標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions; Models of Political A. Cooper Drury Book 2005 A. Cooper Drury 2005 assessment.database.data [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: magnify 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:07
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions被引頻次
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions年度引用
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions年度引用學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: BRAND 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:34 作者: 含糊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:04 作者: FRAX-tool 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:45 作者: 漫不經(jīng)心 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:29
Beobachtungs- und Verteilungsstationen,g that policy makers tend to make such contradictory and ill-informed comments—such as Vice President Cheney during the 1994 debate—they do not have an accurate, consistent base of knowledge from which to draw.作者: venous-leak 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:39 作者: venous-leak 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:36
Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions978-1-4039-7695-6Series ISSN 2945-5979 Series E-ISSN 2945-5987 作者: 秘方藥 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:16
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-6803-7gainst various target states.. The author asserts that sanctions “are an irresistible, relatively risk-free and inexpensive way of assuaging America’s sense of outrage” (Myers 1997). While suggesting that sanctions are used more for domestic political reasons than for foreign policy efforts, the jou作者: 迅速飛過(guò) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 04:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-40102-6he target leadership to conceding to the sender’s demands. Although there have been multiple empirical studies of various aspects of this claim regarding economic sanction effectiveness, it is valuable to directly and explicitly assess what aspects of the conventional wisdom hold up under simultaneo作者: 迷住 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:17 作者: GIDDY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:41
Stettiner Haff und Kaiserfahrt,s that the executive must make with regard to the use of economic coercion. First, sanctions must be initiated against a target. Second, once sanctions are in place, the president must decide whether to lift, decrease, maintain, or increase them. It is in this chapter that I test the decision to ini作者: 貴族 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39429-8 economic coercion. Diagnostic tests also showed that the models were consistent across individual targets/countries. However, it is still possible that the president is systematically more likely to sanction a type of country. There are three types of countries/targets that have the potential to in作者: Latency 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:16 作者: incubus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:48
Andreas Eisele,Simon Sagmeisternd cognitive constraints do play a part in the president’s decision. In almost every estimation of the theoretical models, the tension level between the United States and the target/country had the biggest, positive impact on the likelihood that the White House would initiate economic coercion. The 作者: 摻假 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:23
Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse,nger an interesting question because sanctions simply do not work. Instead, other unanswered questions concerning economic coercion should be investigated. In this book, I have investigated and attempted to answer some of these questions, specifically: the decisions to initiate and modify a sanction作者: 種族被根除 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:38
Advances in Foreign Policy Analysishttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/301793.jpg作者: bizarre 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:05
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403976956assessment; database; databases; decision theory; foreign policy作者: 博愛(ài)家 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:56
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-94454-3Before turning to the task of defining what constitutes an economic sanction, I first indicate what is . an economic sanction by contrasting economic coercion with economic incentives. I then turn to a discussion of the instruments and then goals of economic coercion.作者: 認(rèn)識(shí) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:59
Economic Coercion in Theory and Practice,Before turning to the task of defining what constitutes an economic sanction, I first indicate what is . an economic sanction by contrasting economic coercion with economic incentives. I then turn to a discussion of the instruments and then goals of economic coercion.作者: mechanical 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:16
Stettiner Haff und Kaiserfahrt, factors, and cognitive constraints in the three models; three control variables are also included. Because some of the data sources cover different periods, two different data sets are compiled. One begins in January 1966 and ends in December 1992. The other begins in January 1991 and ends in December 2000.作者: excursion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39429-8ratic regimes to reform to a liberal political system. Third, the Monroe Doctrine increased U.S. involvement throughout Latin America compared with other regions of the world. All three of these examples could cause the president to act differently toward these types of states.作者: 憤世嫉俗者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:08 作者: 樹(shù)膠 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:47
Is There a Target Selection Bias?,ratic regimes to reform to a liberal political system. Third, the Monroe Doctrine increased U.S. involvement throughout Latin America compared with other regions of the world. All three of these examples could cause the president to act differently toward these types of states.作者: 吹牛大王 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:06 作者: 帶來(lái)的感覺(jué) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:36
The Decision to Modify an Economic Sanction Policy,hoices available to the president. The decisions are not interval data, however, they are ordinal. The president must decide on one of the three increasingly hostile options: completely lift, decrease, or increase the economic pressure on the target.作者: 樣式 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:51
2945-5979 debate, Drury digs deeper to why foreign policy leaders, and especially the president, choose sanctions, of which type, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them. Skilfully integrating domestic and international factors, and placing the analysis of sanctions directly into the mainstream o作者: 機(jī)密 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:53
Evaluating Sanction Effectiveness,us empirical testing. The results in this chapter show that while many of the extant literature’s claims are supported, the overall accuracy of the model is not very high. This poor performance suggests that we must move beyond analyzing effectiveness and seek other answers for why sanctions are used.作者: monologue 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:49 作者: ear-canal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:59
2945-5979 f strategic studies and decision theory, this book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of databases.978-1-349-52997-1978-1-4039-7695-6Series ISSN 2945-5979 Series E-ISSN 2945-5987 作者: adduction 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:15 作者: ostrish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:24
Book 2005rminate them. Skilfully integrating domestic and international factors, and placing the analysis of sanctions directly into the mainstream of strategic studies and decision theory, this book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of databases.作者: membrane 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 05:12 作者: 生氣的邊緣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:56 作者: Conserve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:31 作者: HATCH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:10 作者: tattle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:04 作者: 改正 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:57
When Does the President Sanction? An Empirical Analysis,s that the executive must make with regard to the use of economic coercion. First, sanctions must be initiated against a target. Second, once sanctions are in place, the president must decide whether to lift, decrease, maintain, or increase them. It is in this chapter that I test the decision to ini作者: ligature 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:18
Is There a Target Selection Bias?, economic coercion. Diagnostic tests also showed that the models were consistent across individual targets/countries. However, it is still possible that the president is systematically more likely to sanction a type of country. There are three types of countries/targets that have the potential to in作者: 使害羞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:48
The Decision to Modify an Economic Sanction Policy,n against another country. The analysis in chapter 5 only assessed the decision to initiate an economic sanction. The next stage of analysis focuses on what the president does once sanctions have been levied. Once economic sanctions have been imposed, the president has a series of choices. He can li作者: 畢業(yè)典禮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:20 作者: FLACK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:31
Conclusions and Implications,nger an interesting question because sanctions simply do not work. Instead, other unanswered questions concerning economic coercion should be investigated. In this book, I have investigated and attempted to answer some of these questions, specifically: the decisions to initiate and modify a sanction作者: 針葉類(lèi)的樹(shù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:28
10樓作者: tenosynovitis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:39
10樓
