標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Dynamic Games in Economics; Josef Haunschmied,Vladimir M. Veliov,Stefan Wrzacz Book 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Conflict S [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Fixate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:09
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics被引頻次
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics年度引用
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics年度引用學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Games in Economics讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: PAD416 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:57
Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign,e the socially optimal number of candidates. It appears that the number of candidates maximising the total number of votes on the election day is lower than the number of candidates entering the political game attracted by any non-negative share of consensus.作者: 感激小女 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:47
1566-0419 eory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12.th. Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality..978-3-662-51193-0978-3-642-54248-0Series ISSN 1566-0419 Series E-ISSN 2363-8370 作者: 把…比做 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:34
Robust Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Dynamic Choice Model with Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting,on time. This requirement, in turn, leads to a non-cooperative infinite horizon stochastic game played by a countably many . representing him during the play. As a result, we provide two existence theorems for a robust Markov perfect equilibrium (.) and discuss its properties.作者: 爭(zhēng)議的蘋(píng)果 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:07
Differential Games and Environmental Economics,lution control and the lake game. It will be shown that existing solution techniques can cover some of the gap between non-cooperative Nash equilibria and the cooperative outcome. It will also be shown that the regulation by means of realistic tax rates can cover some of the remaining gap but not all the way.作者: foreign 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:45
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenee to which the foreign competitor can absorb these spillovers depends on its absorptive effort. Using numerical methods the properties of a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game are characterized and the implications of the variation of different key parameters are examined.作者: foreign 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:27
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftene the socially optimal number of candidates. It appears that the number of candidates maximising the total number of votes on the election day is lower than the number of candidates entering the political game attracted by any non-negative share of consensus.作者: Munificent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:02 作者: bronchodilator 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:20 作者: cardiac-arrest 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:38
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaften procedure” leading to subgame-consistent solutions is derived and an illustration is presented. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods with uncertainties in stock dynamics and future payoffs is analyzed.作者: Inclement 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:05
Capacity Accumulation Games with Technology Constraints,To assess the factors that influence efficiency and market power, the chapter presents a linear-quadratic example. Our simulations indicate that contracts based on input quantities generate higher joint payoffs and tend to benefit the input producer.作者: 擁護(hù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:10
Time-Consistent Equilibria in a Differential Game Model with Time Inconsistent Preferences and Parte the sustainability of cooperation, players should bargain at every instant of time their weight in the whole coalition, and nonconstant weights are introduced. The results are illustrated with two examples: a common property resource game and a linear state pollution differential game.作者: 外形 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:36
Subgame Consistent Cooperative Provision of Public Goods Under Accumulation and Payoff Uncertaintie procedure” leading to subgame-consistent solutions is derived and an illustration is presented. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods with uncertainties in stock dynamics and future payoffs is analyzed.作者: Pert敏捷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:08
1566-0419 tions for future research in the field.Includes supplementar.Dynamic game theory serves the purpose of including strategic interaction in decision making and is therefore often applied to economic problems. This book presents the state-of-the-art and directions for future research in dynamic game th作者: output 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:03 作者: 袖章 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:17
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenlution control and the lake game. It will be shown that existing solution techniques can cover some of the gap between non-cooperative Nash equilibria and the cooperative outcome. It will also be shown that the regulation by means of realistic tax rates can cover some of the remaining gap but not all the way.作者: conception 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:19 作者: 拋物線 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:27
Karen D?ring,Anja S. G?ritz,Klaus Moserfeedback information pattern, and the Stackelberg game for the feedback information pattern. Applying the OPTGAME algorithm to the MUMOD1 model we show how the policy makers react to demand and supply shocks according to different solution concepts. Some comments are given on possible applications to the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe.作者: Vaginismus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:16 作者: Mortal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:19
Karen D?ring,Anja S. G?ritz,Klaus Moseralysis of this game is used to obtain through an indirect approach SPE for three classes of differential/dynamic games: (i) linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) zero-sum differential games with common noisy measurements, (ii) discrete-time LQG zero-sum dynamic games with common noisy measurements, and (i作者: 搖擺 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:45
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenst of lobbying might be significantly increased under uncertainty with respect to the benchmark. This highlights some specificities of the political liberalization in Arab countries and the associated risks.作者: Ophthalmoscope 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:02 作者: 圓錐體 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:50
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenational inequalities, along with some initial and/or boundary conditions. This reformulation presents differential equations, variational inequalities, and equilibrium conditions in a systematic way, and is advantageous since it can be treated as a system of differential algebraic equations, for whi作者: 捏造 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:55
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenurthermore, in case there is no full cooperation we show that the optimal configuration of the coordination structure depends on the type of shock that has occurred. We present a detailed analysis of the relationship between coordination structures and type of shock.作者: 休戰(zhàn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:20
Stochastic Differential Games and Intricacy of Information Structures,alysis of this game is used to obtain through an indirect approach SPE for three classes of differential/dynamic games: (i) linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) zero-sum differential games with common noisy measurements, (ii) discrete-time LQG zero-sum dynamic games with common noisy measurements, and (i作者: Senescent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:58
The Dynamics of Lobbying Under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries,st of lobbying might be significantly increased under uncertainty with respect to the benchmark. This highlights some specificities of the political liberalization in Arab countries and the associated risks.作者: 人類(lèi)學(xué)家 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:36
A Feedback Stackelberg Game of Cooperative Advertising in a Durable Goods Oligopoly,ditions under which it is optimal for the manufacturer to not offer any advertising subsidy and study the role of retail competition on the manufacturer’s subsidy rates decisions. For a special case of two retailers, using a linear demand formulation, we present managerial insights on issues such as作者: Harpoon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:46 作者: 比賽用背帶 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:24 作者: 不足的東西 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:47
Robust Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Dynamic Choice Model with Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting,n feature in our model is an application of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting concept to describe the situation in which agent’s preferences may hinge on time. This requirement, in turn, leads to a non-cooperative infinite horizon stochastic game played by a countably many . representing him during t作者: adhesive 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:47 作者: 光亮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:54 作者: arboretum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:53
The Dynamics of Lobbying Under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries,onservative elite and a reformist group, the former player pushing against political liberalization in opposition to the latter. In contrast to the benchmark model, we introduce uncertainty. We consider the typical case of an Arab resource-exporting country where oil rents are fiercely controlled by作者: 一回合 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:02 作者: 內(nèi)部 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:20 作者: jagged 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:27 作者: Benzodiazepines 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:57 作者: Mnemonics 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:57 作者: Armada 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:17
Multi-agent Optimal Control Problems and Variational Inequality Based Reformulations,individual cost functional and strategy set, and the cost functional is dependent on all the other agents’ state and/or control variables. Here the “agent” can be understood as a true decision maker, or as an abstract optimization criterion. The strategy sets, along with admissible control set, are 作者: 受辱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:59 作者: cutlery 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:25 作者: 結(jié)果 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 22:33
Subgame Consistent Cooperative Provision of Public Goods Under Accumulation and Payoff Uncertaintiestainable unless there is guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle can be maintained throughout the planning duration. This paper derives subgame consistent cooperative solutions for public goods provision by asymmetric agents in a discrete-time dynamic game framework with uncertainties i作者: 無(wú)辜 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:17
Book 2014s book presents the state-of-the-art and directions for future research in dynamic game theory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12.th. Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality..作者: d-limonene 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:51
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0Conflict Situations; Dynamic Game Theory; Dynamic Games; Economic Dynamics; Economic Games作者: avarice 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:09
978-3-662-51193-0Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014作者: Memorial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:47 作者: 設(shè)想 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:21 作者: escalate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:37
