標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; Second International John S. Baras,Jonathan Katz,Eitan Altman Conference proceedings 2011 Springer-V [打印本頁] 作者: 不足木 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:04
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: DOLT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:58 作者: Implicit 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:11 作者: commodity 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:08 作者: propose 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:20 作者: debris 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:18
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983053ies (clones) of it and deploys such clones back into the network, in order to impact the network’s functionality. In the absence of a centralized authority, distributed clone detection methods have been developed to mitigate this attack. In this paper, we show that the node capture attack and the ne作者: debris 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:05
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983053an process, have two different transition probabilities, which depends on the presence or absence of a intruder nearby. The detection of the transition probability change at one node should be confirmed by a detection of similar change at some other sensors. Based on a simple game the model of a fus作者: 符合規(guī)定 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:31 作者: 放逐某人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 04:16 作者: Freeze 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:45
Defining and Protecting Autonomous Workn but solutions for higher values of . have never been reported in the literature. In this paper we derive an asymptotic formula for the value of the game as .?→?∞ and we present an algorithm that allows us to numerically solve the game for .?≤?256.作者: negotiable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1613-4 of nature. The defense strategies include both actions where security generates positive externalities and actions that do not. When the players are assumed to be risk averse, market insurance enters as a third strategic option. We formulate a one-shot security game with market insurance, character作者: 誰在削木頭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:26
Equipment and Physical Infrastructure through traditional means such as by using antivirus and antivirus softwares. In reality, an Internet user faces risks due to security attacks as well as risks due to non-security related failures (e.g., reliability faults in the form of hardware crash, buffer overflow, etc.). These risk types are 作者: CYN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:19
K. Siddique-e Rabbani,Trevor D. Cradduck within a market and which, if any, become dominant. In this paper, we introduce a model for Dynamic Influence in Competitive Environments (DICE). We show that existing models of influence propagation, including linear threshold and independent cascade models, can be derived as special cases of DICE作者: 輕快來事 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:30
Cari Borrás,K. Siddique-e Rabbanin-based service (LBS) with their current coordinates. However, LBS providers collect a significant amount of data from mobile users and could be tempted to misuse it, by compromising a customer’s location privacy (her ability to control the information about her past and present location). Many solu作者: Regurgitation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:36
Dusan Paredes,Marcelo Lufin,Patricio Arocat investigating various aspects of digital trust decisions. Digital trust in online environments differs from its offline variants due to its unique characteristics such as near instantaneous communication, transient and impersonal nature of interactions, immediate access to opinions of others, and 作者: jumble 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:26 作者: vertebrate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:12
Fernando Rubiera-Morollón,Ana Vi?uela’ services based on the extent of privacy that firms are able to provide. Kantarcioglu et.al. (2010) [9] contributes to guidelines for entrepreneurs’ adoption decisions through a novel framework, which combines copula functions and a Stackelberg leader-follower game with consumers taking the role of作者: strain 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3346-3ion links. In this regard, the security of individual nodes depend not only on their own efforts, but also on the efforts and underlying connectivity structure of neighboring network nodes. By the term ‘effort’, we imply the amount of investments made by a user in security mechanisms like antivirus 作者: 衰弱的心 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:30 作者: 現(xiàn)任者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:59
978-3-642-25279-2Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2011作者: septicemia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:44
An Asymptotic Solution of Dresher’s Guessing Gamen but solutions for higher values of . have never been reported in the literature. In this paper we derive an asymptotic formula for the value of the game as .?→?∞ and we present an algorithm that allows us to numerically solve the game for .?≤?256.作者: 寄生蟲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:21 作者: ARCH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:49
Defining and Protecting Autonomous Workn but solutions for higher values of . have never been reported in the literature. In this paper we derive an asymptotic formula for the value of the game as .?→?∞ and we present an algorithm that allows us to numerically solve the game for .?≤?256.作者: Arb853 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:19 作者: 步履蹣跚 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:20
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/d/image/264330.jpg作者: 圍巾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:13
Indices of Power in Optimal IDS Default Configuration: Theory and Examplesaries in an IDS with respect to given attack graphs. Such valuations take into consideration the knowledge on common attack graphs and experienced system attacks and are used to configure an IDS optimally at its default state by solving a knapsack optimization problem.作者: Precursor 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:54 作者: 共和國 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:04
A Novel Cyber-Insurance Model user faces risks due to both, security as well as non-security related failures. We propose ., a simple and novel cyber-insurance model in which the user accepts a fraction . of loss recovery on himself and transfers rest of the loss recovery on the cyber-insurance agency. We mathematically show th作者: 高歌 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:57 作者: Expressly 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:04
Digital Trust Games: An Experimental Studycondly, they take into account signals from their social circle much more than aggregate signals such as average scores. Both of these results and additional insights gained have important implications for future game theoretic modeling efforts of digital trust.作者: FISC 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:30 作者: intangibility 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:39
Investment in Privacy-Preserving Technologies under Uncertainty This study extends the static-copula-game model to include project value uncertainty, simultaneously considering different market competition structures and the regulatory promise of random arrival of government mandatory adoption. The project value from the static-copula-game model is used as an e作者: 入會(huì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:15
Modeling Internet Security Investments: ,e game-theoretic approach to analyze individual user security in a communication network by accounting for both, the partial information that a network node possess about its underlying neighborhood connectivity structure and security investment of its neighbors, as well as the presence of positive 作者: plasma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:41
Zili Sloboda,Linda Dusenbury,Hanno Petrasaries in an IDS with respect to given attack graphs. Such valuations take into consideration the knowledge on common attack graphs and experienced system attacks and are used to configure an IDS optimally at its default state by solving a knapsack optimization problem.作者: 松緊帶 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:15 作者: ABHOR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:39
Equipment and Physical Infrastructure user faces risks due to both, security as well as non-security related failures. We propose ., a simple and novel cyber-insurance model in which the user accepts a fraction . of loss recovery on himself and transfers rest of the loss recovery on the cyber-insurance agency. We mathematically show th作者: 使更活躍 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:29
Cari Borrás,K. Siddique-e Rabbani of connecting to the LBS. However, such a solution will only function if users are willing to share regional data obtained from the LBS provider. We model this collaborative location-data sharing problem with rational agents following threshold strategies. Initially, we study agent cooperation by u作者: 無表情 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:00
Dusan Paredes,Marcelo Lufin,Patricio Arocacondly, they take into account signals from their social circle much more than aggregate signals such as average scores. Both of these results and additional insights gained have important implications for future game theoretic modeling efforts of digital trust.作者: 代替 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:28 作者: Grasping 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:56 作者: Irrigate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:01 作者: Dictation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:11
Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Solution Concepts for the 21st Centurynd games in terms of ..; essentially, this is a rule for predicting how the game will be played. The most commonly used solution concept in game theory is ... Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium is a .. (a collection of strategies, one for each player in the game) such that no player can do better by de作者: 定點(diǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:26
Network Security Games: Combining Game Theory, Behavioral Economics, and Network Measurementsg security defenses. A typical example is that of denial-of-service prevention: ingress filtering, where attack traffic gets discarded by routers close to the perpetrators, is in principle an excellent remedy, as it prevents harmful traffic not only from reaching the victims, but also from burdening作者: wangle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:56
Indices of Power in Optimal IDS Default Configuration: Theory and Exampleslated to the computational resources at its disposal. However, it is difficult to guarantee especially with an increasing demand of network capacity and rapid proliferation of attacks. On the other hand, modern intrusions often come as sequences of attacks to reach some predefined goals. It is there作者: 詞匯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:35 作者: instulate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:21
An Anti-jamming Strategy for Channel Access in Cognitive Radio Networkseing jammed in each time slot. Given the secondary does not know what idle bands are under attack, using our method it tries to choose the best possible channel in each time slot to avoid the jammer. We show this problem can be formulated as a multi-armed bandit process and compare the results of di作者: miniature 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:15 作者: HALO 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:32
Multi-variate Quickest Detection of Significant Change Processan process, have two different transition probabilities, which depends on the presence or absence of a intruder nearby. The detection of the transition probability change at one node should be confirmed by a detection of similar change at some other sensors. Based on a simple game the model of a fus作者: 擋泥板 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 03:11
Interplay between Security Providers, Consumers, and Attackers: A Weighted Congestion Game Approachifferent performance and price levels. In this paper, we model the interactions among users as a noncooperative game, with a negative externality coming from the fact that attackers target popular systems to maximize their expected gain. Using a nonatomic weighted congestion game model for user inte作者: cartilage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:01 作者: 圖表證明 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:55 作者: ARIA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:23
Security Games with Market Insurance of nature. The defense strategies include both actions where security generates positive externalities and actions that do not. When the players are assumed to be risk averse, market insurance enters as a third strategic option. We formulate a one-shot security game with market insurance, character作者: MAOIS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 17:57 作者: 裂縫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 00:17
Maximizing Influence in Competitive Environments: A Game-Theoretic Approach within a market and which, if any, become dominant. In this paper, we introduce a model for Dynamic Influence in Competitive Environments (DICE). We show that existing models of influence propagation, including linear threshold and independent cascade models, can be derived as special cases of DICE作者: neuron 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 03:39
Collaborative Location Privacy with Rational Usersn-based service (LBS) with their current coordinates. However, LBS providers collect a significant amount of data from mobile users and could be tempted to misuse it, by compromising a customer’s location privacy (her ability to control the information about her past and present location). Many solu作者: intrigue 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:31 作者: 關(guān)節(jié)炎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:05 作者: intention 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 16:45 作者: 散布 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 17:32 作者: 依法逮捕 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 00:43
0302-9743 nternational Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011, held in College Park, Maryland, USA, in November 2011. The 16 revised full papers and 2 plenary keynotes presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The papers are organized in topical secti作者: HERE 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 05:32
Adolescence and Early Adulthoodovides a more robust model for such games, and further, that these games may model situations of real world security and international interest. We have formulated two such real world models, and have created a modeling bot, which when facing adversaries with equal or better performing risk profiles, achieves a 7-fold increase in win performance.
