派博傳思國際中心

標題: Titlebook: Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya; Roger C. Arditti Book 2019 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 201 [打印本頁]

作者: Flexibility    時間: 2025-3-21 19:18
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作者: 殺子女者    時間: 2025-3-21 21:54
The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019
作者: Mundane    時間: 2025-3-22 03:40
Modifizierter Stakeholder-Value-Ansatzion to the key “stale-mate” and “continuity” interpretations of how the counter-insurgency campaign evolved. It then considers how historians have previously assessed the role of intelligence within the Emergency, which revolves predominantly around Special Branch. The chapter then defines the vario
作者: harbinger    時間: 2025-3-22 07:00

作者: 冷淡周邊    時間: 2025-3-22 11:08
Modifizierter Stakeholder-Value-Ansatzence apparatus in the region. At its centre, at least in terms of Malaya, was the newly created Malayan Security Service. The next level was Security Intelligence Far East, the Security Service’s regional clearing house. Finally strategic assessment and oversight was provided by the Joint Intelligen
作者: 存在主義    時間: 2025-3-22 16:12
Modifizierter Stakeholder-Value-Ansatzittee (Far East) in the period between April 1946 and June 1948. Britain’s new post-war intelligence apparatus in the Far East appeared conceptually sound but required time to “bed-in”—for remits to be defined, working practices established and personal relations forged. This, however, never happene
作者: 存在主義    時間: 2025-3-22 17:52

作者: 泥沼    時間: 2025-3-23 00:22
,Modellgesetze und ?hnlichkeitsregeln,ntelligence to find and apprehend their insurgent foes. It traces the various operational developments designed to increase the flow of intelligence about the insurgents, including the Ferret Force, the Civil Liaison Corps, aerial surveillance, photographic intelligence, deportation, resettlement, f
作者: Fraudulent    時間: 2025-3-23 05:11

作者: 符合規(guī)定    時間: 2025-3-23 08:37
Konstruktiver Aufbau von Windkraftanlagen,ured insurgents, human intelligence from agents and sources, visual and photographic intelligence. All these streams of intelligence coordination if they were to be used profitably. This chapter traces the difficult process of moving from the infirm post-war organisational structures to creating an
作者: REIGN    時間: 2025-3-23 12:29

作者: abnegate    時間: 2025-3-23 15:14
Roger C. ArdittiFirst book to examine the full range of counterinsurgency intelligence during the Malayan Emergency.Maps the breadth of the intelligence apparatus in existence at the start of the Emergency and how th
作者: 人工制品    時間: 2025-3-23 20:22
Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary Worldhttp://image.papertrans.cn/c/image/239110.jpg
作者: FORGO    時間: 2025-3-24 01:42
Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya978-3-030-16695-3Series ISSN 2731-6807 Series E-ISSN 2731-6815
作者: FOR    時間: 2025-3-24 02:52

作者: nocturia    時間: 2025-3-24 09:26

作者: 憤怒歷史    時間: 2025-3-24 12:59

作者: 貴族    時間: 2025-3-24 16:14
Modifizierter Stakeholder-Value-Ansatzommittee (Far East), Security Intelligence Far East, the Malayan Security Service, and various forms of military intelligence. Finally, the chapter outlines the thesis of the book: that the development of an effective counter-insurgency intelligence was far more complicated, broad, and uncertain than previously acknowledged.
作者: 辯論的終結    時間: 2025-3-24 22:24
Modifizierter Stakeholder-Value-Ansatzcedent created in the Second World War. However, the foundations provided by South East Asia Command proved infirm and not capable of withstanding the many pressures and demands generated in region in the immediate post-war period.
作者: 疾馳    時間: 2025-3-25 00:51
Modifizierter Stakeholder-Value-Ansatzint Intelligence Committee (Far East) were able to provide any moderating influence. As a result, on the eve of the declaration of Emergency in Malaya, Britain’s intelligence apparatus in the Far East was fractured and dysfunctional. The impact on forthcoming counterinsurgency campaign would be far-reaching.
作者: 項目    時間: 2025-3-25 06:27
,Modellgesetze und ?hnlichkeitsregeln,t posed by the insurgents was a function of the intelligence being provided by Special Branch. Other forms of intelligence and the various tactical initiatives were worthy, but as long as this human intelligence from Special was limited, the paramilitary forces would struggle to restore law and order.
作者: cumber    時間: 2025-3-25 11:09
Richtlinien und Nachweisverfahren,on. The switch to a more consensual model of policing in 1952 heralded the start of a more effective approach to generating intelligence but this took time to implement and even longer for this is to translate into more efficient counterinsurgency operations.
作者: Limousine    時間: 2025-3-25 14:12
Konstruktiver Aufbau von Windkraftanlagen,ess of creating an intelligence suitable for counterinsurgency operations was fraught with difficult and false starts, and it was not until just prior to Malayan independence that the apparatus matured and became effective.
作者: 行為    時間: 2025-3-25 19:19
Introduction,ommittee (Far East), Security Intelligence Far East, the Malayan Security Service, and various forms of military intelligence. Finally, the chapter outlines the thesis of the book: that the development of an effective counter-insurgency intelligence was far more complicated, broad, and uncertain than previously acknowledged.
作者: 史前    時間: 2025-3-25 20:26

作者: Abbreviate    時間: 2025-3-26 03:42
Organisational Conflict,int Intelligence Committee (Far East) were able to provide any moderating influence. As a result, on the eve of the declaration of Emergency in Malaya, Britain’s intelligence apparatus in the Far East was fractured and dysfunctional. The impact on forthcoming counterinsurgency campaign would be far-reaching.
作者: 不發(fā)音    時間: 2025-3-26 06:50
Paramilitary Intelligence,t posed by the insurgents was a function of the intelligence being provided by Special Branch. Other forms of intelligence and the various tactical initiatives were worthy, but as long as this human intelligence from Special was limited, the paramilitary forces would struggle to restore law and order.
作者: Landlocked    時間: 2025-3-26 09:04
Policing and Human Intelligence,on. The switch to a more consensual model of policing in 1952 heralded the start of a more effective approach to generating intelligence but this took time to implement and even longer for this is to translate into more efficient counterinsurgency operations.
作者: 草率女    時間: 2025-3-26 15:07

作者: 粗語    時間: 2025-3-26 17:29
Book 2019 the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), the Malayan Security Service, Special Branch and wider police service, and military intelligence, to examine how British and Malayan authorities tackled the insurgent challenge posed by the Malayan Communist Party. This study assesses the nature of the i
作者: 憎惡    時間: 2025-3-26 23:05
2731-6807 aratus in existence at the start of the Emergency and how thThis book examines the full range of counterinsurgency intelligence during the Malayan Emergency. It explores the involvement of the Security Service, the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), the Malayan Security Service, Special Branch
作者: Tincture    時間: 2025-3-27 04:42

作者: 裝勇敢地做    時間: 2025-3-27 08:21
Intelligence Prior to the Declaration of Emergency, a credible existential threat, both in terms of capability and intent. This was reported to the Malayan government on a regular basis but, largely due to the organisational infighting that was taking place, this was ignored. The declaration of a state of Emergency was not a failure of intelligence. It was a failure to listen.
作者: EVICT    時間: 2025-3-27 12:10

作者: 發(fā)誓放棄    時間: 2025-3-27 17:05
Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya
作者: 捏造    時間: 2025-3-27 19:10

作者: 生意行為    時間: 2025-3-28 01:43
2731-6807 ya. Once astate of emergency had been declared, officials struggled to find the right combination of methods, strategy and management structures to eliminate the threat posed by the Communist insurgents. This b978-3-030-16695-3Series ISSN 2731-6807 Series E-ISSN 2731-6815
作者: 草本植物    時間: 2025-3-28 04:10

作者: 殘廢的火焰    時間: 2025-3-28 07:26

作者: PARA    時間: 2025-3-28 12:22
Creating a New Intelligence Apparatus in the Far East,ence apparatus in the region. At its centre, at least in terms of Malaya, was the newly created Malayan Security Service. The next level was Security Intelligence Far East, the Security Service’s regional clearing house. Finally strategic assessment and oversight was provided by the Joint Intelligen
作者: REP    時間: 2025-3-28 14:37
Organisational Conflict,ittee (Far East) in the period between April 1946 and June 1948. Britain’s new post-war intelligence apparatus in the Far East appeared conceptually sound but required time to “bed-in”—for remits to be defined, working practices established and personal relations forged. This, however, never happene
作者: Ornithologist    時間: 2025-3-28 21:14

作者: Haphazard    時間: 2025-3-29 00:00
Paramilitary Intelligence,ntelligence to find and apprehend their insurgent foes. It traces the various operational developments designed to increase the flow of intelligence about the insurgents, including the Ferret Force, the Civil Liaison Corps, aerial surveillance, photographic intelligence, deportation, resettlement, f
作者: GLIB    時間: 2025-3-29 06:34
Policing and Human Intelligence,ecuring human intelligence (humint) which would then direct their paramilitary colleagues in their efforts to locate the insurgents. This, however, provided highly problematic. This was because the government’s strategy in the first four years of the emergency served only to alienate the country’s C
作者: 語言學    時間: 2025-3-29 10:32
Organising Intelligence,ured insurgents, human intelligence from agents and sources, visual and photographic intelligence. All these streams of intelligence coordination if they were to be used profitably. This chapter traces the difficult process of moving from the infirm post-war organisational structures to creating an
作者: 極小    時間: 2025-3-29 14:35





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