標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; First International Tansu Alpcan,Levente Buttyán,John S. Baras Conference proceedings 2010 Springer [打印本頁] 作者: Monsoon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:35
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 暫停,間歇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:03
978-3-642-17196-3Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010作者: Phenothiazines 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:06 作者: FOLD 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:52
Jacques Ganoulis,Margaritis M. Vafiadisurity practitioners. This paper adds penetration testing to the realm of information security investment. Penetration testing is modeled as an information gathering option to reduce uncertainty in a discrete time, finite horizon, player-versus-nature, weakest-link security game. We prove that once s作者: 沐浴 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:51 作者: elastic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:38 作者: elastic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:30 作者: 要塞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:32
J?rg Polakiewicz,Julia Katharina Kirchmayrsource’s objective is to choose transmission probabilities so as to maximize the probability of successful delivery of some content to the destination within a deadline. These transmissions are subject to interference from a jammer who is a second, adversarial type controller, We solve three variant作者: 增長 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:29 作者: Contracture 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:11 作者: Impugn 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:46
The Aesthetic Concept of Culture as Artwithout the user’s knowledge. In many cases, botnet herders are motivated by economic incentives and try to significantly profit from illegal botnet activity while causing significant economic damage to society. To analyze the economic aspects of botnet activity and suggest feasible defensive strate作者: Goblet-Cells 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:21
Conclusion: Cultural Crosscurrents number of recently proposed initiatives that focus on how ISPs should detect and remediate bots. However, it is very expensive for ISPs to do it alone and they would probably welcome some external funding. Among others, botnets severely affect ad networks (ANs), as botnets are increasingly used for作者: Systemic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:39 作者: notification 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:22
Conclusion: Cultural Crosscurrentsthen check whether live system’s activity fits the learned models. This approach, referred to as ., has enjoyed immense popularity because of its effectiveness at recognizing unknown attacks (under the assumption that attacks cause glitches in the protected system). Typically, instead of building a 作者: antiandrogen 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:20
The Aesthetic Concept of Culture as Arteir long tradition, password schemes exhibit a high number of security flaws which jeopardise the confidentiality and integrity of personal information. As Web users tend to reuse the same password for several sites, security negligence at any one site introduces a negative externality into the enti作者: 共同給與 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:56
Jolyon Howorth,John T. S. Keelerling users’ access to resources, improving authorisation techniques may mitigate the insider threat. Current approaches to authorisation suffer from the assumption that users will (can) not depart from the expected behaviour implicit in the authorisation policy. In reality however, users can and do 作者: corpus-callosum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:11 作者: 必死 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:04 作者: PALSY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:19
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403981363s of deployed systems based on this line of research are the ARMOR system in use at the Los Angeles International Airport [20], and the IRIS system used by the Federal Air Marshals Service [25]. Game analysis always begins by developing a model of the domain, often based on inputs from domain expert作者: lavish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:14 作者: WATER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:30
Disperse or Unite? A Mathematical Model of Coordinated AttackWe introduce a new type of search game that involves a group of immobile hiders rather than a single hider. We provide the mathematical framework for the game and we show that the game is useful to understand under what conditions attackers disperse or unite.作者: Ptsd429 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:48 作者: 最有利 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:34 作者: 制定 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:13 作者: lanugo 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:28
Tansu Alpcan,Levente Buttyán,John S. BarasFast-track conference proceedings.State-of-the-art research.Up-to-date results作者: Albinism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:04
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/d/image/264327.jpg作者: Individual 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:36 作者: impaction 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62317-6mplete information with customers taking the role of the follower. Firms integrate customers’ optimal decisions into their valuation. Rational utility maximizing customers optimally decide whether to use firms’ services by linking to their own decision threshold. The threshold is their own fair valu作者: avenge 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:34
J?rg Polakiewicz,Julia Katharina Kirchmayrm). We obtain some explicit expressions for the solution of the first game, and some structural results as well as explicit expressions for the others. An interesting outcome of the analysis is that the latter two games exhibit switching times for the two players, where they switch from pure to mixe作者: BLANC 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:23
The Aesthetic Concept of Culture as ArtS (susceptible-infectious-susceptible) epidemic model. For a given level of network defense, we define the strategy of the botnet herder as the solution of a control problem and obtain the optimal strategy as a feedback on the rate of infection. In addition, using a differential game model, we obtai作者: 咯咯笑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:11 作者: Additive 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:32
The Aesthetic Concept of Culture as Artow the theory: Web sites that have little incentive to invest in security are indeed found to have weaker password schemes, thereby facilitating the compromise of other sites. We use the theoretical model to explore which technical and regulatory approaches could eliminate the empirically detected i作者: –吃 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 05:48
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403981363els. We present the first algorithms for approximating equilibrium solutions in these games, and study these algorithms empirically. Our results show dramatic improvements over existing techniques, even in cases where there is very limited uncertainty about an adversaries’ payoffs.作者: 字形刻痕 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:59 作者: CHOP 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:58
Tracking Games in Mobile Networkscally quantify the effect of complete and incomplete information on the strategy selection of mobile users and of the adversary. Our results enable system designers to predict the best response of mobile users with respect to a local adversary strategy, and thus to select the best deployment of coun作者: Discrete 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:31
When Do Firms Invest in Privacy-Preserving Technologies?mplete information with customers taking the role of the follower. Firms integrate customers’ optimal decisions into their valuation. Rational utility maximizing customers optimally decide whether to use firms’ services by linking to their own decision threshold. The threshold is their own fair valu作者: ungainly 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:29 作者: 賞錢 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:49
A Game-Theoretical Approach for Finding Optimal Strategies in a Botnet Defense ModelS (susceptible-infectious-susceptible) epidemic model. For a given level of network defense, we define the strategy of the botnet herder as the solution of a control problem and obtain the optimal strategy as a feedback on the rate of infection. In addition, using a differential game model, we obtai作者: 冰雹 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:34
Effective Multimodel Anomaly Detection Using Cooperative Negotiationns can influence the detection accuracy. To mitigate these issues we propose a radically different approach: rather than treating the aggregation as a calculation, we formulate it as a decision problem, implemented through cooperative negotiation between autonomous agents. We validated the approach 作者: 表主動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:33 作者: 可用 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:14 作者: 偶像 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:10 作者: negotiable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:16 作者: 過剩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:16
Optimal Information Security Investment with Penetration Testingurity practitioners. This paper adds penetration testing to the realm of information security investment. Penetration testing is modeled as an information gathering option to reduce uncertainty in a discrete time, finite horizon, player-versus-nature, weakest-link security game. We prove that once s作者: enmesh 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:33 作者: Ingratiate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:16
gPath: A Game-Theoretic Path Selection Algorithm to Protect Tor’s Anonymityhe problem as a repeated non-cooperative game between the defender and the adversary (i.e., controller of the compromised Tor nodes to carry out entry-exit linking attacks). Given the current path selection algorithm of Tor, we derive an optimal attack strategy for the adversary according to its uti作者: 機(jī)械 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:54
When Do Firms Invest in Privacy-Preserving Technologies?privacy that firms are able to provide, for example, the use of certain banking services, health care information technology [7]...etc. Firms thus face crucial assessment of investment on privacy-preserving technologies. Two important factors affect firms’ valuation: (1) a customer’s valuation of hi作者: gain631 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:12
Adversarial Control in a Delay Tolerant Networksource’s objective is to choose transmission probabilities so as to maximize the probability of successful delivery of some content to the destination within a deadline. These transmissions are subject to interference from a jammer who is a second, adversarial type controller, We solve three variant作者: 虛弱的神經(jīng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:48
Security Interdependencies for Networked Control Systems with Identical Agentsced risks. Each plant is modeled by a discrete-time stochastic linear system, which is sensed and controlled over a communication network. We model security decisions of the individual systems (also called players) as a game. We consider a two-stage game, in which first, the players choose whether t作者: RODE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 04:54 作者: FRONT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:23
A Game-Theoretical Approach for Finding Optimal Strategies in a Botnet Defense Modelwithout the user’s knowledge. In many cases, botnet herders are motivated by economic incentives and try to significantly profit from illegal botnet activity while causing significant economic damage to society. To analyze the economic aspects of botnet activity and suggest feasible defensive strate作者: Decline 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:21 作者: BLUSH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 17:24
A Localization Game in Wireless Sensor Networks and clone: therefore classical security solutions based on access control and strong authentication are difficult to deploy. In this paper we look at the problem of assessing the reliability of node localization data from a game theoretical viewpoint. In particular, we analyze the scenario in which作者: Banister 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:56
Effective Multimodel Anomaly Detection Using Cooperative Negotiationthen check whether live system’s activity fits the learned models. This approach, referred to as ., has enjoyed immense popularity because of its effectiveness at recognizing unknown attacks (under the assumption that attacks cause glitches in the protected system). Typically, instead of building a 作者: 招惹 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 04:14
The Password Game: Negative Externalities from Weak Password Practiceseir long tradition, password schemes exhibit a high number of security flaws which jeopardise the confidentiality and integrity of personal information. As Web users tend to reuse the same password for several sites, security negligence at any one site introduces a negative externality into the enti作者: 記成螞蟻 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:03
Towards a Game Theoretic Authorisation Modelling users’ access to resources, improving authorisation techniques may mitigate the insider threat. Current approaches to authorisation suffer from the assumption that users will (can) not depart from the expected behaviour implicit in the authorisation policy. In reality however, users can and do 作者: Throttle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:16
Uncertainty in Interdependent Security Gamesexemplifies a formal mechanism for resolving this kind of uncertainty in interdependent security (IDS) scenarios. We focus on a single IDS model involving a computer network, and adapt the model to capture a notion that players have only a very rough idea of security threats and underlying structura作者: 褲子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 14:48 作者: Rejuvenate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 20:04
Methods and Algorithms for Infinite Bayesian Stackelberg Security Gamess of deployed systems based on this line of research are the ARMOR system in use at the Los Angeles International Airport [20], and the IRIS system used by the Federal Air Marshals Service [25]. Game analysis always begins by developing a model of the domain, often based on inputs from domain expert
