標題: Titlebook: Eisenhower and American Public Opinion on China; Mara Oliva Book 2018 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 Eisenhower Admi [打印本頁] 作者: 天真無邪 時間: 2025-3-21 19:56
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作者: 慌張 時間: 2025-3-21 22:44 作者: MAL 時間: 2025-3-22 02:14
Keeping Promises,publican Party right wing. Setting aside his views on foreign policy, he had endorsed the harsh GOP rhetoric in accusing the Truman administration of having abandoned millions of people to Communism in favor of a Europe-first policy and having involved the country in a stalemated war against the Peo作者: 保留 時間: 2025-3-22 05:32
Challenge One: Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference of 1954, discussing a possible US intervention in the French colonial war against the Communist-led Vietminh in Indochina. The military crisis at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent peace conference in Geneva were the first challenge to the Eisenhower administration’s hardline policy toward the People’s Republ作者: Phonophobia 時間: 2025-3-22 12:00
,Challenge Two: The First Taiwan Crisis of 1954–1955,t D. Eisenhower was vacationing at the Summer White House in Denver. At approximately seven o’clock that evening, he received a message from Deputy Defense Secretary Robert B. Anderson from Washington, DC. He reported that at two o’clock that morning, the Chinese Communists had begun heavy artillery作者: Motilin 時間: 2025-3-22 14:36 作者: Motilin 時間: 2025-3-22 19:21 作者: 灰心喪氣 時間: 2025-3-22 22:32
Conclusions, foreign policy toward the People’s Republic of China. This examination suggests that first, with reference to the expectations of the realist and Wilsonian liberal models, the pattern of the public’s influence on this intensive case study can be generally described as either no-impact or minor cons作者: 漸變 時間: 2025-3-23 02:52
,K?lner Verkehr der letzten Jahrzehnte,over of the mainland in 1949 and the unexpected North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950. Second, this chapter analyzes how those illusions affected the US domestic political debate and influenced the 1952 Presidential contest. No other aspect of American foreign affairs was more deeply involved in domestic politics than US-China relations.作者: 使乳化 時間: 2025-3-23 07:14 作者: 消毒 時間: 2025-3-23 13:28
ple’s Republic of China.Offers new insights into Sino-AmericIn the 1950s, most of the American public opposed diplomatic and trade relations with Communist China; traditional historiography blames this widespread hostility for the tensions between China and the United States during Dwight D. Eisenho作者: PON 時間: 2025-3-23 15:20
Book 2018ad hostility for the tensions between China and the United States during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency. In this book, Mara Oliva reconsiders the influence of U.S. public opinion on Sino-American relations, arguing that it is understudied and often misinterpreted. She shows how the Eisenhower adm作者: Evolve 時間: 2025-3-23 20:38
Introduction, a review of the current literature on Sino-American relations in the early Cold War. Second, it discusses the challenges encountered and the methodology used in assessing the influence of US public opinion on the administration’s China policy. It argues that the role that popular opinion played in 作者: Ingratiate 時間: 2025-3-24 00:37 作者: Blanch 時間: 2025-3-24 03:01
Challenge One: Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference of 1954,ietminh take control of the Indochina peninsula. The vast revisionist literature on the involvement of Eisenhower’s administration in Indochina has advanced numerous interpretations of the influence those contradictory popular feelings had on the President’s thinking. Without disputing Eisenhower’s 作者: 恃強凌弱 時間: 2025-3-24 10:25 作者: cloture 時間: 2025-3-24 13:33 作者: Diuretic 時間: 2025-3-24 15:42
Hard Line Until the End, intensified through 1958 and reached a peak when the Chinese Communists began shelling the offshore islands for a second time in the autumn of that year. While support for establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing (Peiping) and its admission into the United Nations never reached an overall nat作者: 評論者 時間: 2025-3-24 22:14
Conclusions,n, did not let popular feelings shape their national security agenda but used them only as warning signs to determine whether opposition was building against a policy. Consequently, public opinion did not influence the administration’s hard line policy toward Beijing as previously assumed by histori作者: 我不重要 時間: 2025-3-25 01:10
Book 2018 hampering relations with the Communist giant and seriously heightening the risk of nuclear conflict. Drawing together an extensive array of published and unpublished sources, this book offers a new prism for understanding one of the most difficult decades in the history of both countries..作者: adulterant 時間: 2025-3-25 03:38 作者: 煩擾 時間: 2025-3-25 10:12
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-97346-7ull control of the policymaking process and its public relations management. Unlike his predecessor, he would make full use of the National Security Council which would be chaired by the President and would meet regularly every week. A firm believer in the necessity of support of public opinion for 作者: 隱士 時間: 2025-3-25 12:20
Absolutismus in Sachsen-Anhalt,ietminh take control of the Indochina peninsula. The vast revisionist literature on the involvement of Eisenhower’s administration in Indochina has advanced numerous interpretations of the influence those contradictory popular feelings had on the President’s thinking. Without disputing Eisenhower’s 作者: OWL 時間: 2025-3-25 15:50 作者: 女上癮 時間: 2025-3-25 21:23 作者: Evacuate 時間: 2025-3-26 03:41 作者: pester 時間: 2025-3-26 07:46 作者: Scleroderma 時間: 2025-3-26 12:23 作者: 最初 時間: 2025-3-26 13:31
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76195-4Eisenhower Administration; Dwight D; Eisenhower; Eisenhower foreign policy; Cold war; People‘s Republic 作者: Flinch 時間: 2025-3-26 20:16 作者: nonchalance 時間: 2025-3-26 21:53 作者: 易彎曲 時間: 2025-3-27 04:07
http://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/305487.jpg作者: 地殼 時間: 2025-3-27 07:17 作者: synovium 時間: 2025-3-27 11:46
,K?lner Verkehr der letzten Jahrzehnte,own in our land was without its society to collect funds and clothing for Chinese missions, to worry about those who labored in distant, dangerous and exotic vineyards of the Lord, and to hear the missionaries’ inspiring reports.” The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it presents a histori作者: 仇恨 時間: 2025-3-27 15:27
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-97346-7publican Party right wing. Setting aside his views on foreign policy, he had endorsed the harsh GOP rhetoric in accusing the Truman administration of having abandoned millions of people to Communism in favor of a Europe-first policy and having involved the country in a stalemated war against the Peo作者: Abominate 時間: 2025-3-27 18:28 作者: LVAD360 時間: 2025-3-28 00:35
Geschichte des Preu?ischen Verwaltungsrechtst D. Eisenhower was vacationing at the Summer White House in Denver. At approximately seven o’clock that evening, he received a message from Deputy Defense Secretary Robert B. Anderson from Washington, DC. He reported that at two o’clock that morning, the Chinese Communists had begun heavy artillery作者: GEON 時間: 2025-3-28 03:38
Geschichte des Preu?ischen Verwaltungsrechts People’s Republic of China (PRC) to defuse the tensions that had arisen over the Chinese Communists’ attempts to recapture the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Matzu (Matsu), and settle other unresolved issues between the two countries. The negotiations took place in Geneva and lasted two ye作者: 長處 時間: 2025-3-28 09:13
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-25717-3increasingly frustrated with the difficult state of Sino-American relations. “Dissatisfaction is nothing new, but it is being expressed more openly now,” he wrote. The American public particularly blamed Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kei-shek) and his associates in Washington for the dangerous situation in t
