作者: AVID 時間: 2025-3-21 23:31 作者: 原諒 時間: 2025-3-22 01:54 作者: 強(qiáng)所 時間: 2025-3-22 06:05 作者: 無可非議 時間: 2025-3-22 10:06
Efficiency, Payoff, and Bidsdified private value framework is given in Section 7.2. Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 explore Dynamic Alliance auctions alongside this framework. Section 7.3 treats two special cases and shows that Nash equilibria with plausible outcomes do exist for them. Afterwards, Section 7.4 develops a formal repr作者: 使痛苦 時間: 2025-3-22 16:19
Experimentgnificant. Average payoffs could be found significantly lower in treatments where subjects knew their distribution (differences depend on the value section considered). Differences in bidding behavior also existed. Bidding behavior was investigated using bid-to-value ratios, which directly indicate 作者: 使痛苦 時間: 2025-3-22 20:10
Putting Insights to Practicenet-based spot markets, it is simple and it imposes no extra effort on shippers. This mechanism is called . Dynamic Alliance auctions were developed for DaimlerChrysler’s Internet-based freight marketplace (Fleetboard (2002)). The aim was to provide this marketplace with an unprecedent service.作者: 彎曲的人 時間: 2025-3-22 22:20 作者: Esophagus 時間: 2025-3-23 02:50
Experimentetween T2 and T4 were detected for high values: T4-subjects submitted significantly lower bids than T2-subjects. In both treatments T3 and T4, different distributions of subjects (D1-D6) respond to different degrees of competition for complementary orders. Intuitive bidding (according to B50 , BT , 作者: 細(xì)節(jié) 時間: 2025-3-23 05:48 作者: jealousy 時間: 2025-3-23 11:16 作者: 琺瑯 時間: 2025-3-23 17:32 作者: Diatribe 時間: 2025-3-23 21:59 作者: 老巫婆 時間: 2025-3-23 23:31 作者: 甜瓜 時間: 2025-3-24 03:44 作者: evanescent 時間: 2025-3-24 07:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84139-1 orders in Internet-based marketplaces. Second, it introduces a mechanism that satisfies the requirements (R1)-(R3) as Chapter 6 will later show. This mechanism is called.The Dynamic Alliance auction represents a result of the research project.at the Department for Research and Communication at Daim作者: 沉積物 時間: 2025-3-24 13:42 作者: Spongy-Bone 時間: 2025-3-24 17:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84139-1dified private value framework is given in Section 7.2. Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 explore Dynamic Alliance auctions alongside this framework. Section 7.3 treats two special cases and shows that Nash equilibria with plausible outcomes do exist for them. Afterwards, Section 7.4 develops a formal repr作者: intoxicate 時間: 2025-3-24 20:49 作者: lambaste 時間: 2025-3-25 01:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84139-1net-based spot markets, it is simple and it imposes no extra effort on shippers. This mechanism is called . Dynamic Alliance auctions were developed for DaimlerChrysler’s Internet-based freight marketplace (Fleetboard (2002)). The aim was to provide this marketplace with an unprecedent service.作者: 演講 時間: 2025-3-25 06:01 作者: 開玩笑 時間: 2025-3-25 10:21
Contributions to Management Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/283502.jpg作者: jaundiced 時間: 2025-3-25 13:00 作者: malapropism 時間: 2025-3-25 18:03 作者: 某人 時間: 2025-3-25 20:07 作者: LEVER 時間: 2025-3-26 03:40
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84139-1From now on, transportation.markets will be considered. These markets are characterized by the fact that mainly single short-term orders are placed by many different shippers. The Internet-based marketplaces in question are those like Benelog, i.e. marketplaces作者: MOCK 時間: 2025-3-26 05:54 作者: facilitate 時間: 2025-3-26 10:16
Conventional Freight AuctionsFrom now on, transportation.markets will be considered. These markets are characterized by the fact that mainly single short-term orders are placed by many different shippers. The Internet-based marketplaces in question are those like Benelog, i.e. marketplaces作者: hypertension 時間: 2025-3-26 15:28
Dynamic Alliance Auctions978-3-642-57430-6Series ISSN 1431-1941 Series E-ISSN 2197-716X 作者: 能量守恒 時間: 2025-3-26 18:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84139-1net-based spot markets, it is simple and it imposes no extra effort on shippers. This mechanism is called . Dynamic Alliance auctions were developed for DaimlerChrysler’s Internet-based freight marketplace (Fleetboard (2002)). The aim was to provide this marketplace with an unprecedent service.作者: Resection 時間: 2025-3-26 21:02
Putting Insights to Practicenet-based spot markets, it is simple and it imposes no extra effort on shippers. This mechanism is called . Dynamic Alliance auctions were developed for DaimlerChrysler’s Internet-based freight marketplace (Fleetboard (2002)). The aim was to provide this marketplace with an unprecedent service.作者: 流眼淚 時間: 2025-3-27 02:53 作者: 斷斷續(xù)續(xù) 時間: 2025-3-27 07:50 作者: Landlocked 時間: 2025-3-27 12:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84139-1esentation of shippers‘ expected payoffs, which is used in Section 7.5 in order to demonstrate that the special case equilibria do not hold for arbitrary markets. Intuitive bidding strategies are also offered in Section 7.5.作者: employor 時間: 2025-3-27 16:23 作者: flourish 時間: 2025-3-27 20:26 作者: Palpate 時間: 2025-3-27 22:05
Book 2004e formation lacks transparency. However, this state is no law of nature since in principle, all market participants could manage to get together somehow and do business - but gaining new business partners beyond existing bonds usually takes too high efforts. After all, the items in transportation ma作者: 蔓藤圖飾 時間: 2025-3-28 02:20 作者: genuine 時間: 2025-3-28 09:26
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84139-1 mechanism is called.The Dynamic Alliance auction represents a result of the research project.at the Department for Research and Communication at DaimlerChrysler. To some extent, it has already been explored by Ihde & Schild (2002).作者: LIMN 時間: 2025-3-28 13:41
Das Windows-Textprogramm WRITE,gained by means of mutual cooperation. This section will introduce various solutions to bargaining games that satisfy ‘reasonable’ conditions — . The axioms represent desirable properties a bargaining outcome should possess (Sandholm (1999)). Accordingly, the solutions are called .作者: 季雨 時間: 2025-3-28 15:53
Theoriesgained by means of mutual cooperation. This section will introduce various solutions to bargaining games that satisfy ‘reasonable’ conditions — . The axioms represent desirable properties a bargaining outcome should possess (Sandholm (1999)). Accordingly, the solutions are called .
