標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011; 13th International W Bart Preneel,Tsuyoshi Takagi Conference proceedings 2011 Int [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: 筆記 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:07
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011被引頻次
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011年度引用
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011年度引用學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 柔美流暢 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:16
FPGA-Based True Random Number Generation Using Circuit Metastability with Adaptive Feedback Control flip-flops. Metastability is achieved by using precise programmable delay lines (PDL) that accurately equalize the signal arrival times to flip-flops. The PDLs are capable of adjusting signal propagation delays with resolutions higher than fractions of a pico second. In addition, a real time monito作者: SOB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:37 作者: arthroplasty 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:22 作者: 桶去微染 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:42
Higher-Order Glitches Free Implementation of the AES Using Secure Multi-party Computation Protocols is nowadays an important topic. In parallel, another class of attacks, called ., have been investigated which exploit the hardware glitches phenomena occurring during the physical execution of algorithms. We introduce in this paper a circuit model that encompasses sufficient conditions to resist gl作者: 愛(ài)了嗎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:18
Protecting AES with Shamir’s Secret Sharing Schemelock cipher implementations is masking, which randomizes the variables to be protected by combining them with one or several random values. In this paper, we propose an original masking scheme based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme?[22] as an alternative to Boolean masking. We detail its implementa作者: 愛(ài)了嗎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:38 作者: overwrought 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:41 作者: SLING 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:34
To Infinity and Beyond: Combined Attack on ECC Using Points of Low Orderult injection, these points turn into points of very low order. Using side channel information we deduce when the point at infinity occurs during the scalar multiplication, which leaks information about the secret key. In the best case, our attack breaks a simple and differential side channel analys作者: 激怒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:02 作者: Commission 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:13
Extreme Enumeration on GPU and in Clouds recently proposed lattice-based cryptosystems. We integrate several recent algorithmic improvements for solving SVP and take first place at dimension 120 in the SVP Challenge Hall of Fame. Our implementation allows us to find a short vector at dimension 114 using 8 NVIDIA video cards in less than t作者: collateral 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:55 作者: 野蠻 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:26 作者: Supplement 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:09
Information Theoretic and Security Analysis of a 65-Nanometer DDSLL AES S-Boxgainst side-channel attacks. In this paper, we complement this work by analyzing an implementation of the AES S-box, in the DDSLL dual-rail logic style, using the same 65-nanometer technology. For this purpose, we first compare the performance results of the static CMOS and dual-rail S-boxes. We sho作者: 蘆筍 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 03:10
Thwarting Higher-Order Side Channel Analysis with Additive and Multiplicative Maskingshe order, but for small orders (. 2 and 3) recent studies have demonstrated that they pose a serious threat in practice. In this context, it is today of great importance to design software countermeasures enabling to counteract higher-order side channel attacks for any arbitrary chosen order. At CHE作者: 瘋狂 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:35
Extractors against Side-Channel Attacks: Weak or Strong?eoretical interest, they have recently gained attention because of their use in the design and proof of leakage-resilient primitives, such as stream ciphers and pseudorandom functions. However, for these proofs of leakage resilience to be meaningful in practice, it is important to instantiate and im作者: 具體 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:39 作者: 安撫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:59
Meet-in-the-Middle and Impossible Differential Fault Analysis on AESd to improve the time complexity of this attack. This attack is very efficient as a single fault is injected on the third round before the end, and then it allows to recover the whole secret key in 2. in time and memory. However, since this attack, it is an open problem to know if provoking a fault 作者: Bureaucracy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:19 作者: Mechanics 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:08 作者: 徹底明白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:10
Tom Short,Tom Stehlik,Janene Piip-box is typically in the range of one order of magnitude (in terms of “number of traces to recover the key”). They also confirm the importance of a profiled information theoretic analysis for the worst-case security evaluation of leaking devices. They finally raise the important question whether dua作者: 諷刺滑稽戲劇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:45 作者: Bronchial-Tubes 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:27
Mathematical and Cryptological Background,0 faults and its complexity is around 2. in time and memory, an improvement allows only 5 faults and its complexity in memory is reduced to 2. while the second one requires either 1000 or 45 faults depending on fault model and recovers the secret key in around 2. in time and memory.作者: 友好關(guān)系 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:38
Information Theoretic and Security Analysis of a 65-Nanometer DDSLL AES S-Box-box is typically in the range of one order of magnitude (in terms of “number of traces to recover the key”). They also confirm the importance of a profiled information theoretic analysis for the worst-case security evaluation of leaking devices. They finally raise the important question whether dua作者: Affectation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:25 作者: brachial-plexus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:13
Meet-in-the-Middle and Impossible Differential Fault Analysis on AES0 faults and its complexity is around 2. in time and memory, an improvement allows only 5 faults and its complexity in memory is reduced to 2. while the second one requires either 1000 or 45 faults depending on fault model and recovers the secret key in around 2. in time and memory.作者: 大氣層 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:26
Bart Preneel,Tsuyoshi TakagiUp-to-date results.Fast-track conference proceedings.State-of-the-art research作者: Misnomer 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:38 作者: MUTE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:01
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011978-3-642-23951-9Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: NAIVE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:44 作者: 教育學(xué) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:37
Chinese Academy of Cyberspace Studiestilize them. For cryptographic use-cases, this can be very effective due to the demand for non-standard or niche operations that are not supported by general-purpose architectures. However, one disadvantage of fixed-function ISEs is inflexibility, contradicting a need for “algorithm agility.” This p作者: 油氈 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:13
Tom Short,Tom Stehlik,Janene Piip flip-flops. Metastability is achieved by using precise programmable delay lines (PDL) that accurately equalize the signal arrival times to flip-flops. The PDLs are capable of adjusting signal propagation delays with resolutions higher than fractions of a pico second. In addition, a real time monito作者: GEST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:16 作者: mucous-membrane 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:14
Tom Short,Tom Stehlik,Janene Piiphave shown that collision-correlation power analysis is able to recover the secret keys on embedded implementations. However, we noticed that the attack published last year by Moradi et al. is not efficient on correctly first-order protected implementations. We propose in this paper improvements on 作者: Dorsal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:06
To Build Smart Sensors Using MEMS is nowadays an important topic. In parallel, another class of attacks, called ., have been investigated which exploit the hardware glitches phenomena occurring during the physical execution of algorithms. We introduce in this paper a circuit model that encompasses sufficient conditions to resist gl作者: 完全 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:31
Neroli Sheldon,Michelle Wallacelock cipher implementations is masking, which randomizes the variables to be protected by combining them with one or several random values. In this paper, we propose an original masking scheme based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme?[22] as an alternative to Boolean masking. We detail its implementa作者: emission 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:42 作者: 飛行員 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:33
Tom Short,Tom Stehlik,Janene Piipnatures per second on an elliptic curve at a 2. security level. Public keys are 32 bytes, and signatures are 64 bytes. These performance figures include strong defenses against software side-channel attacks: there is no data flow from secret keys to array indices, and there is no data flow from secr作者: Affectation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:37 作者: Obstreperous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:30 作者: 公共汽車(chē) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:21 作者: genesis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:57
Mathematical and Cryptological Background,y attacks on RSA-CRT signatures: instead of targeting one of the sub-exponentiations in RSA-CRT, we inject faults into the . before CRT interpolation, which makes a number of countermeasures against Boneh?et al.’s attack ineffective..Our attacks are based on orthogonal lattice techniques and are ver作者: RALES 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:15
Neroli Sheldon,Michelle Wallacecs of a device, adversaries are able to break algorithms such as AES or Triple-DES (3DES), for which no efficient analytical or brute-force attacks exist. In this paper, we demonstrate practical, noninvasive side-channel attacks on the Mifare DESFire MF3ICD40 contactless smartcard, a 3DES-based alte作者: Rodent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:42 作者: 種族被根除 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:16
Mathematical and Cryptological Background,he order, but for small orders (. 2 and 3) recent studies have demonstrated that they pose a serious threat in practice. In this context, it is today of great importance to design software countermeasures enabling to counteract higher-order side channel attacks for any arbitrary chosen order. At CHE作者: Unsaturated-Fat 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:17 作者: discord 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:53 作者: GEN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 22:03
Mathematical and Cryptological Background,d to improve the time complexity of this attack. This attack is very efficient as a single fault is injected on the third round before the end, and then it allows to recover the whole secret key in 2. in time and memory. However, since this attack, it is an open problem to know if provoking a fault 作者: 難解 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 03:21 作者: champaign 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:03 作者: 小丑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:01
High-Speed High-Security Signaturesnatures per second on an elliptic curve at a 2. security level. Public keys are 32 bytes, and signatures are 64 bytes. These performance figures include strong defenses against software side-channel attacks: there is no data flow from secret keys to array indices, and there is no data flow from secret keys to branch conditions.作者: 不透明 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:25
0302-9743 l Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2011, held in Nara, Japan, from September 28 until October 1, 2011. The 32 papers presented together with 1 invited talk were carefully reviewed and selected from 119 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections named: FPGA作者: 游行 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 18:43
Chinese Academy of Cyberspace Studiesscalar multiplication, which leaks information about the secret key. In the best case, our attack breaks a simple and differential side channel analysis resistant implementation with input/output point validity and curve parameter checks using a single query.作者: COLON 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:57 作者: 衰老 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 04:38 作者: 合法 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 05:09 作者: 中國(guó)紀(jì)念碑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:38
Conference proceedings 2011ions. The papers are organized in topical sections named: FPGA implementation; AES; elliptic curve cryptosystems; lattices; side channel attacks; fault attacks; lightweight symmetric algorithms, PUFs; public-key cryptosystems; and hash functions.作者: JAMB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 17:24 作者: 該得 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 21:06 作者: xanthelasma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 23:02 作者: 發(fā)芽 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 04:19 作者: 芳香一點(diǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 08:19
0302-9743 implementation; AES; elliptic curve cryptosystems; lattices; side channel attacks; fault attacks; lightweight symmetric algorithms, PUFs; public-key cryptosystems; and hash functions.978-3-642-23950-2978-3-642-23951-9Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: 加花粗鄙人 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 11:04
Chinese Academy of Cyberspace Studiesusing an FPGA-based LEON3 prototype, show that this approach provides a flexible general-purpose platform for cryptographic ISEs with all known advantages of previous work, but relies on careful analysis of the associated security issues.作者: encomiast 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 16:28
Neroli Sheldon,Michelle Wallaceeme in order to compare it to Boolean masking. Our results show that for a given amount of noise the proposed scheme - implemented to the first order - provides the same security level as 3. up to 4. order boolean masking, together with a better efficiency.作者: placebo-effect 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 20:35
World Digital Government Development, ROM space because these are the operations over .(2.). In the implementation results, we show that the higher-order masking scheme using our masked S-box is about 2.54 (second-order masking) and 3.03 (third-order masking) times faster than the fastest method among the existing higher-order masking schemes of AES.
