標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 14th International C Jie Fu,Tomas Kroupa,Yezekael Hayel Conference proceedings 2023 The Editor(s) (i [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: 作業(yè) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:09
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作者: 藥物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:19 作者: 蒸發(fā) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:41 作者: Blood-Vessels 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:33 作者: CANON 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:53 作者: 裙帶關(guān)系 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:00
Uday Kamath,John Liu,James Whitakerrol over multiple devices. This particular epidemic has been employed in some of the most extensive and widespread distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [.]. To take control of numerous devices, the attacker’s strategy consists of injecting malicious code from an infected device into one or m作者: 裙帶關(guān)系 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:16 作者: justify 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:36 作者: Bumptious 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:22
Zakir Hussain,Malaya Dutta Borahaluate nonconvex game dynamics. Complex adversarial security games often exhibit nonconvex behaviour such as those admitted by a Kuramoto-Sakaguchi system with Lanchester dynamics. We pose this system as a two-player, zero-sum dynamic security game, where players seek to gain a decision advantage ov作者: Aromatic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:08
Prasannavenkatesan Theerthagirid stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense strategies co-evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play toward an equilibrium. Solutions proposed in previous work prove the feasibility of this approach for small infrastructures but do not scale to realis作者: 滑動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:37
Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathy assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only network aspects but also attackers’ preferences. The allocation of honeypots in tactical networks under network mobility is of great interest. To achieve this objective, we present a game-theoretic approach that g作者: Affectation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:38
Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathystem using a formal security model: a probabilistic attack graph. By allocating fake targets/decoys, the defender aims to distract the attacker from compromising true targets. By increasing the cost of some attack actions, the defender aims to discourage the attacker from committing to certain polic作者: Fortuitous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:49 作者: Vasodilation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:32 作者: 身心疲憊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:36 作者: 樂(lè)意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:31 作者: chisel 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:49
978-3-031-50669-7The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl作者: Macronutrients 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:52
Decision and Game Theory for Security978-3-031-50670-3Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: Enthralling 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:04
Observable Perfect Equilibriumle action probabilities (not necessarily over all action probabilities that may not be observable by opposing players). Observable perfect equilibrium correctly captures the assumption that the opponent is playing as rationally as possible given mistakes that have been observed (while previous solut作者: 六個(gè)才偏離 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:24
Does Cyber-Insurance Benefit the?Insured or?the?Attacker? – A Game of?Cyber-Insurancevestment and increases the attacker’s expected payoffs. Therefore, the attacker has a motive to manipulate cyber-insurance by selective cyber-attacks on organizations up to a critical point, beyond which we discovered that imposing further threat will force organizations to invest more in cybersecur作者: hauteur 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:16 作者: 遵循的規(guī)范 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:09
Asymmetric Centrality Game Against Network Epidemic Propagatione of devices may vary due to factors such as variations in roles, information accessibility, available resources, and diverse viewpoints on risks, issues, or opportunities [.]. Consequently, the agents involved in the process may hold different views regarding the significance of devices, resulting 作者: Halfhearted 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:23 作者: Hallowed 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:44
Characterizing and?Improving the?Robustness of?Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworkst be .. We then bound the loss of decision quality in the presence of adversarial label drift to show there may exist a strict gap between the performance of the two algorithms. We verify our theoretical findings empirically in two asymmetric and two symmetric settings. These experimental results de作者: 能量守恒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:29
Scalable Learning of?Intrusion Response Through Recursive Decompositionecomposed game we introduce an algorithm called Decompositional Fictitious Self-Play (.), which learns Nash equilibria through stochastic approximation. We evaluate the learned strategies in an emulation environment where real intrusions and response actions can be executed. The results show that th作者: NEG 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:51
Honeypot Allocation for?Cyber Deception in?Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approachcost associated with deception and reconfiguration due to changes in network topology. We present an iterative algorithm to find Nash equilibrium strategies and analyze the scalability of the algorithm. Finally, we validate our approach and present numerical results based on simulations, demonstrati作者: 雀斑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:47
Optimal Resource Allocation for?Proactive Defense with?Deception in?Probabilistic Attack Graphsattackers. We show the problem against a rational attacker can be formulated as a bi-level linear program. For attackers with bounded rationality, we show that under certain assumptions, the problem can be transformed into a constrained optimization problem. We proposed an algorithm to approximately作者: 小丑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:56
The Credential is Not Enough: Deception with?Honeypots and?Fake Credentialsreferences by observing the attacker’s actions, we enrich both parties’ action spaces by allowing the attacker to query whether a server is real or honeypot and by allowing the defender to choose between honeypots that better reveal attacker behavior, or honeypots that exploit current knowledge of a作者: 越自我 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:29
Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with?Small Manipulation Cost agent that provably guarantees that the utility of any opponent would converge to a value we desire. We then use this scheme to design winning policies for our agent. We also prove that these winning policies can be found in polynomial running time. We then turn to demonstrate the efficiency of our作者: CHANT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:43 作者: Cultivate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:29
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2233-5vestment and increases the attacker’s expected payoffs. Therefore, the attacker has a motive to manipulate cyber-insurance by selective cyber-attacks on organizations up to a critical point, beyond which we discovered that imposing further threat will force organizations to invest more in cybersecur作者: Generator 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:13
Deep Learning for Biomedical Data Analysison-existence of equilibrium is not only avoided, but can be computed in polynomial time in games with two defenders. Under additional assumptions, our algorithm can be extended to games with more than two defenders and its computation scaled up in special classes of games with compactly represented 作者: 不自然 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:43 作者: Ordnance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:37 作者: Flatus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:46 作者: Bravura 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:06 作者: 鳴叫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:58
Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathycost associated with deception and reconfiguration due to changes in network topology. We present an iterative algorithm to find Nash equilibrium strategies and analyze the scalability of the algorithm. Finally, we validate our approach and present numerical results based on simulations, demonstrati作者: endoscopy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:34
Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathyattackers. We show the problem against a rational attacker can be formulated as a bi-level linear program. For attackers with bounded rationality, we show that under certain assumptions, the problem can be transformed into a constrained optimization problem. We proposed an algorithm to approximately作者: 莎草 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:38
Biswajit Biswas,Swarup Kr Ghosh,Anupam Ghoshreferences by observing the attacker’s actions, we enrich both parties’ action spaces by allowing the attacker to query whether a server is real or honeypot and by allowing the defender to choose between honeypots that better reveal attacker behavior, or honeypots that exploit current knowledge of a作者: acheon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:57 作者: expire 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:10
Observable Perfect Equilibriumtermine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed and studied for sequential imperfect-information games, the most prominent being trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium, and recently on作者: 發(fā)源 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:55
Does Cyber-Insurance Benefit the?Insured or?the?Attacker? – A Game of?Cyber-Insurance breaches. The rapid expansion of cyber-insurance in recent years hints the strong demand for cyber-insurance and its benefits. However, the impacts of cyber-insurance practice on cybersecurity enhancement and cyber-attackers are largely unknown. In this paper we study the optimal cybersecurity inve作者: 代替 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:45
Rule Enforcing Through Orderingarge number of individuals. Common practice is to give each individual a chance to suffer a smaller . and be guaranteed to avoid the legal process with probable considerably larger punishment. However, thanks to the large number of offenders and a limited capacity of the central authority, the indiv作者: Communicate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:35 作者: BUST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:35 作者: 縱欲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:46
Shades of?Grey: Strategic Bimatrix Stopping Games for?Modelling (Un)Ethical Hacking Roles an ethical to an unethical hacking role to disclose or exploit the vulnerabilities for malicious benefit. This paper focuses on the emerging topic of game-theoretical modelling of the phenomenon of grey-hat hackers. A two-player complete information bimatrix game is designed to capture the strategi作者: AWRY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:16
Characterizing and?Improving the?Robustness of?Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworksrk shows the traditional predict-then-optimize (PTO) framework can be improved by training a predictive model with respect to the optimization task through a PTO paradigm called . Little is known, however, about the performance of traditional PTO and decision-focused learning when exposed to .. We p作者: lymphedema 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 22:40
Quantisation Effects in?Adversarial Cyber-Physical Gamesaluate nonconvex game dynamics. Complex adversarial security games often exhibit nonconvex behaviour such as those admitted by a Kuramoto-Sakaguchi system with Lanchester dynamics. We pose this system as a two-player, zero-sum dynamic security game, where players seek to gain a decision advantage ov作者: 得罪 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:40
Scalable Learning of?Intrusion Response Through Recursive Decompositiond stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense strategies co-evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play toward an equilibrium. Solutions proposed in previous work prove the feasibility of this approach for small infrastructures but do not scale to realis作者: Malaise 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:58
Honeypot Allocation for?Cyber Deception in?Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only network aspects but also attackers’ preferences. The allocation of honeypots in tactical networks under network mobility is of great interest. To achieve this objective, we present a game-theoretic approach that g作者: labyrinth 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:20 作者: hypertension 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:57 作者: lavish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:08
Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with?Small Manipulation Cost in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility). Achieving this balance is typically very challenging or even impossible when explicit communication is not feasible (e.g., negotiation or bargaining are not allowed). In this paper we investigate how an agent can achi
