派博傳思國際中心

標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Electronic Voting; Second International Robert Krimmer,Melanie Volkamer,Carsten Schürmann Conference proceedings 2017 Springer Internationa [打印本頁]

作者: 選民    時間: 2025-3-21 16:43
書目名稱Electronic Voting影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Electronic Voting影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Electronic Voting網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Electronic Voting網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Electronic Voting被引頻次




書目名稱Electronic Voting被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Electronic Voting年度引用




書目名稱Electronic Voting年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Electronic Voting讀者反饋




書目名稱Electronic Voting讀者反饋學(xué)科排名





作者: HAIL    時間: 2025-3-21 22:12
Cryptographic Security Analysis of E-voting Systems: Achievements, Misconceptions, and Limitations, field in the last decade or so in terms of formalizing security requirements and formally analyzing e-voting systems. This paper summarizes some of the achievements and lessons learned, which, among others, challenge common believes about the role of and the relationships between central security r
作者: 提升    時間: 2025-3-22 02:08
Voting in E-Participation: A Set of Requirements to Support Accountability and Trust by Electoral Coting result on the outcome of the e-participation process might differ a lot as voting can relate to approving, polling or co-decision making. The greater the impact of the electronic voting on the outcomes of the e-participation process, the more important become the regulations and technologies t
作者: 合唱隊    時間: 2025-3-22 04:40
The Weakness of Cumulative Voting,gle candidate. It is sometimes used to elect members to a legislative body such as a parliament or city council, and its purpose is to achieve a more proportional representation than that which results from many other voting systems. Cumulative voting is most commonly used in municipal elections in
作者: MAIM    時間: 2025-3-22 11:53
No More Excuses: Automated Synthesis of Practical and Verifiable Vote-Counting Programs for Complex against their legal definition and only if they can produce an easily verifiable certificate for the correctness of the count. We then show that both are achievable for the Schulze method of vote-counting, even when the election involves millions of ballots. We argue that our methodology is applica
作者: 謙虛的人    時間: 2025-3-22 16:04

作者: 謙虛的人    時間: 2025-3-22 17:34
Towards a Mechanized Proof of Selene Receipt-Freeness and Vote-Privacy,allow voters to retrieve their votes from a public bulletin board and a commitment scheme that allows them to hide their vote from a potential coercer. So far, however, Selene was never studied formally. The Selene protocol was neither completely formalized, nor were the correctness proofs for Vote-
作者: Asymptomatic    時間: 2025-3-22 23:28

作者: 抵制    時間: 2025-3-23 03:03
Updated European Standards for E-voting,ndation to member States, Rec(2004)11 and the two 2010 Guidelines on certification and on transparency were recently repealed and replaced by Rec(2017)5 on Standards for e-voting and the associated Guidelines on its implementation. We discuss the 2017 Recommendation and the main novelties introduced
作者: expire    時間: 2025-3-23 05:57
A Formally Verified Single Transferable Voting Scheme with Fractional Values, of vote counting as application of a sequence of rules. The rules are an intermediate step for specifying the protocol for vote-counting in a precise symbolic language. We then formalise these rules in Coq. This reduces the gap between the legislation and formalisation so that, without knowledge of
作者: 上釉彩    時間: 2025-3-23 09:41

作者: NAV    時間: 2025-3-23 16:06
Return Code Schemes for Electronic Voting Systems,s generated as a multiparty computation of a secure MAC tag applied on an encrypted message submitted by a voter. Our proposals enjoy a great level of flexibility with respect to various usability, security, and performance tradeoffs.
作者: 輕打    時間: 2025-3-23 20:28
Eos a Universal Verifiable and Coercion Resistant Voting Protocol, votes anonymously. Voters may assume multiple pseudo identities, one of which is legitimate. We use the others to signal coercion to the Election Authority. Eos uses two mixing phases with the goal to break the connection between the voter and vote, not to preserve vote privacy (which is given alre
作者: albuminuria    時間: 2025-3-24 00:48

作者: 六個才偏離    時間: 2025-3-24 05:04
Verifiability Experiences in Government Online Voting Systems,ve implemented these properties in their voting systems. However, not all the systems have adopted the same levels of verifiability nor the same range of cryptographic mechanisms. For instance, Estonia (2013) and New South Wales (Australia, 2015) started by adopting individual verifiability to their
作者: 有角    時間: 2025-3-24 09:39

作者: consent    時間: 2025-3-24 11:54
How Could Snowden Attack an Election?,e voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election re
作者: Essential    時間: 2025-3-24 18:40

作者: Exaggerate    時間: 2025-3-24 19:18
Estonian Voting Verification Mechanism Revisited Again,nts to the weaknesses and questionable design choices of the new scheme. We show that the scheme does not fix the vote privacy issue it claims to. It also introduces a way for a malicious voting application to manipulate the vote without being detected by the verification mechanism, hence breaking t
作者: 意外    時間: 2025-3-24 23:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9428-3at Eve acts as maliciously as possible. From an economic perspective, Eve tries to maximize her utility in a game with other participants. The game’s rules are determined by the system and its security mechanisms, but Eve can invent new ways of interacting with participants. We show that Eve can be
作者: 流逝    時間: 2025-3-25 04:37

作者: 多山    時間: 2025-3-25 11:23

作者: insidious    時間: 2025-3-25 12:30
Inspecting the Newborn Baby‘s Eyesgle candidate. It is sometimes used to elect members to a legislative body such as a parliament or city council, and its purpose is to achieve a more proportional representation than that which results from many other voting systems. Cumulative voting is most commonly used in municipal elections in
作者: Cerebrovascular    時間: 2025-3-25 17:12
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04058-1 against their legal definition and only if they can produce an easily verifiable certificate for the correctness of the count. We then show that both are achievable for the Schulze method of vote-counting, even when the election involves millions of ballots. We argue that our methodology is applica
作者: 原始    時間: 2025-3-25 21:59

作者: 頌揚(yáng)本人    時間: 2025-3-26 00:12

作者: 剝削    時間: 2025-3-26 06:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52965-2tection services from a cloud provider. However, current DDoS detection and mitigation methods come at the cost of significantly increased trust in the cloud provider. In this paper we examine the security implications of denial-of-service prevention in the context of the 2017 state election in West
作者: 碌碌之人    時間: 2025-3-26 08:48
Overcoming the underdog mentality,ndation to member States, Rec(2004)11 and the two 2010 Guidelines on certification and on transparency were recently repealed and replaced by Rec(2017)5 on Standards for e-voting and the associated Guidelines on its implementation. We discuss the 2017 Recommendation and the main novelties introduced
作者: 纖細(xì)    時間: 2025-3-26 12:53

作者: 西瓜    時間: 2025-3-26 19:56
Bénamar Chouaf,Serguei Pergamenchtchikovting system. Such attacks violate availability. Thankfully, they are typically easily detected. We identify and investigate a denial-of-service attack on a voter’s spam filters, which is not so easily detected: ., an attack that lets the attacker silently suppress mails from the voting system. Rever
作者: 細(xì)菌等    時間: 2025-3-27 00:11
Aaron D. Isabelle,Nataly Z. Valles generated as a multiparty computation of a secure MAC tag applied on an encrypted message submitted by a voter. Our proposals enjoy a great level of flexibility with respect to various usability, security, and performance tradeoffs.
作者: 生銹    時間: 2025-3-27 03:31

作者: Dri727    時間: 2025-3-27 05:47
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19397-4describe how clash attacks against STAR-Vote could weaken its security guarantees: corrupt voting terminals could identify voters with identical ballot preferences and print identical receipts for them, while generating electronic ballot ciphertexts for other candidates. Each voter would then be abl
作者: Congestion    時間: 2025-3-27 12:49

作者: 合并    時間: 2025-3-27 16:29
K. B. Yatsimirskii,V. P. Vasil’evused to match the cast ballots against the pre-generated encrypted code tables..Our solution provides an attractive balance of security and functional properties. It is based on well-known cryptographic building blocks and relies on standard cryptographic assumptions, which allows for relatively sim
作者: 拱墻    時間: 2025-3-27 21:33

作者: glomeruli    時間: 2025-3-28 00:14
D. Massa,A. Fullterton,R. Prinjasparency and trust base). We conclude that for many vulnerabilities of Internet voting systems, there exist related weakness in paper systems as well. The main reason why paper-based elections are perceived as more secure is historical experience. We argue that recent criticism about Internet voting
作者: 諷刺滑稽戲劇    時間: 2025-3-28 03:27

作者: fatuity    時間: 2025-3-28 07:57
Robert Krimmer,Melanie Volkamer,Carsten SchürmannIncludes supplementary material:
作者: Wordlist    時間: 2025-3-28 11:39

作者: PANT    時間: 2025-3-28 18:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5data security; authentication; computer crime; cryptography; electronic voting; e-voting; Internet voting;
作者: Anticoagulant    時間: 2025-3-28 19:41

作者: flammable    時間: 2025-3-29 00:25

作者: MULTI    時間: 2025-3-29 06:01

作者: Apoptosis    時間: 2025-3-29 10:48
Return Code Schemes for Electronic Voting Systems,s generated as a multiparty computation of a secure MAC tag applied on an encrypted message submitted by a voter. Our proposals enjoy a great level of flexibility with respect to various usability, security, and performance tradeoffs.
作者: APRON    時間: 2025-3-29 11:31

作者: 只有    時間: 2025-3-29 19:02

作者: 繁榮中國    時間: 2025-3-29 20:29
Electronic Voting978-3-319-68687-5Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
作者: 大方不好    時間: 2025-3-30 01:41
Inspanningsfysiologie bij kinderen repeal of the Elections to the Austrian Federation of Students in 2009 where electronic voting was piloted as additional remote channel for casting a ballot. The court states its perspectives on elections and electronic voting which serve as sources for the derivation of legal requirements for elec
作者: Militia    時間: 2025-3-30 07:01
Overcoming the underdog mentality,elines are expected to be completed through further work. The main differences between the old and the new Council of Europe standards on e-voting are outlined. Correlations are illustrated. The expected use, impact and evolution of the Recommendation and Guidelines are briefly explained.
作者: FUSC    時間: 2025-3-30 09:18

作者: 我們的面粉    時間: 2025-3-30 15:13
Voting in E-Participation: A Set of Requirements to Support Accountability and Trust by Electoral C repeal of the Elections to the Austrian Federation of Students in 2009 where electronic voting was piloted as additional remote channel for casting a ballot. The court states its perspectives on elections and electronic voting which serve as sources for the derivation of legal requirements for elec
作者: mediocrity    時間: 2025-3-30 20:19

作者: Indurate    時間: 2025-3-30 22:54
Reverse Bayesian Poisoning: How to Use Spam Filters to Manipulate Online Elections,soned the Bogofilter spam filter using these keywords. Then we tested how genuine Helios mails are classified. Our experiments show that reverse Bayesian poisoning can easily suppress genuine emails from the Helios voting system.
作者: 結(jié)束    時間: 2025-3-31 03:06
Eos a Universal Verifiable and Coercion Resistant Voting Protocol,hority. Eos uses two mixing phases with the goal to break the connection between the voter and vote, not to preserve vote privacy (which is given already) but to guarantee coercion resistance by making it (nearly) impossible for a coercer to follow their vote through the bulletin board. Eos is universally verifiable.
作者: sed-rate    時間: 2025-3-31 07:07

作者: Preserve    時間: 2025-3-31 11:59
0302-9743 om 48 submissions. In addition the book contains 3 keynote talks. The papers deal with security, usability and technical issues; administrative, legal, political and social issued; and election and practical experiences.?.978-3-319-68686-8978-3-319-68687-5Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
作者: GREEN    時間: 2025-3-31 16:55

作者: Fluctuate    時間: 2025-3-31 20:47
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04906-5Privacy and Receipt-Freeness..In this paper, we give a formal model for a simplified version of Selene in the symbolic model, along with a machine-checked proof of Vote-Privacy and Receipt-Freeness. All proofs are checked with the Tamarin theorem prover.
作者: Daily-Value    時間: 2025-4-1 00:03

作者: Oafishness    時間: 2025-4-1 04:27

作者: HUMP    時間: 2025-4-1 09:02

作者: compel    時間: 2025-4-1 11:56
Instability and Conflict in the Middle Eastsumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election result or to play into the adversary’s hand and to publicize sensitive information. We stress that the attack is different from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.
作者: 爵士樂    時間: 2025-4-1 14:41





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