標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Covenants and Third-Party Creditors; Empirical and Law & Daniela Matri Book 2017 Springer International Publishing AG 2017 Covenants.Credi [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Roosevelt 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:15
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors被引頻次
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors年度引用
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors年度引用學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱Covenants and Third-Party Creditors讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: inspired 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:37 作者: magenta 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:35 作者: 單調(diào)性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:00 作者: 山間窄路 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:58 作者: COST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:31 作者: COST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:05 作者: 會(huì)犯錯(cuò)誤 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:35 作者: 天文臺(tái) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:39
Results: Covenants as a Reciprocal Private Governance Creditor Protection System will be presented and analysed. This will be followed by the presentation and subsequent discussion of potential positive externalities. Finally, the results showing the influence of third-party creditors on the bank’s conduct will be described and discussed.作者: Neutral-Spine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:07
Book 2017n the contexts of bankruptcy law, corporate law and corporate governance. The general thrust of the debate is that negative effects on third-party creditors predominate because banks act in their own self-interest..After systematising the debated potential positive and negative externalities of cove作者: 使閉塞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:50
rify the legitimacy of self-help devices and the varying vulnerability of third-party creditors in the face of potential externalities. It will begin by introducing the reason for self-help creditor protection, namely the reduction of credit risk. Afterwards, it will outline the extent to which particular creditor types can use self-help devices.作者: harpsichord 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:08
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62036-7Covenants; Creditors; Tragedy of the Commons; Externalities; Insolvency law; Externality; Credit law; Credi作者: rectocele 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:50
978-3-319-87218-6Springer International Publishing AG 2017作者: alcoholism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:19 作者: 要求比…更好 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:19 作者: Occupation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:34 作者: 自制 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:21 作者: companion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:19
The Self-Interested Behaviour of Banks and Its Legal LimitsThe collective effect of covenants and the event of default clause depends, therefore, on the bank’s conduct. This chapter will first describe the bank’s probable self-interested behaviour and, subsequently, use examples to discuss the legal restrictions of such self-interested conduct under German and US law.作者: GROWL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:56 作者: Favorable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:12
Self-Help Devices of Creditor Protectionrify the legitimacy of self-help devices and the varying vulnerability of third-party creditors in the face of potential externalities. It will begin by introducing the reason for self-help creditor protection, namely the reduction of credit risk. Afterwards, it will outline the extent to which particular creditor types can use self-help devices.作者: heckle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:59 作者: Aboveboard 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:57 作者: Ganglion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:39 作者: tariff 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:02
em of covenants. First, it will describe the concept of delegated monitoring, as this theory provides a suitable starting point for analysing potential externalities of a bank’s conduct after a covenant default. Subsequently, the potential positive externalities of providing information as well as a作者: 輕觸 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:36
e results for the covenant’s enforcement out of court will be described and discussed. Subsequently, the findings for potential negative externalities will be presented and analysed. This will be followed by the presentation and subsequent discussion of potential positive externalities. Finally, the作者: 參考書(shū)目 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:04 作者: 擦掉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:46 作者: Hyperlipidemia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:33
the standard situation for applying covenants, where a bank consortium provides a loan to a debtor company?—?Papermaker?—?and the loan agreement includes covenants. Here, the negative pledge clause allows the bank consortium to protect itself from both asset and claim dilution. However, covenants a作者: 出生 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:34
the law. They were developed in a dynamic process and will continue to be shaped by national and international regulations. For example, when regulating banks, the national regulator affects the bank’s conduct after a covenant default. Regulations may hinder the bank’s discretion after a covenant d作者: obstinate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:47 作者: 微生物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:41
http://image.papertrans.cn/c/image/239194.jpg作者: 注意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:07
shown. Afterwards, the specific potential externalities of the bilateral governance system will be presented. This part will systematise the theoretical considerations in the literature to allow for an overall assessment. It will be completed by the subsequent chapter, which will establish the gene作者: 極少 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:29
ata will be discussed. Finally, the feasibility of positive and negative externalities will be deduced. Overall, the chapter will show that the scale of positive and negative effects mainly depends on the bank’s conduct after a covenant default.作者: penance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:27
research into the effects on third-party creditors, however, has so far been insufficient. The work therefore tackled this task by first systematising potential externalities of covenants and then empirically testing the presumptions about the bank’s conduct after a covenant default. In that way, th作者: hemophilia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:20
CPR private governance structure looses its “teeth”. This will lead to a lower level of protection for all creditors as well as to a shift of control in corporate governance towards short-term stakeholders. Thus, future research in the area of bank regulation must consider its interrelationship wit作者: 爭(zhēng)論 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:53 作者: superfluous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:10 作者: left-ventricle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:50 作者: 有發(fā)明天才 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:10
Outlook CPR private governance structure looses its “teeth”. This will lead to a lower level of protection for all creditors as well as to a shift of control in corporate governance towards short-term stakeholders. Thus, future research in the area of bank regulation must consider its interrelationship wit作者: 分開(kāi)如此和諧 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:24
Book 2017d value of the debtor company’s asset pool (as CPR) exists an n-person prisoner’s dilemma between banks and third-party creditors: No creditor knows when and under what conditions the other creditor will appropriate funds from the debtor company’s asset pool. This coordination problem is traditional作者: 隨意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:38
between banks and third-party creditors: No creditor knows when and under what conditions the other creditor will appropriate funds from the debtor company’s asset pool. This coordination problem is traditional978-3-319-87218-6978-3-319-62036-7作者: Innovative 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:54 作者: Triglyceride 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:59
Covenants and Bilateral Creditor Protectionll illustrate the debtor company’s obligations and, with it, the bank’s rights and potential for influencing the debtor company. First, the common covenants will be presented according to their ability to reduce the three credit risks. Afterwards, the clauses ensuring that covenants are enforceable 作者: 領(lǐng)先 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:30 作者: SKIFF 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:44
Potential Externalities of the Bilateral Governance Systemem of covenants. First, it will describe the concept of delegated monitoring, as this theory provides a suitable starting point for analysing potential externalities of a bank’s conduct after a covenant default. Subsequently, the potential positive externalities of providing information as well as a作者: faddish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:42
Results: Covenants as a Reciprocal Private Governance Creditor Protection Systeme results for the covenant’s enforcement out of court will be described and discussed. Subsequently, the findings for potential negative externalities will be presented and analysed. This will be followed by the presentation and subsequent discussion of potential positive externalities. Finally, the作者: POLYP 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:09 作者: 溫和女孩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:58 作者: Crayon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 03:24 作者: 易改變 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:03 作者: 抵消 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:16
