派博傳思國際中心

標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Decisions, Games and Markets; Pierpaolo Battigalli,Aldo Montesano,Fausto Panunzi Book 1997 Springer Science+Business Media New York 1997 d [打印本頁]

作者: trace-mineral    時間: 2025-3-21 17:24
書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets被引頻次




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets年度引用




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets讀者反饋




書目名稱Decisions, Games and Markets讀者反饋學(xué)科排名





作者: Minuet    時間: 2025-3-21 23:53

作者: capsule    時間: 2025-3-22 00:42

作者: UTTER    時間: 2025-3-22 05:30
Iran: A Century of Undemocratic Violencesed. We present and discuss some models of Bayesian social learning which recently appeared in the economics literature. We focus on the problems of information acquisition, stationarity of the environment and endogenous pricing, and we propose some applications.
作者: 廚師    時間: 2025-3-22 08:59
At The Roots of Indeterminacya..It argues that Indeterminacy can be eliminated by excluding forms of “money illusion” from agents’ objectives, by adding equations or by restricting the partition of exogenous/endogenous variables, in an ..
作者: Incorporate    時間: 2025-3-22 14:39

作者: Incorporate    時間: 2025-3-22 19:55

作者: 攀登    時間: 2025-3-22 22:43
978-1-4613-7910-2Springer Science+Business Media New York 1997
作者: 夜晚    時間: 2025-3-23 04:32

作者: 群居動物    時間: 2025-3-23 08:56

作者: yohimbine    時間: 2025-3-23 13:25

作者: 透明    時間: 2025-3-23 14:01
Andreas F?llesdal,Peter Koslowskimption is dropped. We provide a macroeconomic example which clearly illustrates the crucial role of players’ structural and behavioral conjectures: different equilibrium and disequilibrium paths (some with keynesian type inefficiencies) are generated by different expectations patterns. Convergence o
作者: 香料    時間: 2025-3-23 20:02

作者: 枕墊    時間: 2025-3-24 00:31

作者: 參考書目    時間: 2025-3-24 05:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72197-2the case of an “unsophisticated” market where all agents are liquidity traders. For this case we find the optimal pricing policy. We then proceed to analyze the case of a market where sophisticated traders try to infer the specialist’s information observing the announced prices. For this case we fin
作者: inveigh    時間: 2025-3-24 07:29

作者: 不理會    時間: 2025-3-24 13:31

作者: Sarcoma    時間: 2025-3-24 16:28

作者: maladorit    時間: 2025-3-24 19:12

作者: Cpr951    時間: 2025-3-25 01:45
Rachel E. Johnson,Shirin M. Rai future dividends. This paper analyzes the relationship between market size and risk in a rational expectations equilibrium model with many assets and transaction costs. It predicts that (i) the conditional and unconditional variance of stock returns is higher for thin stocks, and (ii) this relation
作者: 監(jiān)禁    時間: 2025-3-25 07:24

作者: Mri485    時間: 2025-3-25 07:47
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137361912“flexible”, which allows them to vary the cost structure, or a “rigid” technology, which in periods of high demand is more efficient. We build an evolutionary model in which firms tend to imitate the more rewarding technology choice. We characterize stable distributions of technology choices, showin
作者: 竊喜    時間: 2025-3-25 14:20
“Direct” and “Indirect” Duality for Dominance Relationsher (vector) space .. Dual characterizations of the dominance relation are of two kinds: “direct,” which are based on the dominance ordering on ., and “indirect,” which are derived from the partial ordering on .. Indirect representations are easier to obtain but less prone to meaningful interpretati
作者: Evacuate    時間: 2025-3-25 17:58

作者: verdict    時間: 2025-3-25 21:50
Games with Observable Deviators that of her . — 1 opponents. This paper defines and characterizes the observable deviators property for extensive form games with incomplete information and illustrates how this property can be used to simplify game theoretic analysis. In particular, it is proved that sequential equilibria can be c
作者: absorbed    時間: 2025-3-26 00:32
Conjectural Equilibria and Rationalizability in a Game with Incomplete Informationmption is dropped. We provide a macroeconomic example which clearly illustrates the crucial role of players’ structural and behavioral conjectures: different equilibrium and disequilibrium paths (some with keynesian type inefficiencies) are generated by different expectations patterns. Convergence o
作者: Toxoid-Vaccines    時間: 2025-3-26 07:24
Lexicographic Rationality Orderings and Iterative Weak Dominanceic system put forward by Blume . (1991a), i.e. each player is endowed with a vector of probability measures on her opponents’ strategy space and act to lexicographically maximize her expected utility. The theory of rationality orderings entails that players’ strategy sets are partitioned into cells
作者: JADED    時間: 2025-3-26 12:27

作者: Transfusion    時間: 2025-3-26 12:54

作者: inspiration    時間: 2025-3-26 17:02

作者: 頌揚國家    時間: 2025-3-27 00:15
Decentralization, Mobility Costs and the Soft Budget Constraintproblems. In our framework, the State is in charge of the decision of refinancing a loss-making “strategic” enterprise in a centralized setting. In a decentralized setting, the region where the firm is located takes the decision of whether to continue or stop the activity of the unprofitable firm. H
作者: 孵卵器    時間: 2025-3-27 03:54
Equivalence and Duality Between the Sets of Pareto-Maximal Allocations and the Sets of Maximal Distr utilities. This paper provides the global characterization of efficient allocations by means of the sets of Pareto—maximal allocations and the sets of maximal distributable surplus allocations..These sets are defined both with respect to given resources and with respect to given utilities. Equivale
作者: 巧辦法    時間: 2025-3-27 05:54
Economic Models of Social Learningsed. We present and discuss some models of Bayesian social learning which recently appeared in the economics literature. We focus on the problems of information acquisition, stationarity of the environment and endogenous pricing, and we propose some applications.
作者: 氣候    時間: 2025-3-27 12:28
Market Size, the Informational Content of Stock Prices and Risk: A Multiasset Model and Some Evidenc future dividends. This paper analyzes the relationship between market size and risk in a rational expectations equilibrium model with many assets and transaction costs. It predicts that (i) the conditional and unconditional variance of stock returns is higher for thin stocks, and (ii) this relation
作者: evaculate    時間: 2025-3-27 16:00

作者: paragon    時間: 2025-3-27 21:43

作者: jumble    時間: 2025-3-27 23:36

作者: 莊嚴(yán)    時間: 2025-3-28 03:55

作者: GEN    時間: 2025-3-28 09:13
Decentralization, Mobility Costs and the Soft Budget Constraintnclusions. First, decentralization achieves a hard budget constraint only if immigration is harmful to the welfare of the recipient region; otherwise, centralization is preferable..Second, low mobility costs are a necessary condition for decentralization to contribute harden the firm’s budget constr
作者: hardheaded    時間: 2025-3-28 12:49
Andreas F?llesdal,Peter Koslowskion a given set of outcomes are common knowledge, we show for a restricted class of games that players’ maximally rational strategies coincide with the strategies that survive the iterated deletion of strategies which are dominated by . strategies.
作者: 磨坊    時間: 2025-3-28 18:00
Lexicographic Rationality Orderings and Iterative Weak Dominanceon a given set of outcomes are common knowledge, we show for a restricted class of games that players’ maximally rational strategies coincide with the strategies that survive the iterated deletion of strategies which are dominated by . strategies.
作者: 魯莽    時間: 2025-3-28 22:18

作者: 遠(yuǎn)足    時間: 2025-3-28 23:30
“Laws of Large Numbers” in Continuum Economiesurely”, or in some other sense, equal to the coordinate distribution function ., that the integral of .(.) or .(.) (this is not usually clear) over a set be equal to the common expectation of the .(.)’s multiplied by the “l(fā)ength” of the set. This paper considers problems and possible solutions connected with these requirements.
作者: 天空    時間: 2025-3-29 07:09
Market Size, the Informational Content of Stock Prices and Risk: A Multiasset Model and Some Evidencship between thinness and stock return variability arises only from the unsystematic component of stock return risk. These predictions are tested on data from the Milan Stock Exchange and appear to be consistent with the evidence.
作者: 下級    時間: 2025-3-29 10:06

作者: 修剪過的樹籬    時間: 2025-3-29 13:55
0926-972X ll as in their applications to economics. The book isdivided into three parts - Decision Theory, Game Theory, andthe Theory of Markets. Though its orientation is primarilymethodological, some articles are more applied. The consistent use offormal analysis and methodological individualism constitutes
作者: 鼓掌    時間: 2025-3-29 18:52

作者: HAUNT    時間: 2025-3-29 20:31

作者: Psychogenic    時間: 2025-3-30 03:03
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137361912utionary model in which firms tend to imitate the more rewarding technology choice. We characterize stable distributions of technology choices, showing under what conditions firms of asymmetric sizes can coexist in the market. We also consider the case where switching between technologies is costly.
作者: 預(yù)兆好    時間: 2025-3-30 06:14

作者: 維持    時間: 2025-3-30 08:47
Book 1997heir applications to economics. The book isdivided into three parts - Decision Theory, Game Theory, andthe Theory of Markets. Though its orientation is primarilymethodological, some articles are more applied. The consistent use offormal analysis and methodological individualism constitutes theunifyi
作者: 一個姐姐    時間: 2025-3-30 14:34
Games with Observable Deviatorsion and illustrates how this property can be used to simplify game theoretic analysis. In particular, it is proved that sequential equilibria can be characterized by simple and transparent restrictions on players’ assessments.
作者: MOT    時間: 2025-3-30 19:55

作者: 600    時間: 2025-3-30 23:30





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