 2025-3-22 16:53
Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood that political leadership at nascent statehood is an important key to whether or not a state-building process results in a state with good governance. The extent to which political leaders manage to set boundaries to elites’ access to the political, military, and administrative institutions of the 作者: INERT 時間: 2025-3-22 18:43
Rulers and Their Elite Rivals: How Democratization Has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Sawith regular elections have become the norm and a majority of countries have now held a fourth and fifth round of elections (Lindberg, 2006; Lynch and Crawford, 2011), indicators of quality of government show decline, despite theoretical expectations that democracy should lead to improvements. This 作者: 單色 時間: 2025-3-23 00:35 作者: 受傷 時間: 2025-3-23 05:19 作者: 癡呆 時間: 2025-3-23 09:35
Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites’ Rotation and Asset Ownershiputocracies institutions serve ruling elites. It is generally expected that unaccountable elites use their power to expropriate the rest of society and to do so they establish extractive institutions instead of inclusive ones that would be serving the society at large (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). I作者: 兩種語言 時間: 2025-3-23 13:35
Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behaviorus is lacking about how important institutions are, few scholars argue that institutions have no impact whatsoever. Yet, for all the knowledge produced, the results of institutional reforms are meager. This is not surprising as a central theme in the institutional literature is that poor institution作者: 不透氣 時間: 2025-3-23 14:53
Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behaviores, and may substantially undercut the will and capacity of political elites to address broad societal issues such as inequality or underdevelopment. Recent years have seen renewed interest in exploring clientelism as a social and political phenomenon (e.g., Stokes et al., 2013), as well as understa作者: Traumatic-Grief 時間: 2025-3-23 20:10 作者: 嬉耍 時間: 2025-3-24 00:04
Why Women in Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Partiestion. Empirical research, however, shows that the link is weaker than anticipated in theory. Citizens do not always and everywhere “vote the rascals out,” and it is hard to underpin the notion that perceptions of corruption play an important role when voters decide which party to vote for (see Xezon作者: Organonitrile 時間: 2025-3-24 04:32
Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Governmentcreasingly hot topic during the last decade, relatively little attention has been paid to the ‘a(chǎn)ward-side’ of the equation, that is, the extent of voter support for parties and candidates whose main campaign issue is anti-corruption. It is surprising, not least because such parties, despite often be作者: Immunization 時間: 2025-3-24 10:06
Why Women in Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Partiesakis et al., Chapter 16 in this volume). This does not mean that electoral accountability can be neglected in studies on corruption and good governance—it only means that we need to find new ways to analyze how this mechanism works in different settings.作者: cruise 時間: 2025-3-24 12:40
Schmier-, Putz- und Dichtungsmaterial,itical elites are likely to be copied, complemented, and reinforced by actors further down the hierarchy. In line with this logic, it is often argued that “the fish rots from the head down,” whereas responsive and responsible leadership plays an important role in setting in motion a virtuous development spiral (Rothstein, 2011).作者: Mucosa 時間: 2025-3-24 14:58 作者: Expostulate 時間: 2025-3-24 21:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99446-3prime minister. In contrast to other niche parties, which only rarely have assumed any prominent governmental positions, it is thus possible to actually examine what ‘Anti-Corruption Parties’ or ACPs actually accomplish once in power. In this chapter, we summarize and discuss our findings in this area.作者: Aids209 時間: 2025-3-25 01:57 作者: 漫步 時間: 2025-3-25 06:13 作者: 包庇 時間: 2025-3-25 08:54
Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Governmentprime minister. In contrast to other niche parties, which only rarely have assumed any prominent governmental positions, it is thus possible to actually examine what ‘Anti-Corruption Parties’ or ACPs actually accomplish once in power. In this chapter, we summarize and discuss our findings in this area.作者: 發(fā)芽 時間: 2025-3-25 14:49
Rulers and Their Elite Rivals: How Democratization Has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Sa Crawford, 2011), indicators of quality of government show decline, despite theoretical expectations that democracy should lead to improvements. This chapter contributes a theoretical argument, focused on elite–ruler relations, that explains the mismatch between our existing theories and observed empirical realities in Africa.作者: Accommodation 時間: 2025-3-25 17:51 作者: 一美元 時間: 2025-3-25 20:38 作者: 仔細檢查 時間: 2025-3-26 01:22
Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites’ Rotation and Asset Ownership to do so they establish extractive institutions instead of inclusive ones that would be serving the society at large (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Inclusive institutions are more likely to be observed in democracies, and this suggests a positive correlation between institutional and democratic quality.作者: maintenance 時間: 2025-3-26 05:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39767-1akis et al., Chapter 16 in this volume). This does not mean that electoral accountability can be neglected in studies on corruption and good governance—it only means that we need to find new ways to analyze how this mechanism works in different settings.作者: TSH582 時間: 2025-3-26 10:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-85910-5r honors and adheres to the institutional framework there may ensue positive spirals toward higher quality of government (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2011, 2014; North et al. 2009; Rothstein 2011).作者: 我不明白 時間: 2025-3-26 13:56 作者: 非實體 時間: 2025-3-26 17:57
How Institutions Constrain Elites from Destructive Behaviorr honors and adheres to the institutional framework there may ensue positive spirals toward higher quality of government (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2011, 2014; North et al. 2009; Rothstein 2011).作者: interpose 時間: 2025-3-26 21:26 作者: Scintigraphy 時間: 2025-3-27 04:20 作者: 捏造 時間: 2025-3-27 05:53 作者: 公共汽車 時間: 2025-3-27 11:12
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91833-8rn (Isham et al., 1997) and perform better in areas such as rule of law, bureaucratic quality and school enrolment, as well as provide minimal levels of corruption (Keefer, 2007). These dividends of democracy probably help us understand why it is also claimed that “democracy does cause growth” (Acemoglu et al., 2014, p. 1).作者: 殖民地 時間: 2025-3-27 16:19
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-10750-7 to do so they establish extractive institutions instead of inclusive ones that would be serving the society at large (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Inclusive institutions are more likely to be observed in democracies, and this suggests a positive correlation between institutional and democratic quality.作者: insipid 時間: 2025-3-27 18:28 作者: ANN 時間: 2025-3-27 23:39
Frank Engelmann,Thomas Guthmannividuals isolate themselves from knowledge of corruption and avoid personal involvement in illicit dealings so long as their from’s bottom line benefits from the malfeasance of their employees and agents? Finally, are there situations where the ‘fish rots from the tail up’? In other words, can perva作者: FLIRT 時間: 2025-3-28 02:37 作者: Intend 時間: 2025-3-28 07:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91853-6s Acemoglu and Robinson (A&R) (2012) offer broad accounts of how this might happen. I argue that these accounts are lacking as they do not adjust for the fact that elites are pursuing an interest defined in terms of power rather than wealth, and that shifting focus from wealth to power would add to 作者: Amorous 時間: 2025-3-28 13:15 作者: 革新 時間: 2025-3-28 16:15
Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government作者: radiograph 時間: 2025-3-28 21:07 作者: 致詞 時間: 2025-3-29 01:11 作者: 構想 時間: 2025-3-29 05:34
Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?ividuals isolate themselves from knowledge of corruption and avoid personal involvement in illicit dealings so long as their from’s bottom line benefits from the malfeasance of their employees and agents? Finally, are there situations where the ‘fish rots from the tail up’? In other words, can perva作者: 多產(chǎn)子 時間: 2025-3-29 09:46
Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruptionenjoy privileges of immunity from the host country’s laws and are not susceptible to prosecution unless diplomatic privileges are waived, which is very rare. Compared with other political elites analyzed in this volume, diplomats therefore enjoy more unchecked power and less accountability for crimi作者: Fillet,Filet 時間: 2025-3-29 13:11 作者: jovial 時間: 2025-3-29 15:37 作者: Expressly 時間: 2025-3-29 20:55 作者: intention 時間: 2025-3-30 02:51
Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government978-1-137-55628-8Series ISSN 2946-367X Series E-ISSN 2946-3688 作者: 移植 時間: 2025-3-30 07:15
2946-367X Overview: To a large extent, elite politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen hold the fortunes of their societies in their hands. This edited volume describes how formal and informal institutions affect elite behaviour, which in turn affects corruption and the quality of government.978-1-137-55628-8Series ISSN 2946-367X Series E-ISSN 2946-3688 作者: intention 時間: 2025-3-30 11:45
Book 2015To a large extent, elite politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen hold the fortunes of their societies in their hands. This edited volume describes how formal and informal institutions affect elite behaviour, which in turn affects corruption and the quality of government.作者: Colonnade 時間: 2025-3-30 15:48
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137556288Corruption; Good Governance; Quality of Government; Elites; State building; Parties; Constrains; corruption作者: mendacity 時間: 2025-3-30 19:25
Executive Politics and Governancehttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/307725.jpg作者: hegemony 時間: 2025-3-30 23:42 作者: Gourmet 時間: 2025-3-31 01:53
