標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Crisis, Agency, and Law in US Civil-Military Relations; Daniel Maurer Book 2017 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 Civil [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: 到來(lái) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:59
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書(shū)目名稱Crisis, Agency, and Law in US Civil-Military Relations讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱Crisis, Agency, and Law in US Civil-Military Relations讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: transdermal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:08
Wissenschaftliche Arbeit als Qualifikationmanages these strategic civilian and military elites—the Constitution, statutes, case law, regulations, or military doctrine—neatly dictates the parameters or even the norms of these relationships. This chapter surveys the primary sources of legal and bureaucratic authority for these parties, rangin作者: –FER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:07 作者: 翻布尋找 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:27
Wissenschaftliche Bildung für allet collaborative relations. From former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, to President Barack Obama, to Generals Stanley McChrystal and Martin Dempsey, and Admiral Mike Mullen, senior strategic leaders have implied that the civil-military relationship is one that closely resembles jurisprudential co作者: 無(wú)法破譯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:56
Theorizing Socio-Spatial Practices,nd the steps he took to reinvigorate their scope of responsibility. Maurer uses this anecdotally to introduce the legal, jurisprudential, meaning of Agency and its associated fiduciary-like duties, including that of candor, loyalty, confidentiality, and authority. These duties, Maurer suggests, offe作者: fructose 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:31 作者: fructose 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:20
r 6, and acknowledges that such broad variation can lead to, rather than heal, the parties’ mutual dissatisfaction. Maurer offers a novel legal device to help the parties and public guide their application of agency duties and norms. Innovatively employing a key concept about Executive Branch power 作者: graphy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:02
Wissenschaftliche Bildung für allel security or in legal practice—often work at cross-purposes, undermining the principal–agent relationship between strategic civil-military leader. Maurer summarizes two famous cases where fidelity to one’s principal (and vice versa) seemed to cramp the parallel duty of candor. Both the “Revolt of t作者: 聰明 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:51
Zusammenfassung, Kritik und Perspektiven,s a missed opportunity for establishing “quality assurance” mechanisms for those relationships. Maurer crafts a revisionary amendment to one of the sections of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, infusing it with principles of jurisprudential agency duties. As a proof-of-concept, Maurer applies this amendmen作者: palliative-care 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41976-9ized miscalculation. With the nature of this relationship fundamentally a principal–agent dynamic, and with “fingerprints” left by senior strategic civil and military leaders as evidence of that fact, Maurer concludes that common fiduciary duties of candor, loyalty, confidentiality, and scope of res作者: 無(wú)畏 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:25
Maurer points to the future of war and warfare as a source of repeated strain, tension, and frustration between strategic military and civilian policy-makers. With a creative tack, Maurer invents a fictional Socratic Dialogue to illustrate key themes of civil-military relations theory and jurisprudential agency duties作者: infelicitous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:59
Exhibit D: The Future Fallacy: A Civ-Mil Dialogue,Maurer points to the future of war and warfare as a source of repeated strain, tension, and frustration between strategic military and civilian policy-makers. With a creative tack, Maurer invents a fictional Socratic Dialogue to illustrate key themes of civil-military relations theory and jurisprudential agency duties作者: 喃喃訴苦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:40 作者: Projection 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:15
978-3-319-85174-7The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017作者: Cosmopolitan 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:23
Daniel MaurerOffers a close look at the uniqueness of civil-military relations in the US and the extent to which the follow prescribed ‘laws‘.Provides a creative approach to understanding the ‘ecology of war‘ in g作者: 預(yù)防注射 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:07 作者: 莊嚴(yán) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:53 作者: 光明正大 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:40
Crisis, Agency, and Law in US Civil-Military Relations作者: 來(lái)自于 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:30 作者: Maximize 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:56 作者: corporate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:04
The Case-In-Chief: What the Law Does (Not) Say,manages these strategic civilian and military elites—the Constitution, statutes, case law, regulations, or military doctrine—neatly dictates the parameters or even the norms of these relationships. This chapter surveys the primary sources of legal and bureaucratic authority for these parties, rangin作者: fledged 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:36 作者: BLANC 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:28 作者: DUST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:09 作者: faultfinder 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:02
Exhibit A: Scope of Responsibility and Authority,esponsibility or “freedom of maneuver.” He relies on several historical vignettes to demonstrate the varying lengths by which civilian principles “l(fā)eashed” their senior military officers. This chapter looks first to Jefferson Davis’s overbearing relationship with his generals, including Braxton Brag作者: Commonplace 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:26 作者: Cardiac-Output 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:41
Exhibit B: When Fidelity and Frankness Conflict,l security or in legal practice—often work at cross-purposes, undermining the principal–agent relationship between strategic civil-military leader. Maurer summarizes two famous cases where fidelity to one’s principal (and vice versa) seemed to cramp the parallel duty of candor. Both the “Revolt of t作者: insolence 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:12 作者: Chagrin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:25
Closing Argument,ized miscalculation. With the nature of this relationship fundamentally a principal–agent dynamic, and with “fingerprints” left by senior strategic civil and military leaders as evidence of that fact, Maurer concludes that common fiduciary duties of candor, loyalty, confidentiality, and scope of res作者: indignant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:29 作者: Tortuous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:21
Exhibit B: When Fidelity and Frankness Conflict,he Admirals” case in the wake of the Second World War and Lincoln’s use of a journalist to “spy” on General U.S. Grant during the Civil War highlight the ease by which one party can mistakenly label the other as disloyal (or risk of doing so), and the difficulty in determining when candor goes too far, or is directed at the wrong principal.作者: 六邊形 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:44
Exhibit C: Amending the Goldwater-Nichols Act,t as a diagnostic device to evaluate MacArthur’s famous “old soldiers never die” speech before a combined session of Congress and his subsequent testimony before two Senate Committees in the weeks following his relief from command.作者: Daily-Value 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:02
luctuating war-strategizing powers shared between civilian policy-maker and senior military leader. The case’s framework attempts to work out a . guide for the application of . authority between two parties that . have some degree of power, a distinct lane of responsibility, but who share a blurry division of labor in some contexts.作者: defuse 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:18
,Boundaries, or a “Poverty of Useful and Unambiguous Authority”?,luctuating war-strategizing powers shared between civilian policy-maker and senior military leader. The case’s framework attempts to work out a . guide for the application of . authority between two parties that . have some degree of power, a distinct lane of responsibility, but who share a blurry division of labor in some contexts.作者: PRE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:30
creative approach to understanding the ‘ecology of war‘ in g.This book develops a responsible and practical method for evaluating the success, failure, or “crisis” of American civil-military relations among its political and uniformed elite. The author’s premise is that currently there is no objecti作者: 假裝是我 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:13 作者: 蝕刻 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41976-9vil and military leaders as evidence of that fact, Maurer concludes that common fiduciary duties of candor, loyalty, confidentiality, and scope of responsibility from the law of agency offer meaningful, useful, and easy-to-employ tools to make that diagnosis.作者: 表主動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:30
Book 2017book tracks the “duties”—care, competence, diligence, confidentiality, scope of responsibility—and perceived shortcomings in the interactions between US civilian political authorities and their military advisors in both peacetime and in war..作者: 玩笑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:48 作者: 怕失去錢(qián) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:25
Wissenschaft und Nachhaltigkeitghlights the practical nuances that Dubik’s work brings, emphasizing the context-dependent nature of the principal–agent relationships, and stressing that the relationships’ character is partly a function of where in the bureaucracy the relationship sits.作者: liaison 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:10 作者: FRAUD 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 22:17 作者: reserve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:09 作者: 混雜人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:40 作者: MULTI 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:56
The Expert Witnesses: The Fingerprints of Agency,olicy and policy-maker once the decision has been cast, even if the expert’s advice was not followed; and the military leader’s duty to refrain from speaking beyond his or her capacity, authority, or responsibility are recurring themes.
