標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction; Prospects for Effect Berhanykun Andemicael,John Mathiason Book 2005 Palgrave Macmillan, a division [打印本頁] 作者: 可擴(kuò)大 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:36
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書目名稱Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 使服水土 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:44
Building an Effective WMD Control RegimeThe model was then considered to be unrealistic as a basis for negotiating a convention for phased across-the-board disarmament to be implemented by a single international disarmament and verification organization. However, it established a firm conceptual foundation and an outline of partial or col作者: 皺痕 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:22
Conclusionruction in the possession of the major powers. During the past decade, the two Gulf Wars against Iraq and the crises in the rest of the Middle East, in the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia have shown that despite over 40 years of effort, there is a clear perception that weapons of mass destruction作者: cluster 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:48
Forschungslücken und Zielsetzung der Arbeitfor it’.. A more concise recent definition broadens the concept to apply it to the century-old process by stressing security enhancement as a goal of all States: it presents arms control as ‘measures directly related to military forces, adopted by governments to contain the costs and harmful consequ作者: cliche 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:36 作者: Champion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:59 作者: Champion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:36
2947-8863 the role of international organizations controversial. Whether they can effectively verify compliance with the WMD treaty regime has now been questioned by the United States. In responding to this basic question, Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction examines how existing organizations apply the 作者: 經(jīng)典 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:22
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8881-2at could destroy all human life on earth provided an incentive to find solutions. At the same time, it was the highest expression of the realist approach to international politics, dealing as it does with the ability of a State to defend itself.作者: artless 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:33 作者: 積云 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:44 作者: observatory 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:18
Compliance Issues and Recoursehe verification process detects significant violations. They result from a thorough evaluation of information at different stages: the analysis of information from declarations and other sources, from ongoing technical monitoring, from import/export monitoring and, ultimately, from on-site inspections.作者: 修飾語 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:32 作者: 壯麗的去 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:05 作者: 鄙視讀作 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:48 作者: Laconic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:31
The Structure and Logic of the WMD Ban Regimeso an essential part of the debate about international relations theory. The ‘balance of terror’, the possibilities loosed by technology of weapons that could destroy all human life on earth provided an incentive to find solutions. At the same time, it was the highest expression of the realist appro作者: 水汽 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:30
Evolution of the WMD Control Regimelly with respect to weapons of mass destruction. Verification is the process of gathering, analyzing and evaluating information to determine whether a State is complying with its obligations under a treaty or another type of agreement.. The concept of verified disarmament is an integral part of the 作者: 粗糙 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:46
Baseline Information: Declarations and Data Collectioned is crucial for effective verification, but it does not exist in a vacuum. Its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed irrespective of the goodwill of submitting States, but needs to be checked against the totality of available information assembled from other sources, including existing da作者: 悅耳 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:32
Technical Monitoringly depends on ongoing, indirect monitoring. Called technical monitoring, it addresses the problem of intrusiveness into sovereign territory by making the detection mechanism mechanical and automatic. ‘Look, Ma, no hands’, so to speak.作者: 河潭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:50
Controlling Supply: Procurement and Import/Export Monitoringle certainty whether a State is testing nuclear weapons or has moved material around internally, it cannot actually prevent or control the development and production of weapons, especially chemical and biological weapons.作者: 宴會(huì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:22
Verification by On-Site Inspectionor compliance with arms control agreements. It has formed the core of a system of mutually reinforcing elements of verification ranging from national means of detection to cooperative measures, including exchange and evaluation of information, ongoing technical monitoring and procurement control tha作者: 相符 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:18
Compliance Issues and Recourse under a particular agreement. Compliance issues are, therefore, our first area for specific attention. Compliance measures become necessary only if the verification process detects significant violations. They result from a thorough evaluation of information at different stages: the analysis of inf作者: Interim 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:23
Building an Effective WMD Control Regimenational authority responsible for the development and peaceful use of nuclear energy. It would take custody of all fissionable material and technological information essential for producing nuclear weapons. It would also verify the freeze on weapons production and the destruction of existing stockp作者: NAV 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:49 作者: 紋章 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:10
978-1-349-42931-8Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2005作者: 水槽 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:57
Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction978-0-230-00554-9Series ISSN 2947-8863 Series E-ISSN 2947-8871 作者: 磨碎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:12
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8881-2so an essential part of the debate about international relations theory. The ‘balance of terror’, the possibilities loosed by technology of weapons that could destroy all human life on earth provided an incentive to find solutions. At the same time, it was the highest expression of the realist appro作者: Explicate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:34
Forschungslücken und Zielsetzung der Arbeitlly with respect to weapons of mass destruction. Verification is the process of gathering, analyzing and evaluating information to determine whether a State is complying with its obligations under a treaty or another type of agreement.. The concept of verified disarmament is an integral part of the 作者: JIBE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:32
Das psychologische Markenmodelled is crucial for effective verification, but it does not exist in a vacuum. Its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed irrespective of the goodwill of submitting States, but needs to be checked against the totality of available information assembled from other sources, including existing da作者: 諂媚于人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:46
Das unbewusste Markenged?chtnisly depends on ongoing, indirect monitoring. Called technical monitoring, it addresses the problem of intrusiveness into sovereign territory by making the detection mechanism mechanical and automatic. ‘Look, Ma, no hands’, so to speak.作者: Mundane 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:00
Die neue tiefenpsychologische Markenfunktionle certainty whether a State is testing nuclear weapons or has moved material around internally, it cannot actually prevent or control the development and production of weapons, especially chemical and biological weapons.作者: agonist 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:47
Duration of Proceedings and Time Limitsor compliance with arms control agreements. It has formed the core of a system of mutually reinforcing elements of verification ranging from national means of detection to cooperative measures, including exchange and evaluation of information, ongoing technical monitoring and procurement control tha作者: ostracize 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:47 作者: 導(dǎo)師 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:38
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-7127-2national authority responsible for the development and peaceful use of nuclear energy. It would take custody of all fissionable material and technological information essential for producing nuclear weapons. It would also verify the freeze on weapons production and the destruction of existing stockp作者: 迅速成長 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:39
Status Quo der Arbeitgebermarkenforschung,s an anxious expectation of humankind for a realistic solution to ensure survival. Today’s rapid changes in the strategic environment are being met by inadequate — and sometimes detrimental — policies of arms control. In the past, doctrines of balance and deterrence were used to maintain equilibrium作者: squander 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:00
Das psychologische Markenmodelled is crucial for effective verification, but it does not exist in a vacuum. Its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed irrespective of the goodwill of submitting States, but needs to be checked against the totality of available information assembled from other sources, including existing data banks, media sources and future inspections.作者: Limousine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:46 作者: Cultivate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:37
Die neue tiefenpsychologische Markenfunktionle certainty whether a State is testing nuclear weapons or has moved material around internally, it cannot actually prevent or control the development and production of weapons, especially chemical and biological weapons.作者: COLIC 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:03
Duration of Proceedings and Time Limitsor compliance with arms control agreements. It has formed the core of a system of mutually reinforcing elements of verification ranging from national means of detection to cooperative measures, including exchange and evaluation of information, ongoing technical monitoring and procurement control that were examined in the preceding chapters.作者: obstruct 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:33
Baseline Information: Declarations and Data Collectioned is crucial for effective verification, but it does not exist in a vacuum. Its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed irrespective of the goodwill of submitting States, but needs to be checked against the totality of available information assembled from other sources, including existing data banks, media sources and future inspections.作者: Pudendal-Nerve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:44
Technical Monitoringly depends on ongoing, indirect monitoring. Called technical monitoring, it addresses the problem of intrusiveness into sovereign territory by making the detection mechanism mechanical and automatic. ‘Look, Ma, no hands’, so to speak.作者: 譏諷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:45
Controlling Supply: Procurement and Import/Export Monitoringle certainty whether a State is testing nuclear weapons or has moved material around internally, it cannot actually prevent or control the development and production of weapons, especially chemical and biological weapons.作者: 平庸的人或物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:52 作者: Stress-Fracture 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:22 作者: 你正派 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:54
