標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts; Essays in Honor of J Gerald A. Feltham,Amin H. Amershi,William T. Ziemb Book 1988 Kluwer Ac [打印本頁] 作者: 譴責(zé) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:48
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts被引頻次
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts年度引用
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts讀者反饋
書目名稱Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 通情達(dá)理 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:58
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7Capital Markets; accounting; agents; communication; economics; evaluation; financial market; financial mark作者: Diatribe 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:47
978-94-010-7702-6Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston 1988作者: 產(chǎn)生 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:58 作者: Nutrient 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:47 作者: 租約 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:52 作者: 租約 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:43 作者: 不吉祥的女人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-06876-1mments on theoretical issues are provided. John’s path-breaking work in the application of information economics to the evaluation of accounting information systems is highlighted in the immediately following section and is followed by a review of his studies in the area of bounds on information val作者: blackout 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:27
Geldentstehung und Entwicklung,ach accounting and their papers have implications for accounting, but they examine general information and agency issues that are applicable to a broad range of information and contractual settings. Atkinson and Feltham (1982), Baiman (1982), Verrecchia (1982), and Feltham (1984) provide reviews of 作者: 干旱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:27
Tumoren der Wirbels?ule und des Spinalkanals intuition transparent. In the process I will present a generalization of Blackwell’s [1951] seminal result on . that is related to Marschak and Miyasawa’s [1968] concept of .. More important, I want to show that garbling is intimately linked to the more useful and general theory of ., which has bee作者: Working-Memory 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:07
Martin Wiesmann,Omid Nikoubashmanknown paper, the pure exchange case has been subject to detailed investigation, and conditions for the welfare unanimity of (more) information are well understood. (Ohlson and Buckman [1981] summarize these results). On the other hand, attempts to deal with production and exchange simultaneously hav作者: Salivary-Gland 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:22
Atlas Klinische Neuroradiologie des Gehirnsmonstrating that the efficiency criterion satisfied by an information structure is crucially dependent on the market regime, available securities, and endowments. For example, if securities span the state space, (public) information is redundant. Similarly, the Pareto dominance of information struct作者: 高興一回 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:00 作者: 大炮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:40
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28652-5ost reports during each month for control purposes, and is evaluated on the basis of monthly summary cost reports. The manager may wish to adjust his or her daily control effort based on the information in the intermediate cost reports.作者: Accommodation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:22
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0537-5e can be reduced through the unobservable actions of the manager. Investors infer that the manager will undertake actions that maximize the manager’s own welfare rather than the value of the firm and they price the firm’s securities accordingly. In order to raise sufficient capital in the securities作者: Budget 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:54
F. J. Pettijohn,Paul Edwin Potter an agent with private information seeks to raise capital from investors and to share risks with them. Our examination of this . has two major purposes: (1) to characterize the equilibria that may emerge under alternative concepts of rational behavior, and (2) to identify conditions under which veri作者: 愚蠢人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:30
Interpretation of Microscope Observations,ith an annual salary of $360,000, options to buy 400,000 shares of Chrysler common stock at $11 each, plus special payments amounting to more than a million dollars.. Next summer, he volunteered to reduce his base salary to $1.00 for a period of one year.. Although this may not be a typical example,作者: Sinus-Node 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:27 作者: employor 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:06 作者: endoscopy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:47
Walther Bergerhoff Dr. med. habil.The principal/agent paradigm provides a useful vehicle for examining a wide range of contractual relationships. Recent theoretical advances in the modeling of this relationship have enriched our understanding of the interplay between risk sharing and incentives in the design of optimal contracts.作者: LAITY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:54 作者: 小鹿 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:32
The Principal/Agent Problem—Numerical SolutionsThe principal/agent paradigm provides a useful vehicle for examining a wide range of contractual relationships. Recent theoretical advances in the modeling of this relationship have enriched our understanding of the interplay between risk sharing and incentives in the design of optimal contracts.作者: Exploit 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:19 作者: COLIC 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:02 作者: 帶子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:09
Book 1988ble colleague and friend. We were greatly saddened by his untimely death. This book is an attempt to remember him. We dedicate the volume to John with thanks for the contributions he made to our research, to the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of British Columbia, a作者: 6Applepolish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:36 作者: 半球 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:09 作者: Indent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:15 作者: corporate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:32 作者: 小故事 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:19
as a valuable colleague and friend. We were greatly saddened by his untimely death. This book is an attempt to remember him. We dedicate the volume to John with thanks for the contributions he made to our research, to the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of British C作者: Immunization 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:55 作者: 極小 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:38
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0537-5own welfare rather than the value of the firm and they price the firm’s securities accordingly. In order to raise sufficient capital in the securities market, the manager voluntarily bonds himself to the shareholders’ interests.作者: Microaneurysm 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:47 作者: 寬大 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:51
Martin Wiesmann,Omid Nikoubashmanimited. With only weak restrictions on individuals’ preferences/beliefs, firms’ opportunities, characterization of information, and markets, the analysis here provides a comprehensive treatment of public information’s welfare role in neoclassical production and exchange economies.作者: Capture 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:47 作者: Congeal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:36
The Social Value of Public Information in Production Economiesimited. With only weak restrictions on individuals’ preferences/beliefs, firms’ opportunities, characterization of information, and markets, the analysis here provides a comprehensive treatment of public information’s welfare role in neoclassical production and exchange economies.作者: 憤慨一下 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:50
Intrafirm Resource Allocation and Discretionary Actionsselect these same quantities. Consequently, while traditional transfer pricing models identify the implicit prices of intrafirm transfers (which may have some intrinsic interest), these transfer prices need serve no allocational role, and so the failure to implement a transfer pricing scheme has no impact on firm profits in such models.作者: phytochemicals 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:52 作者: 教唆 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:50 作者: blight 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:05
John E. Butterworth’s Pioneering Contributions to the Accounting and Information Economics Literaturction. Material contributions to agency theory in the accounting setting are discussed in the fifth and sixth parts and are followed by comments on John’s research in the areas of oil and gas accounting, and accounting standards and regulations in Canada. Concluding remarks are offered in the last section of this paper.作者: paragon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:42
Communication of Private Information in Capital Markets: ,r news always design contracts to “separate” themselves from agents with worse news, or whether there are conditions under which they choose to “pool.” The answer to this question has significant implications for the value of verified reports.作者: 凝結(jié)劑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:37 作者: overweight 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:27 作者: ALIAS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:52
Managerial Compensation: ,composition of top executive compensation packages is different from that of workers in other occupations. Particularly notable is the recent trend toward paying a substantial portion of the total compensation in the form of incentive plans, such as annual bonus, long-term performance reward, stock 作者: 咆哮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:55 作者: 舞蹈編排 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:17 作者: Bernstein-test 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:10 作者: 珊瑚 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:31
e put this volume together. The research papers in the volume are in three sections: information evaluation in multi person conte)l:ts; contracting in agencies under moral hazard; and contracting in agencies with private information. We begin part I with Jerry Feltham‘s review of John Butterworth‘s pioneering978-94-010-7702-6978-94-009-2667-7作者: Nucleate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:47 作者: vector 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:36
