標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 5th International Co Radha Poovendran,Walid Saad Conference proceedings 2014 Springer International [打印本頁] 作者: Sentry 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:49
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: bleach 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:08 作者: AVOID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:53 作者: perimenopause 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:33 作者: 表臉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:12
Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computationweaker notion of security, i.e., “l(fā)azy-but-honest” contractors. Targeting this type of agents, we develop optimal contracts for outsourcing of computational tasks via appropriate use of rewards, punishments, auditing rate, and “redundancy”. Our contracts provably minimize the expense of the outsourc作者: 白楊魚 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:00
A Supervisory Control Approach to Dynamic Cyber-Securityamic security problem from the defender’s point of view as a supervisory control problem with imperfect information, modeling the computer network’s operation by a discrete event system. We consider a min-max performance criterion and use dynamic programming to determine, within a restricted set of 作者: 白楊魚 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:30
Numerical Computation of Multi-goal Security Strategiesiple and often interdependent aspects. . are behavior profiles that guarantee some performance . of how the adversary really behaves (provided that it stays within its action set). While security strategies towards a single goal are easy to compute via Nash-equilibria (or refinements thereof), playi作者: bifurcate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:48 作者: 描繪 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:23
Limiting Adversarial Budget in Quantitative Security Assessmentd by Buldas-Stepanenko in 2012 and improved in 2013 by Buldas and Lenin. In the previously presented models attacker’s budget was assumed to be unlimited. It is natural to assume that the adversarial budget is limited and such an assumption would allow us to model the adversarial decision making mor作者: 壓倒性勝利 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:44 作者: 商議 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:33
Secure Message Delivery Games for Device-to-Device Communicationsage allowing users to communicate when telecommunications infrastructure are highly congested or absent. In D2D networks, any . from a . to a . relies exclusively on intermediate devices. Each device can run different kinds of ., which offer protection against viruses and other harmful programs by u作者: 肥料 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:29 作者: LUDE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:29 作者: Ingrained 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:57 作者: Intact 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:11
Cybersecurity Games and Investments: A Decision Support Approachon suffers from an underinvestment problem or inefficient spending on cybersecurity. To this end, we first model the cybersecurity environment of an organization. We then model non-cooperative . between the . which abstracts all defense mechanisms of the organization and the . which can exploit diff作者: 糾纏,纏繞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:13 作者: 丑惡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:58 作者: 巧思 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:18 作者: Defiance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:26
Addressing Scalability and Robustness in Security Games with Multiple Boundedly Rational Adversaries into the defender’s planning problem. The second thread, robustness, uses either Bayesian or maximin approaches to handle this uncertainty caused by multiple adversary types. However, the robust approach has so far not been able to scale up to complex, large-scale security games. Thus, each of thes作者: 對手 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:08
Strategic Discovery and Sharing of Vulnerabilities in Competitive Environments on losing competitive advantages. This research provides an understanding of the origins of inefficiency and paves the path towards more efficient sharing of cyber-intelligence among competing entities.作者: Cryptic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:46
Limiting Adversarial Budget in Quantitative Security Assessment high precision, probably not achievable by providing expert estimations for the quantitative annotations on the attack steps, such as the cost or the success probability. It is doubtful that it is reasonable to face this complexity, as the failure-free model provides reliable upper bounds, being at作者: 護(hù)身符 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:38
Secure Message Delivery Games for Device-to-Device Communicationshe . (SMDG). This game is played between the . (i.e., the D2D network) which abstracts all legitimate network devices and the . which abstracts any adversary that can inject different malicious messages into the D2D network in order, for instance, to infect a device with malware. Simulation results 作者: 思想 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:37 作者: 使害怕 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:33
An Economic Model and Simulation Results of App Adoption Decisions on Networks with Interdependent Pphase. The first simulation predictably shows that in the early adoption period, app adoption rates will increase when (1) the interdependent privacy harm caused by an app is lower, (2) installation cost decreases, or (3) network size increases. Surprisingly, we find from the second simulation that 作者: BILE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:45 作者: nutrition 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:33
Data Integrity and Availability Verification Game in Untrusted Cloud Storagenticipate the Cloud provider’s behavior; we then derive the minimum verification resource requirement, and the optimal strategy of the verifier. Finally, our game theoretical model is validated by showing correctness of the analytical results via simulation on a case study.作者: 恫嚇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:38 作者: 自制 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:04
Ralf Denzer,Michael Scherer,Paul Steinmann into the defender’s planning problem. The second thread, robustness, uses either Bayesian or maximin approaches to handle this uncertainty caused by multiple adversary types. However, the robust approach has so far not been able to scale up to complex, large-scale security games. Thus, each of thes作者: 擁擠前 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:59 作者: right-atrium 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:25
Insulator and Semiconductor Surfaces high precision, probably not achievable by providing expert estimations for the quantitative annotations on the attack steps, such as the cost or the success probability. It is doubtful that it is reasonable to face this complexity, as the failure-free model provides reliable upper bounds, being at作者: In-Situ 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2802-5he . (SMDG). This game is played between the . (i.e., the D2D network) which abstracts all legitimate network devices and the . which abstracts any adversary that can inject different malicious messages into the D2D network in order, for instance, to infect a device with malware. Simulation results 作者: nerve-sparing 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:29
Solid-State Reactions between Oxides each player subject to its resource constraint. At the third stage, the players and the adversary fight against each other with updated resource levels and battlefields. We compute the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for this game. Further, we show that when playing according to the equilibrium, t作者: 吸引力 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:28 作者: 匍匐 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:36 作者: Favorable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6821-9nticipate the Cloud provider’s behavior; we then derive the minimum verification resource requirement, and the optimal strategy of the verifier. Finally, our game theoretical model is validated by showing correctness of the analytical results via simulation on a case study.作者: ingenue 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:37 作者: MAL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2802-5 and study their best strategies, we introduce two control models: in the AND model, the attacker has to compromise all resources in order to take over the entire system, while in the OR model, she has to compromise only one. Our analytical and numerical results provide practical recommendations for defenders.作者: Immunoglobulin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:08
Realizable Rational Multiparty Cryptographic Protocolsr to facilitate the design of protocols in the real world. Our results specify a modified ideal and real world model that account for the presence of point-to-point communication channels between players, where security is achieved through the simulation paradigm.作者: Panacea 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:38
FlipThem : Modeling Targeted Attacks with FlipIt for Multiple Resources and study their best strategies, we introduce two control models: in the AND model, the attacker has to compromise all resources in order to take over the entire system, while in the OR model, she has to compromise only one. Our analytical and numerical results provide practical recommendations for defenders.作者: visual-cortex 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:11
Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Adaptive Cyber-Defense Scenario (Preliminary?Report)ns of this environment. The results show how strategic outcomes vary qualitatively with environment conditions, and demonstrate the value of reliable probe detection in setting up an effective deterrent to attack.作者: 神圣不可 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:28
Conference proceedings 2014niques, vulnerability discovery and assessment, multi-goal security analysis, secure computation, economic-oriented security, and surveillance for security. Those aspects are covered in a multitude of domains that include networked systems, wireless communications, border patrol security, and control systems..作者: FAST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:12
Conference proceedings 2014s Angeles, CA, USA, in November 2014..The 16 revised full papers presented together with 7 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The covered topics cover multiple facets of cyber security that include: rationality of adversary, game-theoretic cryptographic tech作者: BOGUS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:59
0302-9743 ce for security. Those aspects are covered in a multitude of domains that include networked systems, wireless communications, border patrol security, and control systems..978-3-319-12600-5978-3-319-12601-2Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: glucagon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:22 作者: 廚師 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4030-0d good stability even for large games. In this work, we thus report on theoretical and practical results how security strategies for multiple (interdependent) goals can be computed via a set of simple transformations and a final application of humble fictitious play.作者: 老人病學(xué) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:11 作者: MULTI 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:10 作者: monologue 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:43
Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computation when auditing capacity and enforceability are limited. Finally, we present a light-weight cryptographic implementation of the contracts to mitigate the double moral hazard problem between the principal and the agents.作者: 貧困 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 03:40
Numerical Computation of Multi-goal Security Strategiesd good stability even for large games. In this work, we thus report on theoretical and practical results how security strategies for multiple (interdependent) goals can be computed via a set of simple transformations and a final application of humble fictitious play.作者: overrule 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 04:26 作者: 污穢 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 10:14 作者: 可憎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:20
A Supervisory Control Approach to Dynamic Cyber-Securityperation by a discrete event system. We consider a min-max performance criterion and use dynamic programming to determine, within a restricted set of policies, an optimal policy for the defender. We study and interpret the behavior of this optimal policy as we vary certain parameters of the supervisory control problem.作者: acclimate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 18:16 作者: NEEDY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:44 作者: 高爾夫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 02:53 作者: obstinate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 07:25
Anatomy of the?Brain and Brain Stemels highly strategic and resourceful adversaries, has become an important computational framework within multiagent systems. Unfortunately, SSG is ill-suited as a framework for handling opportunistic crimes, which are committed by criminals who are less strategic in planning attacks and more flexibl作者: Morphine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 10:49 作者: etidronate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 14:38 作者: 該得 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 17:40
H. Liebowitz,J. D. Lee,N. SubramonianSpecifically, we consider a game between competing firms that utilise a common platform in their systems. The game consists of two stages: firms must decide how much to invest in researching vulnerabilities, and thereafter, how much of their findings to share with their competitors. We fully charact作者: 案發(fā)地點(diǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 21:45
