標題: Titlebook: Efficient Rent-Seeking; Chronicle of an Inte Alan A. Lockard,Gordon Tullock Book 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001 economi [打印本頁] 作者: Destruct 時間: 2025-3-21 17:03
書目名稱Efficient Rent-Seeking影響因子(影響力)
作者: Melodrama 時間: 2025-3-21 21:37
Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: A comment, here Table 1 from my ‘Efficient Rent-Seeking.’. This shows the equilibrium investment of each individual, different numbers of individuals playing the game (.), and differing values of .. Table 2, also reproduced (ibid.), shows the total investment.作者: 閑蕩 時間: 2025-3-22 01:07 作者: Bureaucracy 時間: 2025-3-22 05:12
Free entry and efficient rent seeking,itures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple Harberger (1954) deadweight loss. Indeed, under Tullock’s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by Krueger (1作者: echnic 時間: 2025-3-22 10:27 作者: 孤僻 時間: 2025-3-22 13:33 作者: 孤僻 時間: 2025-3-22 20:53 作者: 亞麻制品 時間: 2025-3-22 21:34 作者: Gratuitous 時間: 2025-3-23 01:59
Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success,election campaigns, industrial disputes, lawsuits, and sibling rivalries. In the rent-seeking literature, each party’s success p. (which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won) has usually been taken to be a function of the . of the respective r作者: 考古學(xué) 時間: 2025-3-23 05:36 作者: 刺耳 時間: 2025-3-23 23:34
Rent-seeking, rent-defending, and rent dissipation,1967) stated intent to identify the total social costs of monopoly. Early studies, which were concerned with the measurement of Tullock costs, simply assumed dissipation would be complete (see Becker, 1968; Kruger, 1974; Posner, 1975; and others). However, Posner (1975) and Fisher (1985) observed th作者: 機制 時間: 2025-3-24 05:49 作者: 后退 時間: 2025-3-24 10:10
A general analysis of rent-seeking games, to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-作者: 賞錢 時間: 2025-3-24 10:45 作者: synovium 時間: 2025-3-24 17:21
Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking, aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation, and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society. How important rent-seeking is as a part of the total monopolistic waste hinges on the size of the total expenditures induced by a given level of excess profits.作者: 延期 時間: 2025-3-24 22:19 作者: 苦惱 時間: 2025-3-25 02:01
Rent-seeking, rent-defending, and rent dissipation,assumed dissipation would be complete (see Becker, 1968; Kruger, 1974; Posner, 1975; and others). However, Posner (1975) and Fisher (1985) observed the question of dissipation can be answered only for overtly specified game structures.作者: TOXIN 時間: 2025-3-25 05:45 作者: 熒光 時間: 2025-3-25 11:18 作者: 潛伏期 時間: 2025-3-25 12:03 作者: 捏造 時間: 2025-3-25 16:25 作者: BLINK 時間: 2025-3-25 22:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90985-1sions (see Tullock, 1989). In this article I attempt to move toward explaining lobbying or rent-seeking investments by examining the questions, “How do firms decide how much to spend on campaign contributions?” and “Do these decisions reflect any underlying models of decision making?”作者: Jogging 時間: 2025-3-26 01:29 作者: 注意力集中 時間: 2025-3-26 05:16
Der Ingenieur als GmbH-Gesch?ftsführer aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation, and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society. How important rent-seeking is as a part of the total monopolistic waste hinges on the size of the total expenditures induced by a given level of excess profits.作者: paradigm 時間: 2025-3-26 08:29 作者: 易于交談 時間: 2025-3-26 13:41
Gianni Mantero,Piero Ponci,Giuseppe Terragniassumed dissipation would be complete (see Becker, 1968; Kruger, 1974; Posner, 1975; and others). However, Posner (1975) and Fisher (1985) observed the question of dissipation can be answered only for overtly specified game structures.作者: xanthelasma 時間: 2025-3-26 17:00
Bilanzierung von Abgrenzungsposten,Hillman and Riley (1989); Katz .. (1990); Long and Vousden (1987); Ursprung (1990) and Varian (1989). The purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective-group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent-seeking efforts.作者: 有機體 時間: 2025-3-26 21:55
Free entry and efficient rent seeking,974) and Posner (1975), rents are exactly dissipated at the social level ($1 is spent to capture $1), so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the Harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits.作者: 吊胃口 時間: 2025-3-27 02:00
The design of rent-seeking competitions,em. He supplies it and designs the rent-seeking game to maximize his wealth. The author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician’s wealth in one-input and two-input rent-seeking processes.作者: Flounder 時間: 2025-3-27 08:07
Rationing and Rent Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals,s not necessarily improve welfare because total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the variance than on the level of time costs and personal valuations. The model is also used to discuss other institutions that involve rent-seeking activities, such as the patent system and import quotas.作者: 使聲音降低 時間: 2025-3-27 09:32
Investments in rent-seeking,sions (see Tullock, 1989). In this article I attempt to move toward explaining lobbying or rent-seeking investments by examining the questions, “How do firms decide how much to spend on campaign contributions?” and “Do these decisions reflect any underlying models of decision making?”作者: 阻礙 時間: 2025-3-27 15:44
Book 2001nter) to work out some examples and gave aseminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) hetitled his talk `Efficient Rent Seeking‘. As Editor of Public Choicehe was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal ofPolitical Economy had turned it down on the grounds tha作者: Decibel 時間: 2025-3-27 21:29 作者: 枕墊 時間: 2025-3-27 23:35 作者: committed 時間: 2025-3-28 04:29
Der Ingenieur und seine Designeran (1983) extended Tullock’s model to a long-run setting, i.e., free entry, and found that under these conditions rents will be dissipated. Tullock (1983) agreed in part, but still maintained that where marginal costs were rapidly falling or rising throughout, Corcoran’s long-run solution does not pertain.作者: 粗俗人 時間: 2025-3-28 06:59
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04185-2 through the detailed results of Tullock’s model using the Nash-Cournot equilibrium concept.. I will also show the pedagogical value of using this unifying framework to study rent-seeking behavior, and I will present an important result concerning the possibility of overdissipation as stated in Tullock’s original model.作者: 跑過 時間: 2025-3-28 13:55
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07184-4al rents may accrue to rent-seekers and, under certain conditions, resist dissipation. A number of studies followed Tullock’s 1980 paper (Corcoran, 1984; Corcoran and Karels, 1985; Higgins, Shugart and Tollison, 1985; Tullock, 1984, 1985, and 1987) which explore the dissipation of excess rents under various assumptions.作者: Asperity 時間: 2025-3-28 15:59
Rent-seeking behavior in the long-run,an (1983) extended Tullock’s model to a long-run setting, i.e., free entry, and found that under these conditions rents will be dissipated. Tullock (1983) agreed in part, but still maintained that where marginal costs were rapidly falling or rising throughout, Corcoran’s long-run solution does not pertain.作者: CAJ 時間: 2025-3-28 19:45 作者: Barrister 時間: 2025-3-28 23:46 作者: 音樂等 時間: 2025-3-29 06:14
Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success,etween the parties can ever occur as a Cournot equilibrium. In contrast, both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties’ resource commitments.作者: FEAT 時間: 2025-3-29 11:09 作者: 某人 時間: 2025-3-29 14:20 作者: 殺死 時間: 2025-3-29 19:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26830-5oblem, which obstinately kept its status as an `intellectual swamp’ (Tullock, 1985). The present contribution is an attempt to point to a way out of this swamp by questioning the appropriateness of the Cournot-Nash solution concept for Tullock’s original problem. Equivalently, we question the modeli作者: 變化無常 時間: 2025-3-29 21:31
Book 2001f not perfectly,at least very well. Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted.It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did showexactly that paradox..Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matterand the discussion sort of wound down, although it could作者: Amplify 時間: 2025-3-30 00:04 作者: obnoxious 時間: 2025-3-30 04:39
Der Ingenieur als GmbH-Gesch?ftsführer is recognized as a factor which must be included among the wastes associated with monopoly power (Tullock, 1967; Posner, 1975).. The expenditures are aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation, and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society. How important rent-seek作者: Entreaty 時間: 2025-3-30 10:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-65836-9 here Table 1 from my ‘Efficient Rent-Seeking.’. This shows the equilibrium investment of each individual, different numbers of individuals playing the game (.), and differing values of .. Table 2, also reproduced (ibid.), shows the total investment.作者: irritation 時間: 2025-3-30 13:12 作者: Intruder 時間: 2025-3-30 18:15 作者: MINT 時間: 2025-3-30 23:45
Michael B. Krause,Winfried Mayer model with an apparent paradox. The market doesn’t clear even with free entry and competition. There have been a number of efforts to deal with this problem (Corcoran, 1984; I commented on it in the same issue, pp. 95–98). (1985) Corcoran and Karels and Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) are fu作者: 戰(zhàn)勝 時間: 2025-3-31 03:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86140-6nts depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker’s investment. If the supply of an input into the rent-seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it, the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious probl作者: Customary 時間: 2025-3-31 08:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-83652-6z, 1986) has largely involved identical players and been mainly concerned with the extent of under or over dissipation of rents, although Tullock has commented at some length on the ‘intellectual mire’ arising from possible non-existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium when there are increasing return作者: 象形文字 時間: 2025-3-31 09:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04185-2 the literature has expanded Tullock’s model in a variety of directions. This article sets out the original problem in the formal framework of a Nash-Cournot game. While only part of Tullock’s original article looks at rent seeking in the Nash-Cournot framework, this framework is a useful way to sum作者: 欲望 時間: 2025-3-31 16:24 作者: 仇恨 時間: 2025-3-31 18:27 作者: Fissure 時間: 2025-3-31 23:53 作者: 令人悲傷 時間: 2025-4-1 05:39 作者: custody 時間: 2025-4-1 08:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91089-5onsidering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality, a case which constitutes our basic model. Several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case. The problem is then extended to deal with (a) groups with different wealth levels, and (b) risk aversion. This la作者: ureter 時間: 2025-4-1 13:59 作者: Enthralling 時間: 2025-4-1 17:40
Bilanzierung von Abgrenzungsposten, directions by Allard (1988); Appelbaum and Katz (1986., ., .); Gradstein and Nitzan (1989); Hillman and Katz (1984, 1987), Hillman and Samet (1987); Hillman and Riley (1989); Katz .. (1990); Long and Vousden (1987); Ursprung (1990) and Varian (1989). The purpose of this paper is to extend this theo作者: 費解 時間: 2025-4-1 21:37
,Von der Buchführung zur Bilanz, to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-作者: 暗語 時間: 2025-4-2 01:57 作者: 包租車船 時間: 2025-4-2 04:44 作者: BLANK 時間: 2025-4-2 10:50
Back to the bog, model with an apparent paradox. The market doesn’t clear even with free entry and competition. There have been a number of efforts to deal with this problem (Corcoran, 1984; I commented on it in the same issue, pp. 95–98). (1985) Corcoran and Karels and Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) are further efforts to solve the problem.作者: 外露 時間: 2025-4-2 11:21
