標題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 8th International Co Stefan Rass,Bo An,Stefan Schauer Conference proceedings 2017 Springer Internati [打印本頁] 作者: metamorphose 時間: 2025-3-21 19:52
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學科排名
作者: airborne 時間: 2025-3-21 22:47 作者: 減少 時間: 2025-3-22 04:23
Adaptivity in Network Interdictionrding to a chosen probability distribution over the links of the network. An intruder, knowing this distribution, wants to travel from her initial location to a target node. For every traversed link she incurs a cost equal to the transit time of that link. Furthermore, if she encounters the checkpoi作者: glomeruli 時間: 2025-3-22 05:00 作者: enterprise 時間: 2025-3-22 11:53
Game-Theoretical Analysis of PLC System Performance in the Presence of Jamming Attackse PLC network try to communicate with the anchor node of the network while the jamming node attempts to degrade the system performance. The fading, attenuation and colored noise of the PLC channel with dependence on the frequency and transmission distance are taken into account. To investigate the j作者: 財政 時間: 2025-3-22 13:41
Secure Sensor Design for Cyber-Physical Systems Against Advanced Persistent Threats persistent threats that can intervene in cyber-physical systems. Such threats are designed for the very specific target systems and seeking to achieve their malicious goals in the long term while avoiding intrusion detection. Since such attacks can avoid detection mechanisms, the controller of the 作者: 財政 時間: 2025-3-22 17:33 作者: 殘暴 時間: 2025-3-22 21:11
The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities Process: An Economic Perspectivevernment possesses. There are costs and benefits to both actions: disclosing the vulnerability allows the vulnerability to be patched and systems to be made more secure, while retaining the vulnerability allows the government to conduct intelligence, offensive national security, and law enforcement 作者: indemnify 時間: 2025-3-23 03:45 作者: FLOUR 時間: 2025-3-23 06:41 作者: buoyant 時間: 2025-3-23 12:35 作者: infatuation 時間: 2025-3-23 15:23 作者: 蹣跚 時間: 2025-3-23 18:21 作者: Conquest 時間: 2025-3-23 22:58
An Ultimatum Game Model for the Evolution of Privacy in Jointly Managed Contentrences at the start of the game and willingness to concede these preferences over time. We provide simulations highlighting specific insights on global and local influence, short-term interactions and the effects of homophily on consensus.作者: 漂泊 時間: 2025-3-24 02:21 作者: 突襲 時間: 2025-3-24 09:12
A Stackelberg Game Model for Botnet Data Exfiltration Furthermore, we provide greedy heuristics to approximately compute an equilibrium of these botnet defense games. Finally, we conduct experiments based on both synthetic and real-world network topologies to demonstrate advantages of our game-theoretic solution compared to previously proposed defense作者: Maximizer 時間: 2025-3-24 13:35 作者: terazosin 時間: 2025-3-24 16:56 作者: 徹底明白 時間: 2025-3-24 21:39
Integrating Learning and Planningcheme, and (ii) maximizing the collected fine, which we show to be strongly NP-hard. We also give a paramterized bound on the worst-case ratio of the intruders best adaptive strategy to the best non-adaptive strategy, i.e., when she fixes the complete route at the start.作者: SIT 時間: 2025-3-25 02:05
Combine Deep ,-Networks with Actor-Critic under some network setup, there exists a threshold power for which the actual gameplay of the legitimate nodes does not depend upon the actions of the jamming node, and vice versa. This allows us to choose the appropriate power allocation schemes given the total power and the action of the jamming 作者: HIKE 時間: 2025-3-25 04:24
Hao Dong,Zihan Ding,Shanghang Zhang state of the system and discloses information to a controller that can have friendly or adversarial intentions. We show that sensor outputs that are memoryless and linear in the state of the system can be optimal, in the sense of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium, within the general class of 作者: 流行 時間: 2025-3-25 09:48
Anmol Jha,M. S. Abirami,Vishal Kumarrences at the start of the game and willingness to concede these preferences over time. We provide simulations highlighting specific insights on global and local influence, short-term interactions and the effects of homophily on consensus.作者: Ambulatory 時間: 2025-3-25 12:52
Mounika Addanki,Saraswathi Selvarajan be seen as a decision about timing: to determine . to disclose. In this paper, we present a model that shows how the criteria could be combined to determine the optimal time for the government to disclose a vulnerability, with the aim of providing insight into how a more formal, repeatable decision作者: 飲料 時間: 2025-3-25 16:42
Raja Bhargava,N. Arivazhagan,K. Sureshbabu Furthermore, we provide greedy heuristics to approximately compute an equilibrium of these botnet defense games. Finally, we conduct experiments based on both synthetic and real-world network topologies to demonstrate advantages of our game-theoretic solution compared to previously proposed defense作者: 軍械庫 時間: 2025-3-25 21:08
Conference proceedings 2017or security and privacy in cloud computing and for critical infrastructure; Security and privacy of wireless and mobile communications, including user location privacy; Game theory for intrusion detection; and Empirical and experimental studies with game-theoretic or optimization analysis for securi作者: Cubicle 時間: 2025-3-26 02:19 作者: 聯(lián)想記憶 時間: 2025-3-26 05:11 作者: 未完成 時間: 2025-3-26 09:41
Incentive Compatibility of Pay Per Last , Shares in Bitcoin Mining Pools deteriorate with inside-pool inequality. In pools where all players have comparable computational power incentives to deviate from protocol are minor, but gains may be considerable in pools where miner’s resources are unequal. We explore how our findings can be applied to ameliorate delay attacks by fitting real-world parameters to our model.作者: HUMP 時間: 2025-3-26 15:14 作者: exigent 時間: 2025-3-26 17:19 作者: Asparagus 時間: 2025-3-26 20:58
Efficient Rational Proofs for Space Bounded Computationss, using a new . for rational proofs which is of independent interest; (ii) we present lower bounds (i.e. conditional impossibility results) for Rational Proofs for various complexity classes..Our new protocol is the first rational proof not based on the circuit model of computation, and the first . protocols for a well-defined language class.作者: harpsichord 時間: 2025-3-27 04:31
Marieke Zeinstra-Helfrich,Albertinka J. Murkce high-risk driving behaviors and thus reduce accidents. Today, traffic police departments use simplified methods for their resource allocation (heuristics, accident hotspots, etc.). To address this potential shortcoming, in [.], we introduced a novel algorithmic solution, based on efficient optimi作者: 減少 時間: 2025-3-27 08:30 作者: 牲畜欄 時間: 2025-3-27 10:18 作者: 泥沼 時間: 2025-3-27 16:35
Challenges of Reinforcement Learning only a verifier running in sublinear-time. We extend our main result in several directions: (i) we present protocols for randomized complexity classes, using a new . for rational proofs which is of independent interest; (ii) we present lower bounds (i.e. conditional impossibility results) for Ratio作者: 旅行路線 時間: 2025-3-27 19:53 作者: 最高點 時間: 2025-3-28 01:18 作者: 星星 時間: 2025-3-28 04:54 作者: 有害 時間: 2025-3-28 10:17 作者: Oversee 時間: 2025-3-28 13:31 作者: archenemy 時間: 2025-3-28 16:46
Stefan Rass,Bo An,Stefan SchauerIncludes supplementary material: 作者: 浸軟 時間: 2025-3-28 20:58 作者: SOW 時間: 2025-3-29 02:18
