標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Effectivity Functions in Social Choice; J. Abdou,H. Keiding Book 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991 Nash equilibrium.coop [打印本頁] 作者: Clique 時間: 2025-3-21 17:03
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice被引頻次
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice年度引用
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice讀者反饋
書目名稱Effectivity Functions in Social Choice讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 鉤針織物 時間: 2025-3-21 23:33
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50859-2ts complexity, each player having to state whole profiles and outcomes compatible with this profile according to the given social choice correspondence. The informational requirements would be quite considerable in any actual play of the game.作者: abracadabra 時間: 2025-3-22 01:17 作者: Ventilator 時間: 2025-3-22 06:38
Value of Effectivity Functions,o important concepts introduced previously, in particular in chapter 2. We shall be interested in structural properties of effectivity functions arising from game situations where coalitions are allowed to choose lotteries over strategies (correlated randomization), or from repeated games.作者: persistence 時間: 2025-3-22 12:38 作者: jovial 時間: 2025-3-22 13:56
Jochen Peter Breuer,Pierre Froto important concepts introduced previously, in particular in chapter 2. We shall be interested in structural properties of effectivity functions arising from game situations where coalitions are allowed to choose lotteries over strategies (correlated randomization), or from repeated games.作者: jovial 時間: 2025-3-22 19:20
Effectivity Functions in Social Choice978-94-011-3448-4Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: 不可接觸 時間: 2025-3-23 00:54
Hans-Georg Schnauffer,Michael Kohlgrüberindividuals alone, independently of the actions of the rest of society. This possibility of influencing society’s choice reflects the . in the society: A group of individuals is powerful if it can enforce some alternatives or actions upon society.作者: 色情 時間: 2025-3-23 01:49 作者: magnanimity 時間: 2025-3-23 07:44
,Das station?re elektrische Str?mungsfeld,ned social choice correspondence Core(.,·), assigning to each profile . the set of alternatives belonging to the core of . at this profile. This social choice correspondence has considerable intuitive appeal; at least it would be undesirable that society should choose a dominated alternative if there are alternatives that are not dominated.作者: 愛哭 時間: 2025-3-23 11:28 作者: deadlock 時間: 2025-3-23 17:55
,Das station?re elektrische Feld,ivity functions associated with a social choice correspondence or with a game form (together with a comment on a further one, the so-called first efFectivity function .* associated with a social choice function). One can easily get the impression that the α- and β-construction are the only ones of interest.作者: 不溶解 時間: 2025-3-23 20:46 作者: 不可比擬 時間: 2025-3-23 23:26
,Das station?re elektrische Str?mungsfeld,In this chapter we commence a discussion of implementation in cooperative equilibria; we shall consider the most important case, that of strong Nash implementation. Only little is known about implication in other types of equilibria.作者: –scent 時間: 2025-3-24 05:49
Stability,In this chapter, we start our discussion of the application of effectivity functions. These applications were sketched already in the previous chapters: effectivity functions describe the power structure in a society by stating what each coalition of individuals can achieve by concerted action.作者: anatomical 時間: 2025-3-24 06:46
Implementation in Strong Nash Equilibrium,In this chapter we commence a discussion of implementation in cooperative equilibria; we shall consider the most important case, that of strong Nash implementation. Only little is known about implication in other types of equilibria.作者: 疾馳 時間: 2025-3-24 11:02
Introduction,individuals alone, independently of the actions of the rest of society. This possibility of influencing society’s choice reflects the . in the society: A group of individuals is powerful if it can enforce some alternatives or actions upon society.作者: 分期付款 時間: 2025-3-24 16:06
The Structure of Effectivity Functions,sible sets structure. Our task here is mainly to describe various useful properties and to study their relationships. The investigation of strategical properties will be postponed to the following chapters.作者: Malleable 時間: 2025-3-24 21:02 作者: 類型 時間: 2025-3-24 23:24 作者: canonical 時間: 2025-3-25 06:11 作者: 數(shù)量 時間: 2025-3-25 10:25 作者: epidermis 時間: 2025-3-25 15:02 作者: 刻苦讀書 時間: 2025-3-25 19:53
978-94-010-5525-3Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991作者: 無畏 時間: 2025-3-25 21:55 作者: gruelling 時間: 2025-3-26 00:31 作者: 小步走路 時間: 2025-3-26 06:25 作者: Ethics 時間: 2025-3-26 08:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50859-2 this, we had to find a game form such that at each profile, the set of strong Nash equilibria of the resulting game coincided with the values of the social choice correspondence at this profile. The particular game form solving this problem was usually of minor interest; its main role was to establ作者: Inculcate 時間: 2025-3-26 12:40
,Das station?re elektrische Str?mungsfeld,One might get the impression that this is the only interesting cooperative solution. This is wrong, however. For all its merits, the strong Nash equilibrium cannot be considered as the only way of formulating a cooperative solution.作者: 令人作嘔 時間: 2025-3-26 18:53
,Das station?re elektrische Feld,ivity functions associated with a social choice correspondence or with a game form (together with a comment on a further one, the so-called first efFectivity function .* associated with a social choice function). One can easily get the impression that the α- and β-construction are the only ones of i作者: 令人發(fā)膩 時間: 2025-3-27 00:42 作者: 引水渠 時間: 2025-3-27 02:59
Book 1991her we try to put some of the results together in order to get a reasonably coherent theory about the role of the power structure in cooperative implementation. The authors are indebted to many persons for assistance and advice during the work on this book. In particular, we would like to thank Pete作者: 雇傭兵 時間: 2025-3-27 08:41
0924-6126 tive implementation. The authors are indebted to many persons for assistance and advice during the work on this book. In particular, we would like to thank Pete978-94-010-5525-3978-94-011-3448-4Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: 健壯 時間: 2025-3-27 10:01
Introduction,individuals alone, independently of the actions of the rest of society. This possibility of influencing society’s choice reflects the . in the society: A group of individuals is powerful if it can enforce some alternatives or actions upon society.作者: Admire 時間: 2025-3-27 16:43 作者: ostensible 時間: 2025-3-27 19:50
Implementation,ned social choice correspondence Core(.,·), assigning to each profile . the set of alternatives belonging to the core of . at this profile. This social choice correspondence has considerable intuitive appeal; at least it would be undesirable that society should choose a dominated alternative if ther作者: 試驗 時間: 2025-3-27 22:09 作者: reaching 時間: 2025-3-28 04:31
Implementation in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium,One might get the impression that this is the only interesting cooperative solution. This is wrong, however. For all its merits, the strong Nash equilibrium cannot be considered as the only way of formulating a cooperative solution.作者: nitric-oxide 時間: 2025-3-28 09:21 作者: allude 時間: 2025-3-28 14:15 作者: Latency 時間: 2025-3-28 17:20
10樓作者: pessimism 時間: 2025-3-28 19:11
10樓作者: 不利 時間: 2025-3-29 02:14
10樓
