標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 9th International Co Linda Bushnell,Radha Poovendran,Tamer Ba?ar Conference proceedings 2018 Springe [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Gullet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:25
書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次
書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用
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書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Little 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:36 作者: Galactogogue 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:19
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/d/image/264324.jpg作者: GNAT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:06 作者: 剛開(kāi)始 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:13
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5ic nature of losses. It is recognised that this information asymmetry may lead to a “market for lemons” in which suppliers face no incentive to provide higher quality products. Some security vendors have begun to offer cyber-warranties—voluntary ex-ante obligations to indemnify the customer in the e作者: Rankle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:15 作者: Rankle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5llicit machine learning classification task. Alice wants Bob (a machine learning system) to learn the task. However, sending either the training set or the trained model to Bob can raise suspicion if the communication is monitored. Training set camouflage allows Alice to compute a second training se作者: CHASE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:38 作者: ineffectual 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 04:09
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5 architecture or augmenting the training set with adversarial examples, but both have inherent limitations. Motivated by recent research that shows outliers in the training set have a high negative influence on the trained model, we studied the relationship between model robustness and the quality o作者: CRAB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:56 作者: forbid 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:16 作者: Suppository 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:54
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5irable—can be exploited by adversaries to contaminate training and evade classification. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of applying a specific class of machine learning algorithms, namely, reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, for autonomous cyber defence in software-defined network作者: reaching 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:52 作者: arthrodesis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:04
Sedimentary Structures and Beddingendation and adaptive medical treatment, among others. We provide a general attack framework based on convex optimization and show that by slightly manipulating rewards in the data, an attacker can force the bandit algorithm to pull a target arm for a target contextual vector. The target arm and tar作者: violate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 03:55 作者: infantile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:57
Petrographic Classification and Glossary answer these concerns is by enabling end users to choose which aspects of their private information can be collected. Based on principles suggested by Feldman and Gonen (2018), we introduce a new online advertising market model which uses information brokers to give users such control. Unlike Feldm作者: 失眠癥 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:44 作者: 有權(quán) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:09 作者: Mast-Cell 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:53 作者: 安心地散步 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:08
Sedimentary Structures and Beddingplayers with no intent to intentionally harm the network. Nevertheless, the need to believe that players will behave consistently exposes the network to vulnerabilities associated with cyber-physical attacks. This paper investigates the effects of cyber-physical attacks on the outcome of distributed作者: 多產(chǎn)魚(yú) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:18
Introduction and Source Materialsected average payoff. For the example of loss minimization, an undercut of the expected loss is unproblematic, while suffering more than the expected loss may disappoint the player and lead it to believe that the played strategy is not optimal. In the worst case, this may subsequently cause deviatio作者: 蝕刻術(shù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:36 作者: 縫紉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:57 作者: 膽小懦夫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5network. We define a new class of games called .-. which extend those defined in previous research. These games have incomplete and imperfect information since the attacker is unaware of moves made by the defender to secure a system, and the defender is not certain of the true identity of the attacker.作者: endarterectomy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:23 作者: sacrum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:22 作者: 受傷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:14
Impact of Privacy on Free Online Service Markets,vacy preference and linear SP profit function, the results suggest that: (i) when consumers place a higher value on privacy, it leads to a larger market share for the SP providing untargeted services and a “softened” competition between SPs; (ii) SPs offering high privacy risk services are sustainab作者: figure 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:04 作者: ARM 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:42 作者: arthroplasty 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:28 作者: 放棄 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:01 作者: 削減 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:57
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Adversarial Boyd-Kuramoto Model,closed form, and that it only depends on the parameters defining the fixed point of the dynamical system. A detailed numerical analysis of the finite version of the game investigates the behaviour of the underlying networked Kuramoto oscillators and yields a unique, dominant Nash equilibrium solutio作者: 遭遇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:52 作者: landmark 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:40 作者: 極大痛苦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:57
Distributed Aggregative Games on Graphs in Adversarial Environments,avior. This study will intensify the urgency of designing novel resilient solutions to DAGs so that the overall network sustains some notion of acceptable global behavior in the presence of malicious agents. Finally, we corroborate and illustrate our results by providing simulation examples. Simulat作者: ACME 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:35
Moving Target Defense for the Placement of Intrusion Detection Systems in the Cloud,. To find a secure switching strategy, we (1) formulate the problem of placing a limited number of IDS systems in a large cloud network as a Stackelberg Game between the cloud administrator and an (external or stealthy) attacker, (2) design scalable methods to find the optimal strategies for switchi作者: Adj異類的 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:13
Conference proceedings 2018ches to security; deceptive technologies in cybersecurity and privacy; empirical and experimental studies with game, control, or optimization theory-based analysis for security and privacy; and adversarial machine learning and crowdsourcing, and the role of artificial intelligence in system security..作者: ACRID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-313-9129-5vacy preference and linear SP profit function, the results suggest that: (i) when consumers place a higher value on privacy, it leads to a larger market share for the SP providing untargeted services and a “softened” competition between SPs; (ii) SPs offering high privacy risk services are sustainab作者: Freeze 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:43 作者: narcissism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:56 作者: addict 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:15 作者: Felicitous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:37
Petrographic Classification and Glossaryine and compare our theoretical results using real world advertising bid data. The experiments suggest that our mechanism performs well in practice even in regimes for which our theoretical guarantee is weak or irrelevant.作者: Anhydrous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 22:56 作者: tinnitus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:31 作者: 廢止 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:12 作者: 單調(diào)女 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:03 作者: 良心 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:15
Transportation and Deposition of Sand. To find a secure switching strategy, we (1) formulate the problem of placing a limited number of IDS systems in a large cloud network as a Stackelberg Game between the cloud administrator and an (external or stealthy) attacker, (2) design scalable methods to find the optimal strategies for switchi作者: Canopy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:29 作者: Mumble 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:37 作者: Expertise 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:00 作者: 連詞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:52
Training Set Camouflage,llicit machine learning classification task. Alice wants Bob (a machine learning system) to learn the task. However, sending either the training set or the trained model to Bob can raise suspicion if the communication is monitored. Training set camouflage allows Alice to compute a second training se作者: folliculitis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:08
Multi-stage Dynamic Information Flow Tracking Game,ersary gathers more privileges, resources, and information about the system and uses this information to gain access to the targeted data of the next stage to reach the final goal. APTs are not only persistent but also stealthy and hence difficult to detect. The persistent nature of APTs, however, c作者: 拘留 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 19:24
Less is More: Culling the Training Set to Improve Robustness of Deep Neural Networks, architecture or augmenting the training set with adversarial examples, but both have inherent limitations. Motivated by recent research that shows outliers in the training set have a high negative influence on the trained model, we studied the relationship between model robustness and the quality o作者: 間接 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:02 作者: syncope 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 03:07
Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Against Rational Timid Adversaries,r using multiple channels. It is assumed that an adversary corrupts a subset of the channels, and makes eavesdropping and tampering over the corrupted channels. In this work, we consider a game-theoretic security model for SMT. Specifically, we introduce a rational adversary who has the preference f作者: Meander 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:03 作者: Coma704 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:10 作者: 全國(guó)性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 15:01
Data Poisoning Attacks in Contextual Bandits,endation and adaptive medical treatment, among others. We provide a general attack framework based on convex optimization and show that by slightly manipulating rewards in the data, an attacker can force the bandit algorithm to pull a target arm for a target contextual vector. The target arm and tar作者: 襲擊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 21:01
Analysis and Computation of Adaptive Defense Strategies Against Advanced Persistent Threats for Cybthe attack. The multi-stage Bayesian game captures the incomplete information of the players’ type, and enables an adaptive belief update according to the observable history of the other player’s actions. The solution concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) under the proactive and reacti作者: grounded 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 00:54 作者: Mangle 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 02:43
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Adversarial Boyd-Kuramoto Model, situations. Combined with the Kuramoto model, which provides a mathematical foundation for describing the behaviour of a set of coupled or networked oscillators, the Boyd-Kuramoto model captures strategic (cyclic) decision making in competitive environments..This paper presents a novel game-theoret作者: flamboyant 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 09:01
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Twitter Follow-Unfollow Mechanism,y little work has been done to analyze the mechanism how Twitter users follow or unfollow each other. In this paper, we apply game theory to modeling the follow-unfollow mechanism on Twitter. We first present a two-player game which is based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and subsequently evaluate the p作者: 不吉祥的女人 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 10:10
Game Theoretic Analysis of a Byzantine Attacker in Vehicular Mix-Zones,n designed with authenticated communications that allows for verification of the sender. In order to enable authenticated communications without sacrificing user privacy VANET designers often employ pseudonyms, temporary identifiers that are tied to a single user. In order to maximize location priva作者: dragon 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 14:21
