標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law; Volume I Basic Conc Richard S. Markovits Textbook 2014 Sp [打印本頁] 作者: Forestall 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:13
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law被引頻次
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law年度引用
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law讀者反饋
書目名稱Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 共棲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:13 作者: mortgage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:59 作者: esthetician 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:15 作者: Myocyte 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:58 作者: 周年紀(jì)念日 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:46
Biometrics and Kansei Engineeringt competition and the impact of conduct on price and QV-investment competition combined have been totally ignored. . will offer a definition of “the impact of a choice on competition” that I think correctly operationalizes this concept in both the U.S. antitrust-law context and the E.C./E.U. competition-law context.作者: 周年紀(jì)念日 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:44
Chapter 2 The Components of the Difference Between a Firm’s Price and Conventional Marginal Costs ant competition and the impact of conduct on price and QV-investment competition combined have been totally ignored. . will offer a definition of “the impact of a choice on competition” that I think correctly operationalizes this concept in both the U.S. antitrust-law context and the E.C./E.U. competition-law context.作者: 使出神 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:16
Chapter 1 The “Correct” Definition of “the Impact of a Choice on Economic Efficiency”lar losses it imposes on its victims (the losers). More controversially, in this formulation, a winner’s equivalent-dollar gain equals the number of dollars that would have to be transferred to him to leave him as well-off as the choice would leave him if作者: 羽飾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:57
Debyashreeta Barik,Koustav Kundu,Mamoni Dashconomic efficiency—must be analyzed separately. Section 2 explains why the issue of abusiveness that is salient in EC/EU competition law must be analyzed separately from the monopolization, competitive-impact, and economic-efficiency issues.作者: hankering 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:46
Ajay Giri Prakash Kottapalli,Mohsen Asadniahip between my definitions of these concepts and the way in which economists have implicitly defined them in use (., when labeling certain pricing models . pricing models), and by specifying my distinction between “natural” and “contrived” oligopolistic conduct.作者: 身心疲憊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:15 作者: Prophylaxis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:24
Mohsen Aboulnaga,Samaa E. Helmymetimes called “market”) power. However, there is no consensus about the way in which these terms should be operationalized, and discussions of these concepts tend to be rudimentary if not simplistic. This chapter executes tediously-detailed analyses of the concepts of a firm’s monopoly, oligopoly, and total economic (market) power.作者: 使腐爛 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:05 作者: 河流 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:56 作者: Deduct 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:19 作者: EXTOL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:11
Khalid Saeed,Jerzy Peja?,Romuald MosdorfS. antitrust law and points out certain mistakes that U.S. courts and various scholars have made when addressing these issues. The second presents a parallel analysis of the E.C./E.U. competition law. And the third compares the above aspects of U.S. antitrust law and E.C./E.U. competition law. This 作者: CHANT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:44
Identification, verification and templates,that I find useful to distinguish and will explain how such conduct and policies can and when they will increase and decrease each of these narrowly-defined categories of economic inefficiency. This chapter is much less ambitious. Section 1 delineates four broad categories and a few subcategories of作者: maroon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:36 作者: 乳白光 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:33 作者: filicide 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:39
Mohsen Aboulnaga,Samaa E. Helmymetimes called “market”) power. However, there is no consensus about the way in which these terms should be operationalized, and discussions of these concepts tend to be rudimentary if not simplistic. This chapter executes tediously-detailed analyses of the concepts of a firm’s monopoly, oligopoly, 作者: 叫喊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:28
Debyashreeta Barik,Koustav Kundu,Mamoni Dashins why the monopolizing character, abusiveness, competitive impact, and economic efficiency of business conduct must be analyzed separately. Section 9.1 explains why the three concepts that play an important role in U.S. antitrust law and policy discussions—monopolization, competitive impact, and e作者: 漂白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:12
Ajay Giri Prakash Kottapalli,Mohsen Asadniat has ever offered an explicit definition of “oligopolistic conduct” or recognized my distinction between “natural” and “contrived” oligopolistic conduct. For this reason, I want to begin by setting out the way in which I define “oligopolistic conduct or interdependence,” by explaining the relations作者: 即席演說 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:45
Melvin H. Keyes,David E. Albertently defined “predatory conduct” in use to be a subspecies of the conduct prohibited by the Sherman Act. More specifically, the characterization of conduct as “predatory” has always implied that its perpetrator’s (perpetrators’) . perception that was . profitable was . critically inflated by its (t作者: Palliation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24307-3antitrust law; comparative U; S; /E; U; antitrust law; competition theory; price theory; vertical integrati作者: Ibd810 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:51
978-3-662-52127-4Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014作者: ALLEY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:56 作者: 細(xì)胞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:21 作者: CHAFE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:58 作者: 剛開始 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:16
Khalid Saeed,Jerzy Peja?,Romuald Mosdorfssues will be addressed respectively in .–15. This chapter will also not discuss the institutional framework of U.S. and E.C./E.U. antitrust law (., the nature of their enforcement “agencies” and courts and the roles each such authority plays in the creation and enforcement of competition law), the 作者: 神經(jīng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:32
Identification, verification and templates,der U.S. antitrust law and E.C. competition law. And Sect. 3 lists the various categories of economic-efficiency gains that business conduct can yield whose generation is either directly or indirectly relevant to its antitrust legality and explains briefly why the fact that conduct yields these cate作者: 里程碑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:00 作者: florid 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 05:02
Biomicroscopy of the Peripheral Fundusly always insisted that a relevant market or set of relevant markets be defined not only in Clayton Act cases but also in Sherman Act Section 2 (monopolization and attempt-to-monopolize) cases. European antitrust institutions—the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Court of First Instance of the Eu作者: 宇宙你 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:29 作者: 沒花的是打擾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:38 作者: Override 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:26 作者: indenture 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:36
Chapter 5 Categories of Economic-Efficiency Gains That Are and Are Not Relevant to Conduct’s Antitruder U.S. antitrust law and E.C. competition law. And Sect. 3 lists the various categories of economic-efficiency gains that business conduct can yield whose generation is either directly or indirectly relevant to its antitrust legality and explains briefly why the fact that conduct yields these cate作者: phlegm 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:45 作者: depreciate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:23
Chapter 7 Economic (Classical) and Antitrust Markets: Official and Scholarly Proposalsly always insisted that a relevant market or set of relevant markets be defined not only in Clayton Act cases but also in Sherman Act Section 2 (monopolization and attempt-to-monopolize) cases. European antitrust institutions—the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Court of First Instance of the Eu作者: Albumin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:41 作者: Cirrhosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:45 作者: 緯線 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:02
Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust LawVolume I Basic Conc作者: OREX 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:25
Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law978-3-642-24307-3作者: groggy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:39 作者: Admire 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:08 作者: enfeeble 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:53
Chapter 2 The Components of the Difference Between a Firm’s Price and Conventional Marginal Costs anitrust laws of the United States and the E.U. make the legality of various types of business conduct depend (sometimes .) on their competitive impact. Surprisingly, neither Industrial Organization economists, nor the antitrust laws in question, nor the lawyers and judges that interpret and apply the作者: irreducible 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:15 作者: 友好 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:50 作者: Iniquitous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:39
Chapter 5 Categories of Economic-Efficiency Gains That Are and Are Not Relevant to Conduct’s Antitruthat I find useful to distinguish and will explain how such conduct and policies can and when they will increase and decrease each of these narrowly-defined categories of economic inefficiency. This chapter is much less ambitious. Section 1 delineates four broad categories and a few subcategories of作者: Concomitant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 03:32 作者: Allege 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:39
