標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy; Proceedings of a Wor Rüdiger Pethig,Ulrich Schlieper Conference proceedings 1987 Springer-Ve [打印本頁] 作者: Levelheaded 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:36
書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
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書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy被引頻次
書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy年度引用
書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy讀者反饋
書目名稱Efficiency, Institutions, and Economic Policy讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Solace 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:42 作者: 南極 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:55
,Conclusion: ‘The Blessings of War’,owth and the income distribution if demographic changes occur.. Recent papers address in addition the questions of equity among generations and the acceptability of intergenerational transfers via social institutions..作者: refine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:49 作者: parallelism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:55
Securing Your Containerized Environment,ated many insights and led to a reorientation of the way some economists think about markets, it still has many gaps. In this comment I want to use Professor Witt’s paper to explore in more detail the strengths and weaknesses of the property rights approach.作者: cogitate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:52 作者: cogitate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:11 作者: 浮夸 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:07
Specific Human Capital and Collective Codetermination Rights,agement (Monissen, H.G., 1978). These collective (group related) decision rights are the essence of what is typically referred to as labor’s codetermination in the decision-making process of the capitalistic business firm.作者: Colonoscopy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:27 作者: Ventricle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:05 作者: 混合物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:39
Troubleshooting Raspberry Pi Computers,o Pethig) an all-or-nothing choice and therefore give more of an incentive to the individuals to participate in the financing of a public good than e.g. voluntary provision. All-or-nothing choice increases the detrimental effects of free riding for an individual and therefore makes such a behavior less attractive.作者: Between 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:33 作者: Autobiography 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:35 作者: guzzle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:09 作者: 擔(dān)憂 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:02
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230288782n with some ideologically motivated concept of justice leading to a redistribution in favor of the poor; on the other extreme, pure self-interest in combination with the prevailing politico-economical system leads to redistribution in favor of the strong and influential..作者: 星星 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:40
Migrating to SharePoint Server 2016, supply artificially scarce. In this paper we study the question whether the inefficiency would disappear if there was a sufficient amount of competition among actual or potential providers of the public good.作者: 大酒杯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:56
Family Structure and Intergenerational Transfers in Social Health Insurance: A Public Choice Model,owth and the income distribution if demographic changes occur.. Recent papers address in addition the questions of equity among generations and the acceptability of intergenerational transfers via social institutions..作者: Forehead-Lift 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:00
Free Riders and Voluntary Contributions Reconsidered,tary contribution approach as well as with exclusive market provision. It is shown that uniform membership dues reduce free rider incentives thus mitigating the exploitation of the great by the small (Olson 1965).作者: pineal-gland 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:59 作者: licence 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53955-3tructure of economic relations while ”normative” work generally takes the objectives as determined exogenously through a political process which is both outside professional economic competence and beyond professional economic concern. There does, however, appear to be a ”consensus political theory”作者: Debrief 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:45
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230288782.. Several factors explaining the expansion in redistributional activities, can be thought of. On the one extreme, one has pure altruism in combination with some ideologically motivated concept of justice leading to a redistribution in favor of the poor; on the other extreme, pure self-interest in c作者: Perigee 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:13
Charlotte Hommerberg,Maria Lindgrene model, the ‘lobbying game’, is clear. The government distributes a given ‘cake’ (transfers, subsidies) according to the relative pressure of each interest group. Each interest group behaves as a Nash-competitor when it determines its lobbying efforts, i.e. takes the efforts of all other groups as 作者: NATAL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:28 作者: 軍械庫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:20 作者: collagen 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:35
Artifact Repository and Container Registry,act neoclassical equilibrium approach (see Albert 1977), comparatively little attention has been paid to an explanation of the conditions under which property rights actually emerge. Early contributions (in German) have gone virtually unnoticed (for a survey see Meyer 1983) and it is a hypothesis su作者: mastopexy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:42
Securing Your Containerized Environment,although some of the issues which have become the central concern of the approach were already being discussed by economic historians and economists interested in the effects of different agricultural land tenure systems. The property rights theorists have contributed to our understanding of institu作者: 失望昨天 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:51 作者: cloture 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:32
Design Thinking and DevOps in the AI Contexthere are, first of all, individual codetermination rights for those in the lower ranks of the hierarchy with respect to the content and the implementation of their labor contract. But more important are collective decision rights that are exercised by elected workers’ representatives. In Germany, th作者: Kinetic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-3766-3the firm. This possiblity has been interpreted by some observers, including a number of economists, politicians, and labor leaders, as providing an explanation as well as a theoretical justification for the German system of codetermination.作者: Sarcoma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-2415-1ve public goods.. But this approach is quite inappropriate for explaining the allocation of all those (group-specific) public goods which are provided by organizations raising their funds through membership dues. This paper develops a membership-dues procedure and compares it with the standard volun作者: 慎重 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:48 作者: 繁重 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:24
Migrating to SharePoint Server 2016, our analysis was that the private monopoly supply of a public good is inefficient because, as in the case of a private good, the monopolist makes his supply artificially scarce. In this paper we study the question whether the inefficiency would disappear if there was a sufficient amount of competit作者: micronized 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 05:48 作者: absorbed 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:53
http://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/302953.jpg作者: Gudgeon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:06 作者: BRAWL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:11 作者: 獸群 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:38
Sayed Y. Hashimi,Sayed Ibrahim HashimiCharles Rowley and Wayne Brough offered a paper on a subject which is quite unknown on the continent, i.e. the Common Law and the American Court Rules. It is certainly unknown to me. Therefore I have to restrict my comments to some general remarks on the economic analysis in this paper.作者: Adjourn 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:37 作者: 不舒服 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:36 作者: 亞當(dāng)心理陰影 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 13:18
,Comment on C. Rowley and W. Brough: “The Efficiency of the Common Law: A New Institutional EconomicCharles Rowley and Wayne Brough offered a paper on a subject which is quite unknown on the continent, i.e. the Common Law and the American Court Rules. It is certainly unknown to me. Therefore I have to restrict my comments to some general remarks on the economic analysis in this paper.作者: 容易懂得 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:03
Overview: 978-3-642-73066-5978-3-642-73064-1作者: Substance-Abuse 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:05 作者: 擺動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:52 作者: 共同生活 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-14343-5e institutions: (1) Intergenerational distribution of costs and benefits takes place between three generations. Thus, the entire life span is taken into consideration. (2) Costs are minimized for the family unit. Thus, the function of the family as redistributive institution in its own right is recognized.作者: hair-bulb 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:23 作者: 期滿 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:38 作者: 放牧 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:06
978-3-642-73066-5Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987作者: antenna 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 22:39 作者: forthy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:28
,Comment on B.-A. Wickstr?m: “The Growth of Government and the Rise of Pressure Groups”,e model, the ‘lobbying game’, is clear. The government distributes a given ‘cake’ (transfers, subsidies) according to the relative pressure of each interest group. Each interest group behaves as a Nash-competitor when it determines its lobbying efforts, i.e. takes the efforts of all other groups as given.作者: 說笑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:40
,Comment on Breyer and von der Schulenburg: “Family Structure and Intergenerational Transfers in Soce institutions: (1) Intergenerational distribution of costs and benefits takes place between three generations. Thus, the entire life span is taken into consideration. (2) Costs are minimized for the family unit. Thus, the function of the family as redistributive institution in its own right is recognized.作者: 我悲傷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:34
,Comment on H. G. Monissen and E. Wenger: “Specific Human Capital and Collective Codetermination Rigthe firm. This possiblity has been interpreted by some observers, including a number of economists, politicians, and labor leaders, as providing an explanation as well as a theoretical justification for the German system of codetermination.作者: chronology 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 12:34
Macroeconomic Policy, Rent seeking and Economic Order, is fair, simple and efficient”. Why is it that economists are amazed when they see an act of rational economic policy, when at the same time they propose a theory which relies on individual rationality and the ”invisible hand” of the market yielding (Pareto-) optimal results?.作者: 流動(dòng)才波動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 18:55 作者: 是貪求 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:21 作者: Stress-Fracture 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 02:37 作者: Defense 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 05:50
Family Structure and Intergenerational Transfers in Social Health Insurance: A Public Choice Model,yees pay contributions to finance the benefits for retired people. The pay-as-you-go financing requires that the current contributions of all insurees cover the total cost of the fund. Many papers have dealt with the implications of the intergenerational contract for economic efficiency, economic gr作者: 是比賽 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 10:15 作者: AWL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 16:12 作者: Harbor 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 19:31 作者: Implicit 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 00:09
The Efficiency of the Common Law: A New Institutional Economics Perspective,rate that the common law is efficient, viewed from the perspective of wealth (even perhaps more generally of utility) maximization. Further, Posner urged, against an impressive array of dissenters, that such efficiency was an appropriate objective for the common law to pursue. The success of Posner’作者: Lacerate 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 05:29
Specific Human Capital and Collective Codetermination Rights,here are, first of all, individual codetermination rights for those in the lower ranks of the hierarchy with respect to the content and the implementation of their labor contract. But more important are collective decision rights that are exercised by elected workers’ representatives. In Germany, th作者: 性上癮 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 06:05
,Comment on H. G. Monissen and E. Wenger: “Specific Human Capital and Collective Codetermination Rigthe firm. This possiblity has been interpreted by some observers, including a number of economists, politicians, and labor leaders, as providing an explanation as well as a theoretical justification for the German system of codetermination.
