標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Differential Information Economies; Dionysius Glycopantis,Nicholas C. Yannelis Book 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005 Differenti [打印本頁] 作者: Coarctation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:06
書目名稱Differential Information Economies影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Differential Information Economies影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Differential Information Economies網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Differential Information Economies網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Differential Information Economies被引頻次
書目名稱Differential Information Economies被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Differential Information Economies年度引用
書目名稱Differential Information Economies年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Differential Information Economies讀者反饋
書目名稱Differential Information Economies讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Nostalgia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/b138401Differential Information Economies; Equilibrium Theory; bargaining; cooperative games; economic theory; e作者: 或者發(fā)神韻 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:22 作者: ensemble 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:32
Dionysius Glycopantis,Nicholas C. YannelisGives an overview of differential information economies.Explores all aspects of the field作者: obnoxious 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 09:25 作者: 笨重 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:48
Differential Information Economies978-3-540-26979-3Series ISSN 1431-8849 Series E-ISSN 2196-9930 作者: 笨重 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:14 作者: 舊石器 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:33 作者: climax 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 04:16
Korea’s Path of Development in Retrospectitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.作者: 內(nèi)行 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:46
Re-Inventing Africa‘s Developmentrivate information, ., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.作者: 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:39 作者: Alcove 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:40
On the continuity of expected utilityess of the domain of the expected utility. Our results have useful applications in cooperative solution concepts in economies and games with differential information, in noncooperative games with differential information and in principal-agent problems.作者: bonnet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:57
Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the coreodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable “insider trading” be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.作者: 拋棄的貨物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:22 作者: 蛛絲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:12 作者: Insatiable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:00
Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with , information asymmetryisk aversion of the borrower. The optimality of ., which Diamond obtained for the case of risk neutrality, is shown to be nonrobust to the introduction of risk aversion. This contrasts with the costly state verification literature, in which debt contracts are optimal for risk averse as well as risk neutral borrowers.作者: 過去分詞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:08 作者: 免費(fèi) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:55 作者: surrogate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:16 作者: 戲服 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:56
Carla Brisotto,Fabiano Lemes de Oliveiraodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable “insider trading” be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and c作者: 諂媚于性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:16
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90445-6orem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in t作者: glamor 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:45 作者: Corral 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:41
Engineering Rural Development for Africaomy is “irreducible”, then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982), exists. Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive a作者: Immunoglobulin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:54 作者: diathermy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:26 作者: myalgia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:52
Korea’s Path of Development in Retrospectress are whether the above concepts are: (i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (ii) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in th作者: LASH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:04
Re-Inventing Africa‘s Developmentrivate information, ., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (c作者: 個(gè)人長(zhǎng)篇演說 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:12 作者: confide 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:36
Prelude: Psychology in Metamorphosis,ore strategy, which is interpreted as an equilibrium set of players’ alternative type-contingent contract offers to their fellows. From this set of offers each player then chooses an optimal one and engages in some subsequent action, thus possibly revealing some private information to the others. No作者: 放棄 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:52
Marc Antoine Campill,Enno von Fircksay be risk averse and need not be identical. We consider two different verification technology specifications. When the verification technology is deterministic, we show that the optimal contract is a multilateral debt contract in the sense that the monitoring set is a lower interval. When the verif作者: 記成螞蟻 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:24
Applying Part III to the Real World of Workisk aversion of the borrower. The optimality of ., which Diamond obtained for the case of risk neutrality, is shown to be nonrobust to the introduction of risk aversion. This contrasts with the costly state verification literature, in which debt contracts are optimal for risk averse as well as risk 作者: hedonic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:24 作者: macabre 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:07 作者: Melanoma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:55
Re-Imagining Curricula in Global TimesWe focus on the private core (Yannelis [19]) of an economy with a finite number of agents with differential information, a continuum of states and an infinite number of commodities. We state a nonemptiness result for the private core and provide a proof based on a fixed-point argument.作者: 圓錐 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:10
The core of an economy with differential informationWe introduce a new core concept for an exchange economy with differential information which is contained in the coarse core concept of Wilson (1978). We prove the existence of (i) a core allocation for an exchange economy with differential information and; (ii) an .-core strategy for a game in normal form with differential information.作者: 過份艷麗 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:53 作者: 商談 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:55
1431-8849 answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of?stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.?978-3-642-05977-3978-3-540-26979-3Series ISSN 1431-8849 Series E-ISSN 2196-9930 作者: 斥責(zé) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:45 作者: HILAR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:17 作者: hyperuricemia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:43
Information, efficiency, and the core of an economyates that a market process may fail to yield an efficient allocation. In fact, in this example the market allocation is not even individually rational for the agents. Also, in this example the core is empty if there are opportunities for communication which disrupt arrangements for mutual insurance.作者: 不公開 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:35
Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core balanced. In this framework, an incentive compatible core concept is defined for NTU games derived from economies with asymmetric information. The main result is nonemptiness of the incentive compatible core.作者: defuse 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:45
Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric informationies without subjective probabilities. Differences in the interpretation of measurability assumptions between these two models are discussed, and another model with information consistent utility functions is developed in which the result would also hold.作者: trigger 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:23
Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential informationtions coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy.作者: 準(zhǔn)則 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:47 作者: 許可 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:45 作者: 性上癮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:24 作者: Firefly 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:21 作者: finale 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:51
Marc Antoine Campill,Enno von Fircksication technology is stochastic, we show that transfers and monitoring probabilities are decreasing functions of wealth. The key economic problem in this environment is that optimal contracts are .. We are able to resolve this interdependency problem by using abstract measure theoretic tools.作者: 吞沒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:10 作者: 構(gòu)想 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:38
Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies,erative and noncooperative concepts, and also we discuss briefly the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian equilibria through the construction of relevant game trees. This possibility is related to whether the allocation is incentive compatible. This depends on whether there is free disposal or not.作者: overrule 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 10:35 作者: 商店街 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:40
Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plansation at the . stage to execute the trade contracts. We prove a result about the nested structure of the set of allocations implementable by various communication plans and establish the existence of core strategies for this cooperative game under various regularity conditions.作者: lobster 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 18:16
1431-8849 is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. Thi作者: 人充滿活力 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:01 作者: craven 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 03:49
Engineering Rural Development for Africations coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy.作者: Largess 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:33
Engineering Rural Development for Africapresence of at least one core element with equal treatment suffice to show existence of a competitive quasi-equilibrium. Conditions on the initial endowments and the communication system are given to ensure that every competitive quasi-equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium.作者: 采納 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:59 作者: 鋸齒狀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 14:23 作者: 幻影 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 21:29 作者: 間諜活動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 22:38
Prelude: Psychology in Metamorphosis,st described, Bayesian incentive compatibility plays a central role. These ideas are formulated within a model of a profit-center game with incomplete information which formally describes interaction of the asymmetrically informed profit-centers in Chandler’s multidivisional firm.作者: 無畏 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 04:05
