標題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 6th International Co MHR Khouzani,Emmanouil Panaousis,George Theodorako Conference proceedings 2015 [打印本頁] 作者: 不能平庸 時間: 2025-3-21 18:36
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網絡公開度
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網絡公開度學科排名
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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學科排名
作者: 軌道 時間: 2025-3-21 21:02 作者: FORGO 時間: 2025-3-22 02:02
Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environmentsre to better understand the timing of actions to audit, clean, or otherwise mitigate such attacks. However, to the best of our knowledge, the modern literature on games shares a common limitation: the assumption that the cost and effectiveness of the players’ actions are time-independent. In practic作者: 搖擺 時間: 2025-3-22 04:42 作者: corpus-callosum 時間: 2025-3-22 12:04
A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resourcesbilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize game theory to understand the fundamental trade-offs involved. Previous works in this direction, however, mainly focus on the single-node case without considering strict resource constraints. In this paper, a g作者: CUMB 時間: 2025-3-22 15:01
Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Gamesselects an optimal attack strategy. Applications of SSG include critical infrastructure protection and dynamic defense of computer networks. Current work focuses on centralized algorithms for computing stochastic, mixed-strategy equilibria and translating those equilibria into security policies, whi作者: CUMB 時間: 2025-3-22 20:39 作者: sperse 時間: 2025-3-22 23:43
Interdependent Security Games Under Behavioral Probability Weighting players. In contrast to much of the existing work that considers risk neutral players in such games, we investigate the impacts of behavioral probability weighting by players while making security investment decisions. This weighting captures the transformation of objective probabilities into perce作者: Medley 時間: 2025-3-23 04:09 作者: 天氣 時間: 2025-3-23 08:38 作者: noxious 時間: 2025-3-23 10:31 作者: Terminal 時間: 2025-3-23 16:49 作者: 澄清 時間: 2025-3-23 19:43 作者: nonsensical 時間: 2025-3-23 22:35 作者: Indent 時間: 2025-3-24 03:51 作者: Constant 時間: 2025-3-24 07:33 作者: 冷淡周邊 時間: 2025-3-24 11:14 作者: 肉身 時間: 2025-3-24 16:13 作者: Entreaty 時間: 2025-3-24 21:23
A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resourcesudy the Nash Equilibria of the game. We further study a sequential game where the defender first announces its strategy and the attacker then responds accordingly, and design an algorithm that finds a nearly optimal strategy for the defender to commit to.作者: inclusive 時間: 2025-3-25 02:21
Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Gamesended by any other agent. We analyze this strategy via a passivity-based approach and formulate sufficient conditions for the probability distribution of the set of defended targets to converge to a Stackelberg equilibrium. We then derive bounds on the deviation between the utility of the system pri作者: Carcinoma 時間: 2025-3-25 07:07
Making the Most of Our Regrets: Regret-Based Solutions to Handle Payoff Uncertainty and Elicitation irst contribution, this paper, for the first time, provides validation of the aforementioned adversary behavioral models based on real-world data from a wildlife park in Uganda. Our second contribution addresses situations where real-world data is not precise enough to determine exact payoffs in GSG作者: insert 時間: 2025-3-25 11:08 作者: 預兆好 時間: 2025-3-25 15:24 作者: Anecdote 時間: 2025-3-25 17:40
Conference proceedings 2015rs, and much more. Combined with our classical approach to computer and network security, and drawing from various fields such as economic, social and behavioural sciences, game and decision theory is playing a fundamental role in the development of the pillars of the "science of security"...作者: OCTO 時間: 2025-3-25 22:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33966-1de responses, as well as the case where the adversary identifies decoys via differences in protocol implementations between decoy and real nodes. Second, we formulate games with an adversary who attempts to find a real node in a network consisting of real and decoy nodes, where the time to detect wh作者: jungle 時間: 2025-3-26 03:04 作者: Cpr951 時間: 2025-3-26 07:27 作者: 個阿姨勾引你 時間: 2025-3-26 12:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42999-1ended by any other agent. We analyze this strategy via a passivity-based approach and formulate sufficient conditions for the probability distribution of the set of defended targets to converge to a Stackelberg equilibrium. We then derive bounds on the deviation between the utility of the system pri作者: SLAG 時間: 2025-3-26 13:49 作者: patriarch 時間: 2025-3-26 19:14
Xuan Tho Dang,Manh Hung Le,Nam Anh Daoly encountered problems of spam email and the security of wireless networks as examples, we demonstrate how different notions of deterrence can complement well-developed models of defence, as well as provide insights into how individuals can overcome conflicting security advice. We use dynamic games作者: EPT 時間: 2025-3-26 21:34
Bassam Haddad,Klaus-Peter Adlassnigvice, and we use the recently proposed . game to model the struggle between the defender and attacker for control of the cloud. Because attacks upon the cloud can occur without knowledge of the defender, we assume that strategies in both games are picked according to prior commitment. This framework作者: 吞下 時間: 2025-3-27 02:42
0302-9743 various fields such as economic, social and behavioural sciences, game and decision theory is playing a fundamental role in the development of the pillars of the "science of security"...978-3-319-25593-4978-3-319-25594-1Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: reception 時間: 2025-3-27 05:54 作者: 階層 時間: 2025-3-27 12:41 作者: NATTY 時間: 2025-3-27 15:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65661-4 (number of resources and the threshold) so as to ensure that it makes no sense for a rational adversary to try to attack the system. This selection is made on the basis of the relative costs of the attacker and the defender.作者: 愉快嗎 時間: 2025-3-27 18:57 作者: HILAR 時間: 2025-3-27 22:19 作者: liposuction 時間: 2025-3-28 03:26 作者: Relinquish 時間: 2025-3-28 08:12
Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Informationactly represented by attack graphs. Computing an exact Stackelberg Equilibrium using standard mixed-integer linear programming has a limited scalability in this game. We propose a set of approximate solution methods and analyze the trade-off between the computation time and the quality of the strategies calculated.作者: negligence 時間: 2025-3-28 12:18
Threshold FlipThem: When the Winner Does Not Need to Take All (number of resources and the threshold) so as to ensure that it makes no sense for a rational adversary to try to attack the system. This selection is made on the basis of the relative costs of the attacker and the defender.作者: 放氣 時間: 2025-3-28 14:46 作者: 縮減了 時間: 2025-3-28 22:42
Computational Synthesis and Creative Systemsk naturally captures a privacy-preserving mechanism through the information asymmetry between the insurer and the user in the model. We develop analytical results to characterize the optimal insurance policy and use network virus infection as a case study to demonstrate the risk-sharing mechanism in computer networks.作者: Working-Memory 時間: 2025-3-29 00:23
Mingchen Gao,Ziyue Xu,Daniel J. Mollura goal of gaining the advantages of both approaches. We present several hybrid methods that combine these techniques in different ways, and empirically evaluated the performance of these methods in a game that models a border patrolling scenario.作者: 諂媚于性 時間: 2025-3-29 06:39 作者: Admonish 時間: 2025-3-29 08:10 作者: Forehead-Lift 時間: 2025-3-29 13:42
Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networksk naturally captures a privacy-preserving mechanism through the information asymmetry between the insurer and the user in the model. We develop analytical results to characterize the optimal insurance policy and use network virus infection as a case study to demonstrate the risk-sharing mechanism in computer networks.作者: 種屬關系 時間: 2025-3-29 19:03
Combining Online Learning and Equilibrium Computation in Security Games goal of gaining the advantages of both approaches. We present several hybrid methods that combine these techniques in different ways, and empirically evaluated the performance of these methods in a game that models a border patrolling scenario.作者: JUST 時間: 2025-3-29 21:20 作者: Spinal-Tap 時間: 2025-3-30 02:30 作者: vitrectomy 時間: 2025-3-30 06:54 作者: giggle 時間: 2025-3-30 10:27 作者: 忙碌 時間: 2025-3-30 14:01 作者: Chemotherapy 時間: 2025-3-30 18:20 作者: 埋伏 時間: 2025-3-30 21:38 作者: maculated 時間: 2025-3-31 04:21 作者: Allodynia 時間: 2025-3-31 05:21
Md. Jawad Siddique,Khaled R. Ahmedbilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize game theory to understand the fundamental trade-offs involved. Previous works in this direction, however, mainly focus on the single-node case without considering strict resource constraints. In this paper, a g作者: Invertebrate 時間: 2025-3-31 11:00 作者: debris 時間: 2025-3-31 14:21
Mingchen Gao,Ziyue Xu,Daniel J. Molluraty domains. However, static equilibrium models defined based on inputs from domain experts have weaknesses; they can be inaccurate, and they do not adapt over time as the situation (and adversary) evolves. In cases where there are frequent interactions with an attacker, using learning to adapt to an作者: 免費 時間: 2025-3-31 19:13
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42999-1 players. In contrast to much of the existing work that considers risk neutral players in such games, we investigate the impacts of behavioral probability weighting by players while making security investment decisions. This weighting captures the transformation of objective probabilities into perce作者: 廣口瓶 時間: 2025-4-1 01:39
